

Ghadr Movement: Original Documents — Soldiers' Revolts (Vol. IV)

Malwinder Jit Singh Waraich
Harish Jain

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Contents

I. REVOLTS
- 1) 23rd Cavalry: Lahore 9
- 2) 130th Baluchis: Rangoon 51
- 3) 5th Native Light Infantry Revolt: Singapore 78
- 4) 12th Cavalry Meerut — March 1915 107

II. RANDOM ATTEMPTS

A) POLITICAL
- 1) Hav. Harnam Singh 129
- 2) Two Sowars of 8th Cavalry 137
- 3) 7th Rajputs: *Ghadrites* (Benares Conspiracy Case):
  - (i) Drill Havildar Jaleshwar Singh: hanged 142
  - (ii) Rikhraj Singh 143
- 4) Revolt in 113th Infantry: *Ghadrites* 144
- 5) Burma Military Police: A Havildar found with revolutionary literature and dynamite 145

B) MISC.
- 1) 58th Rifles: 21 soldiers serving in France, deserted 146
- 2) Revolt in 15th Lancers: 6 Sowars refused to go to war front 148
- 3) 59th Rajput Rifles: 6 sepoys found inciting revolt 148
- 4) 127th Baluchis Light Infantry: A Jemadar refuses to go to war front 149
- 5) 17th Cavalry: Two sowars desert 150
- 6) 27th Punjabis: 4 soldiers desert 151

III. COUNTER MEASURES
- 1) Property Confiscation — March 1916 152
- 2) Preserving Troops' Loyalty — January 1920 154
- 3) Tabulated Statement of attempts to tamper with Indian Troops' Loyalty — 1920-21 162
- 4) Tampering with Indian Troops' Loyalty — Dec. 1922 .. 164

IV. POSTSCRIPT

An Irish Martyr on Indian Soil 174

I. REVOLTS

1) 23rd Cavalry: Lahore

Statement of *Bhai* Mool Singh, son of Gian Singh, caste Sikh, resident of village Bhasin, Police Station Manawan, District Lahore, *Granthi,* 23rd Cavalry.

I have been working as a Granthi of 23rd Cavalry for the last 23 years and my father and grandfather also held the same post. Of my two sons, Sadhu Singh is aged about 19. When the regiment was stationed at Quetta, I went away to my home, leaving Ganda Singh, my cousin, in my place. It was on the 4th January 1914, after a lapse of 2 years, that I rejoined the regiment at Lahore Cantonment, relieving Ganda Singh. Having spent most of my time in the regiment, I am on familiar terms with the greater part of the men and particularly Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh (Vill. Chuslewar) of troop VII. Lance Daffadar Ganda Singh and Sowar Budh Singh of troop I are on very intimate terms with me. Of these Ganda Singh is my pupil, having, learnt *Gurmukhi,* from me.

Previously, Lanchman Singh had no religious bent of mind. It was at Kohat, where the regiment was stationed before its transfer to Quetta that his association with me resulted in a change in him. Consequently he used to attend prayers at the *Gurdwara* regularly and was appointed secretary of the Military *Singh Sabha* at Kohat. The regiment then came on transfer to Quetta, where it remained stationed for three years. It was here that Lachhman Singh began to move in the various *Singh Sabhas* and had an opportunity to mix with the Sikh lecturers, who frequented this place from the Punjab. This led to his entertaining ideas inculcated by the *Bhasaur Sabhas* (in Malwa), the principles of which are more liberal than the orthodox doctrine of *Sikhism.* He used to have frequent talks with me about the principle of this *Sabha* and on a couple of occasions, when he went on leave to his home, he visited *Bhasaur* and discussed religious matters with Bhai Teja Singh, the founder of the Sabha at *Bhasaur.* In those days, Lachhman Singh also succeeded in winning

over Lance-Daffadar Ganda Singh of troop I, Naik Buta Singh and Daffadar Subha Singh of troop VII, Sowars Shehan Singh, Badan Singh, Jawahar Singh of troop III and some others, whose names I have since forgotten, to his religious views. When I rejoined the regiment at Lahore, I found him still holding the same liberal religious views.

The unsuccessful voyage of Gurdit Singh's Ship to Canada and the Budge Budge affair was the main cause which operated to excite the minds of the Sikhs in general against the British Government. I often went about in villages and heard the views of the people, which were certainly not of a desirable nature. The men of the regiment, who went on leave, to their villages, returned disaffected, and a similar effect was caused through letters received by these men from their relations and friends abroad. Besides these influences, the news of the movement among returned emigrants and their practical work reached the men freely, inflaming their minds.

About the time of Dewali, Sowar Reservist Sucha Singh of troop VII, now in Lahore Jail, in the course of conversation spoke about the *Ghadr* movement among the returned emigrants. He said that, while he was on leave he had heard that the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar while on tour had delivered lectures to the villagers asking them not to pay any attention to the doings of the emigrants.

Some days afterwards, Lance-Daffadar Lachhman Singh, who used to visit me at the *Dharamsala* frequently, told me that *the 17th of November would remain for ever a memorable day in the history of India*. He spoke these words to me just as he was leaving the *Gurdwara* and, on my asking him what he meant he promised to tell me later. It was two or three days before the 17th of November that he spoke these words. I did not attach any importance to it then. A day after the expiry of this date I asked him again about it. He told me that the 17th November was the date fixed for the assembly of a large number of returned emigrants and others for creating a *Ghadr* but, owing to the absence of certain prime movers, the gathering was postponed to the 23rd of November to take place at a spot on the banks of the river Beas near villages Karmowala and Ruriwala, where thousands of men were going to collect. Lachhman Singh also told me that he was in constant touch with certain persons of the *Ghadr* party who kept him well informed about the movement, I did not take this matter as seriously as he did, and he went away promising to inform me of further developments.

On the following day, when I was passing through the lines, Naik

Buta Singh (Vill. Kasel) and Lance-Daffadar Lachhman Singh of troop VII met me. Buta Singh told me that as he had to participate in the proposed gathering to be held on 23rd November, he had sent away his family to his village, and he suggested my doing the same if I was prepared to accompany them. I laughed at the idea, upon which Lachhman Singh told Buta Singh that the *Granthi* had no belief in what they said. Having no further conversation with them, I went my way as I considered the matter to be futile. I did not hear anything further about it for some days as they did not meet me, and I have an idea that Lachhman Singh went somewhere on a few days' leave.

Some days later, my wife went to call on the wife of Rasaldar Basawa Singh of troop-I who was away on leave that day. At about 10 P.M. I went to the Rasaldar's quarter to fetch my wife back. Gurdit Singh, Lance-Daffadar, son of Rasaldar Basawa Singh, of troop-I, now on active service, informed me that my wife had gone with his mother to see the wife of Sowar Tara Singh of troop-I, who is related to the Rasaldar. I then went to Tara Singh's quarters, but was told by some one, probably Tara Singh's neighbour, that Tara Singh was in the quarters of the division opposite and where at the time a lamp was burning. I then went towards, the place indicated and saw an assembly of *about thirty or thirty-five men collected near a tree in front of Ganda Singh's quarters*. Troop-I was much below its full strength at the time. I went as far as a bullock cart which was lying on the mud at a short distance from the assembly and shouted out for Tara Singh. On hearing my voice, Lance-Daffadar Ganda Singh, Naik (now Daffadar) Wadhawa Singh of *Ruriwala,* Sowars Natha Singh and Budh Singh of Dhotian came up to me and I remember that Abdulla, farrier, also came along with them. Budh Singh told me that Sowar Reservist Sucha Singh had deserted, and that they were all ready to mutiny and to leave for *Jhar Sahib* (a Sikh *Gurdwara* in Police Station Tarn Taran, District Amritsar) at once as they were to join the *Ghadr* party there. I did not notice whether the horses were saddled up. Thinking about the folly of the action in which the men were about to plunge and realizing that such a small body of men could not succeed against the Government, I warned them of the consequences of their action and asked them to ponder upon their numbers, and enquired whether they had any fort in which to take protection. Thus explaining to them their real position and enjoining them not to enter into such a suicidal enterprise, I advised them to wait until the country was at their back, and pressed them to return to their quarters.

My words had the desired effect. Wadhawa Singh, followed by others who were standing by me, went towards the assembled men and spoke something to them and they all dispersed to their quarters. In the meantime, Tara Singh came up to me from the gathering, but I had no talk with him. At my request he went inside his house and sent my wife out and I returned with her to my quarters. The next morning, the 28th November 1914, Rasaldar Basawa Singh returned from leave and I called upon him at 11AM. I told Wasawa Singh that had I not come on the assembly the previous night by chance, the whole of his troop would have deserted. The Rasaldar replied that he knew everything already. I am on an intimate terms with him. On the following day when I was bathing near the Rasaldar's house, I heard Ganda Singh telling Daffadar Lachhman Singh of troop-I that the Rasaldar had taken away the cash, etc., from him. Lachhman Singh is a near relation of Basawa Singh, Rasaldar, as his son is married to the niece of Lachhman Singh. It was on this or the following day that Budh Singh met me in the lines of his troop and said that, if I had not prevented the proposed rising, 1 should have seen how they would have committed the *wadh* (massacre). He explained the meaning of the word *(wadh)* by waving his hand in the way a sword is used. Shortly afterwards Abdulla met me near the *Gurdwara* when I was standing there alone, and he also remarked that, had I not interfered on that night, I should have seen what would have happened. A week or so before our departure for Nowgong, the men who were told off for active service in the Persian Gulf, raised a subscription for entertaining themselves and others with drinks of *sardai* (Almond shake). Some fifty or sixty men were sitting at the time on a (*thara*) platform of the *Gurdwara* and Budh Singh, who along with Samma Singh, Sowar of troop-III of village *Warana,* Sowars Shehan Singh of Sangat Pura Jawahar Singh of village Hadali and Mal Singh of Dhotian of troop-III, was grinding the *sardai* (Almond shake)*,* said that if I (Bhaiji) had not interfered on that night, everyone would have seen the result and he waved his hand again, as he did before to explain his meaning.

Sucha Singh

That night I had only been told of the desertion of Sucha Singh (of village Chola Sahib, facing trial in supplementary LCC) but the next morning I came to know that Surain Singh and Maharaj Singh, Sowars of troop-VII, had also deserted along with him. I learned this from Sowar Jit Singh of troop-VII at the Gurdwara. Here I also heard from Sowar

Mal Singh of troop-III that Sowar Chanan Singh of troop-III had also deserted that night. No report regarding Chanan Singh's desertion was officially made and Rasaidar Sher Singh hushed the matter up in order to save his troop from a bad name. This sowar, after deserting, returned to the regiment, but I do not know the particulars.

Two or three days after the night of the proposed rising, I happened to be present at the place where Colonel Sherer, Commanding the regiment, and Rasaidar Sher Singh were talking together. The Commanding Officer remarked that it would have been better for the deserters, Sucha Singh, etc., had they rejoined the regiment of their own free will, instead of their being arrested by the police. The Commanding Officer also spoke to me and asked me to advise the men not to follow the course taken by Sucha Singh, etc.

On the following day Lachhman Singh, who had returned from leave, came with Indar Singh, Sowar of troop-VII, at about noon to see me. They told me that Rasaldar Hassam-ud-din with two troops of Dogras and *Pathans* were deputed to move towards Patti in connection with the arrest of men of the *Ghadr* party, and he asked me to send my son, Sadhu Singh, to the *Mahant* of *Jhar Sahib Gurdwara,* with a message to be conveyed by the *Mahant* to one Nihal Singh about his taking steps to attack the above-mentioned troops with a view to taking possession of their arms. I forget now the name of the *Mahant* and the place of residence of Nihal Singh, which I was told at the time. Nihal Singh's village was said to be close to the *Jhar Sahib Gurdwara.* Lachhman said that the *Mahant* was to be told that the message was from Lachhman Singh, his co-villager. He also said that Sucha Singh and the other deserters who would be found there should also be informed of the message. Nihal Singh was stated to be in league with the *Ghadr* party men. I declined to entrust this mission to my son but offered my own services. Lachhman Singh gave me Rs. 2 to cover my expenses. I left accordingly by the afternoon train the same day and, arriving at *Jandoki* Railway Station in the evening, proceeded to village *Sakhera,* where I put up at a *Gurdwara* managed by an old Sadhu. The Sadhu looked after my meals and comforts. On his enquiring I told him that I was going to the *Jhar Sahib Gurdwara.* Early next morning I started from the place and reached the *Jhar Sahib Gurdwara* at about sunrise. This *Gurdwara* is situated in the jungle surrounded by villages at some distance. The *Mahant,* who is young man of 25, slim built, fair complexion and of short stature, was bathing at the well at the time. Just then two Sikh boys

of about 16 or 17 also arrived and began to bathe at the well. The *Mahant,* after finishing his bath, came up and sat with me. On my enquiring whether he was the *Mahant* of the *Gurdwara* and belonged to Lance-Daffadar Lachhman Singh's village, he replied in the affirmative. I asked him where Sucha Singh, etc., were. Before giving me a reply he satisfied himself as to my *bona fides,* and on my assurance on that point he told me that the deserters. Sowars Sucha Singh, Maharaj Singh and Surain Singh, had been arrested by the police outside the *Gurdwara* on the previous day. I then communicated to him Lachhman Singh's message, on which he replied that Nihal Singh had also been arrested and conveyed to Lahore. On hearing this, I did not stop there any longer and starting on my return journey, I took train at 11 A.M. at Jandoke Railway Station and arrived at Lahore Cantonment the same evening. I told Lachhman Singh what had happened the same night when he came to me to enquire the result of my visit.

Some days after this, on my return to Lahore Cantonment by the 9 P.M. train after a few hours visit to Lahore, I found two horses tied up under a *beri* tree outside the *Gurdwara* with grass in front of them. I went inside and found three men lying on the carpet in the *Gurdwara* room. Either Sadhu Singh, my son, or Gurdev Singh, my nephew, was asleep in the same room at that time. After the usual exchange of salutations, with one of the three strangers, I asked him who they were and whence had come. The man told me that he was a descendant of **Bhai Bidhi Chand of Sur Singh village**, and had come there to see the Sikhs of the regiment, as he always went about in the Majha Sikh villages to collect charity. I told him that no one could put up there without permission. On which he said that Lance-Daffadar Lachhman Singh had brought them there, and that they would depart after a few hours. After talking with him for about half an hour on religious matters, I fell asleep at the same place. None of his comrades spoke at this time. I woke at about 3-30 A.M. and fearing lest their presence might leak out, I awoke them and they left the *Gurdwara* with their horses. At their request I accompanied them for a short distance to point out to them the way leading to the tomb of Saint *Mianmir*. The same day, at about 1 P.M., Lachhman Singh, while passing by the *Gurdwara,* asked me whether I would accompany him to the Guru Mangat Gurdwara, and I told him that I would soon follow him. The Guru Mangat Gurdwara was managed by a Sikh Sadhu who had no son, and I had often visited him to prevail upon him to adopt Sadhu Singh as his son to succeed him. About a

quarter of an hour later I followed Lachhman Singh to the *Gurdwara,* but at first I could not find him there. This place is mostly frequented by the military men of the Cantonment, and I found about 25 such men, mostly reservists of other regiments, bathing and preparing *sardai*. I noticed Lachhman Singh seated with some others on the roof of the building belonging to the Jainis, situated adjacent to the *Gurdwara*. I went up and found the following persons there:—

(1) The Mahant descendant of **Bidhi Chand of Sur Singh village**. *Description.* — Dark complexion; tall, stout built; aged 35 or 36; beard about three inches long; wore patties and a coat; was well dressed.

(2) A Sikh companion Bidhi Chand
Wheat complexion; medium stature; age about 40 or 45 years; wearing rustic clothes and had hair on chin only.

(3) Another Sikh companion Bidhi Chand
Wheat complexion; tall, stout build and heavier than the others; beard about 3 inches long; wore dirty rustic clothes, and was a returned emigrant as I gathered from his conversation later on.

Note– Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were the same men who had stopped at the Regimental *Gurdwara* on the preceding night.

(4) Lance-Daffadar Lachhman Singh of troop-VII.

(5) Lance-Daffadar Ganda Singh of troop-I.

(6) Sowar Budh Singh of troop-I.

(7) A Sowar of troop-I, name not known, but whom I can identify.

(8) A Sowar, of whom I have no recollection now.

I went up and sat with them. At the time No. 3 was narrating his experiences abroad. He said that he with others visited the *Gurdwara* at Hong Kong, where the *Granthi* helped them in every way and sheltered them for 10 days without disclosing their names. He praised the *Granthi* and remarked that he rendered pecuniary help by collecting subscriptions for the needy. In spite of orders, he did not enter the names of the visitors in the *Gurdwara* register. He then spoke about Canada and said that **Bhai Bhagwan Singh**[*] had paid a visit to that place and delivered a lecture against the drink evil to the Sikh audience, with the result that the Indians gave up drink altogether. This led to the stoppage of the sale of liquor in the European shops and the Government, finding that it was due to the influence of Bhagwan Singh, deported him from the country. Bhagwan

* Succeeded Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna as President of Ghadr Party.

Singh, he added, then went to Japan, where he disguised himself by shaving his beard and cutting his hair and went on to America. After finishing-this talk, he (No. 3) recited a *Punjabee poem* which I forget. The purport of this was that the Indians were not serving their motherland. He also said that whenever they were short of funds they should go and wait in a certain garden in Lahore, where, they could get the money wanted from a Lahore Secret Committee the members of which were never seen. After this no. 2 addressed Lachhman Singh and his companions and asked them to supply them with arms remarking that, had they been in possession of arms, they would have murdered Sardar **Arur Singh**, Manager of the Amritsar Golden temple*, and collected lots of money and arms by raiding the tehsils and police stations. Lachhman Singh enquired in what way he could supply arms. No. 2 replied that he would bring the men and they of the regiment should provide the arms. Here I interrupted them, saying that, if the regimental men gave away their arms what would they do for themselves and asked Lachhman Singh and his companions to say how they would save themselves. No. 2 proposed that they should desert from the regiment and join them. I then asked them what their strength was. No. 2 replied that he alone *could collect at least two thousand men in a day*. He added that, on a previous occasion, they had collected, an assembly on banks of the Beas river, but the work could not be taken in hand owing to the non appearance of a few men. He added that a similar assembly, collected to *Jhar Sahib Gurdwara*. But here too the same thing happened. Budh Singh proposed that they should come with men and make a raid on the regiment for arms, and that the regimental party (Budh Singh, etc.) would render assistance. On this, I made a sarcastic remark saying that they should come and get these regimental men to go on pension. Leaving them there, I then went to Guru Mangat Gurdwara where I partook of *Sardai*. I then went out and was joined by Lachhaman Singh with No.2 at the gate. No. 2 addressed me saying "Oh *Granthi* Sikh, you should take the lead 'in this matter and give every possible assistance. You have spoiled the whole game once already and persuaded the Sowars to unsaddle their horses at a time when they were ready for action." I replied that I had not made the men unsaddle the horses and was ready to go along with them wherever they wished. On this I stepped forward and went on and joined No. 1 who was walking in front. No.3 remained behind. The other companions of

* Much later in 1919 after Jallianwala massacre he presented *Siropa* to Gen. Dyer, at the Holy Takht.

Lachhman Singh had dispersed at the *Jaini* building. No. 1 told me that the returned emigrants from Canada had given them great trouble in that they had wandered about long distances and their horses even were reduced to skeletons, but nothing had resulted. He also said that they would change their horses at *Guru Sar Satlani*. While we were thus conversing, Lachhman Singh with no. 2, who had been following behind in consultation, joined us. At this stage, no 2 told Lachhman Singh that he should send a man with him, to whom he could point out the place, where the information regarding future arrangements could be obtained, I offered to go myself with them to see the place, on which Lachhman Singh remarked that he wanted to keep me aloof. From this conversation it was clear that nos. 1 to 3 and Lachhman Singh, etc., had settled some plans among themselves for further action in pursuit of the *Ghadr* movement, and that Lachhman Singh, etc., were to arrange among the men of the regiment and to inform them of the date fixed for action. Lachhman Singh and I returned to the regimental lines and I saw the other party going past the Guru Mangat village. I did not see their horses, and on my asking where they had tied them up, no. 2 enquired how I could expect them to take me into their confidence when on my part I was reticent. On the way I pointed out to Lachhman Singh the worthlessness of these men saying that, while they chattered of collecting two thousand men in a day, they could not provide themselves with 10 arms which even a single dacoit could collect alone. Lachhman Singh replied that whatever they would think it over well beforehand. At this stage I recited the following couplet to him "*Shatabi bowad Kar i Aharmanan*" (Hasty works are those of Satan). Lachhman Singh replied that he had in his power one way of testing the worth of the men and he promised to let me know it later on.

After a week or so, Lachhman Singh told me that the above noted persons had told him that a *Nihang* Sikh, named Jewand Singh, Sadhu, of Thatta, Police Station Sirhali, District Amritsar, and Bhai Kehar Singh of Burj Rai, Police Station Sirhali, who had an *arhti* shop at the Patti market, were in league with them. Lachhman Singh said that, hearing this, he had interviewed Jewand Singh, who had told him that he had come into the clutches of these very men, who on the occasion of the gathering at the Beas river, had shown themselves to be mere drunkards (*Sharabi and Kababi*), and that he and his men have separated themselves from them. Lachhman Singh then said that his confidence in these three men had also been shaken.

One day, some time afterwards when I was seated on the wall of the regimental Gurdwara, **Farrier Abdulla** turned up and started a conversation about the war between the English and the Turks. He told me that the Turks had taken possession of Tabrez from the Germans, and as far as it was in his power, he would also go on doing damage to the English. I asked him what he could do? He said that he had cut one or two telegraph wires between Kot Lakhpat and Lahore Cantonment.

During January or February last Sowar Tara Singh, Troop-I, showed me a letter in *Gurmukhi,* which had been sent to him by one of his relatives in China. I read the letter, in which the writer said that the 'Germans had invented 21-inch guns. They were so heavy that one-third portion of them had to be carried by an engine. The writer regretted that they were in India, and he was in China, and he wished that the position could have been just the reverse, *viz.,* he were in India and they in China. He told me that he had shown this letter to several others. I mentioned this fact to Resaldar Bhagat Singh.

I was away on leave in my village from the 10th of Magh to 20th of Besakh when Sadhu Singh worked in my place. However, I used to visit the regimental Gurdwara frequently stopping at times for four or five days. I was at my village when, on 2nd of Besakh, Sadhu Singh, my son, came to the village, and told me about the arrival of **Prem Singh** at the Gurdwara and his putting up with Wasawa Singh and Puran Singh. He also mentioned that Prem Singh had a revolver out of order, which he, at Prem Singh's request, had taken to *Mistri* Mohamad Jan for repairs, but the *Mistri* had declined to repair it. He did not give me any further details. I reprimanded him and advised him not to associate with such men. A week or so after this, when I was seated at a well in the Gurdwara of my village in the morning, a stranger, who gave his name as Prem Singh of village Sur Singh came and sat by my side. He asked me if I was Mool Singh, and on my replying in the affirmative he enquired if I was in Lahore on the previous day. I told him that I had gone to Lahore. He then asked me if I had heard anything about it from the *Shalamar* bomb explosion, to which I replied that I heard about the *tamtamwalas* and that a police Head Constable and a Constable were injured. Prem Singh replied that the bomb explosion did not result in much damage as it had dropped into water. He added that the affair was the work of the party at Lahore and was not the work of his party. I asked him if he knew how to make bombs, to which he replied that he had 'taught bomb-making to Abdulla and Wasawa Singh in the regiment and said that Abdulla was a

strong man (*Tagra admi*). Later on Hakim Singh, Surain Singh, and another Sikh whose name I do not know, probably Surain Singh, brother of one Hira Singh, owners of Wan Walla well, along with a Sikh of patti Manjh, whose name I do not know, but I can identify, who belong to my village, came from the village to see Prem Singh. These are all returned emigrants. They went inside the room of the *Gurdwara* along with Prem Singh, and I also went there. In my presence Prem Singh told them that they should come to the place where he would send for them. I did not enquire details about this. I had gone into the room of the *Gurdwara* to say prayers, after which I had again come out and seated myself on the well with Hakim Singh, who had also come out of the room with me. I asked Hakim Singh why he associated with such people. He said, that he did his best to evade such men but could not prevent them coming to him. He asked me to send Prem Singh away after serving him with food. I may be wrong, but I think, that as Prem Singh had arrived at the well early in the morning, he may have stayed the night at the village, either with Hakim Singh or with some of the others. Those four villagers then went away leaving Prem Singh there, who also left shortly afterwards after taking his meals.

On my return to the regiment after the expiry of my leave, Lance-Daffadar Wasawa Singh met me at the *Gurdwara* in the evening. I spoke to him about Prem Singh and asked him if he had really learned to make bombs from Prem Singh, Wasawa Singh replied that Prem Singh personally did not know anything, but they had learned to manufacture dynamite. Wasawa Singh added that there was some defect in the dynamite. 1 advised him not to mix with such men.

After this, the regiment was transferred to Nowgong and I went along with it leaving my son, Sadhu Singh, at the village. He is still there.

The men of the regiment had confidence in me and therefore talked to me freely whether it was right or wrong, as I was not in the habit of disclosing things told to me.

On the night when I happened to arrive just in time to dissuade the men from committing mischief, 1 noted that all the men were fully attired in *Mufti* (not in uniform), but as I did not go near the assembly, I am not in a position to give the names of all those who had assembled there.

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BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 23RD CAVALRY CASE.

For the last three or four years the notorious seditionist **Hardyal*** has been propagating sedition and rebellion amongst His Majesty's Indian subjects in America and Canada against His Majesty the King-Emperor and the Government of India; and Hardyal with other seditionists founded a society (generally known as the *Ghadr* party) for the purposes of a conspiracy which had for its object the overthrow by force of the Government established by law in British India. Funds were collected for the purposes of this conspiracy and especially for circulating the *Ghadr* paper and other seditious literature.

2. This conspiracy continued during the years 1912 and 1913, and from time to time prior to August 1914 various members of the conspiracy returned to the Punjab. Owing, however, to the outbreak of war in August 1914 the conspirators considered that the time was most favourable for a rebellion in India; and the case of the British Indians who went to Canada in the ss. **Komagata Maru** with Gurdit Singh was also made the occasion of fresh activity by these seditionists.

3. In addition to the passengers of the *Komagata Maru* who returned to India on the 20th September 1914, large numbers of the conspirators left America and Canada after the outbreak of war in pursuance of the conspiracy to raise a rebellion in India; and the conspiracy was actively continued on board the various ships on which the conspirators returned. During the summer and early autumn of 1914 a vigorous campaign for securing recruits to the *"Ghadr* party*"* was inaugurated and maintained at Shanghai and other ports and places on the route from America to India where British Indians were resident. Emissaries of the society broke their journey at these places and by means of inflammatory lectures induced large numbers of British Indians to join the conspiracy, to resign their posts and to return to India for the rebellion. At these lectures Indians were exhorted to return to their homes and expel the British from India; to tamper with the loyalty of the Indian Army and the people in their villages; to commit dacoities for the purpose of collecting funds; and generally to prepare the people and as many Indian regiments as possible for a rising against the British Government.

* First General Secretary, upto March

4. On arrival in India during the autumn of 1914 and the winter of 1914-15 the vast majority of these conspirators, being Sikhs, proceeded to the Punjab of which they were residents, and those that were not interned continued the conspiracy with the common object of waging war on His Majesty the King-Emperor, of overthrowing the Government established by law, and of establishing a system of self-government. The means to be adopted to attain these objects were, *inter alia,* the following:—

(1) The seduction of Indian soldiers from their allegiance to their King, and to cause them to mutiny and join in the rebellion and to furnish arms and munitions.

(2) The collection of arms, men and munitions and also money for the purchase of arms and munitions.

(3) The obtaining of money for the same purpose by means of forcing and robbing Government treasuries and by dacoities which necessarily involved murders.

(4) The obtaining of explosive bombs and the manufacture of the same for the purpose of murders.

(5) The murder of all Europeans, officials and others, who interfered with the carrying out of the conspiracy.

(6) The sudden attack on and killing of all His Majesty's European troops.

(7) The production and circulation of seditious literature, the delivery of seditious speeches and exhortations to rebel.

5. Lahore and Amritsar being leading Sikh districts, large numbers of the conspirators returned to their homes in this tract, and consequently the Lahore-Amritsar neighbourhood became a centre of the revolutionary campaign; and in pursuance of the objects mentioned above efforts were made by leading conspirators to seduce the Indian soldiers of the 23rd Cavalry, stationed at Lahore Cantonments, and to cause them to join the *"Ghadr* party."

6. The magnitude and dangerous character of the conspiracy is apparent from the evidence given in the well-known *Lahore conspiracy case* in which some eighty leading members of the revolutionary party are now standing their trial.

Among those conspirators who made efforts to seduce the Indian soldiers of the 23rd Cavalry, and whose exertions met with some success, are the following approvers and accused in the Lahore conspiracy case:-

Amar Singh; Mula Singh; Nidhan Singh; Harnam Singh of Kahuta;

Prem Singh of Sur Singh; Madan Singh; Naurang Singh; Lal Singh of Bhure; and Sajjan Singh of Narangwal.

7. Further, in pursuance of the objects of the conspiracy, a returned emigrant, named **Balwant Singh**, actually enlisted in the regiment in December 1914, on his return from Shanghai, and carried on the work of the society within the regiment, while at the same time keeping in constant touch with leading conspirators outside. The first indication that we have, however, of attempts on the part of returned emigrants to seduce soldiers of the 23rd Cavalry, is about the end of October 1914, a month and-a-half before the enlistment of Balwant Singh; indeed the evidence in this case will show that the "*Ghadr* party" was actively at work within the regiment before Balwant Singh's enlistment, though it will also prove that he was enlisted for the express purpose of furthering the objects of the conspiracy.*

* The facts stated in this note up to the end of this paragraph will be proved by the evidence of Balwant Singh, Banta Singh, Puran Singh, and Wasawa Singh.

8. At the end of October Sowar Sucha Singh, troop VII, went home on a few day's leave and came back with the news that a large number of emigrants, who had returned from America, intended to raid Lahore and capture Lahore fort, and that they were in need of assistance from the regiment.

Accused – Indar Singh VII; Lance Daffadar Lachman Singh
Witnesses – Surain Singh and Ganda Singh

9. **Sowar Indar Singh**, troop VII, overheard Sucha Singh telling **Lance-Daffadar Singh** all about the *Ghadr* movement and he decided to consult Maharaj Singh and Surain Singh, Sowars of his own troop. Both Maharaj Singh and Surain Singh expressed their willingness to support the *Ghadr* cause. The same evening at about 7 P.M**., Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh** convened a meeting to discuss the matter at his quarters. The following men of troop VII attended:- **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh**•; Sowar Kesar Singh••; Sowar Sucha Singh•••; Sowar Maharaj Singh; Sowar Surain Singh, and Sowar Indar

• First meeting in Lance-Daffadar lachman Singh's quarters. Accused- Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh and Indar Singh (VII). Witness – Surain Singh.

•• Kesar Singh, Sowar No.1604 of troop VII, on active service in France, resident of Chak 62 in Lyallpur.

••• Maharaj Singh. Sowars of troop VII, tried and convicted by Court Martial for desertion.

Singh. Sucha Singh opened proceedings by saying that while on leave *Wasakha Singh of village Dudhir and Sucha Singh of village Chola*, had told him that a large number of emigrants, who had returned from America, intended to create a revolution. He added that these emigrants, who had guns, pistols and bombs in their possession and knew how to manufacture bombs, would assemble in the Lahore *rakh* on November 15th in order to attack Lahore and capture the fort, but that they first wished to enlist the sympathy of the Sowars in the regiment who would be in a position to assist them with arms and men. After some discussion **Lance-Daffadar Lachman** Singh decided to consult Lance-Daffadar Ganda Singh, troop I, before coming to a definite decision as to the line of action to be taken.

10. Two days afterwards, **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh** called a meeting* at the cemetery near the regimental lines at about 2-30 P.M. the following men attended:-

* First meeting at the cemetery. Witness –Ganda Singh and Surain Singh.
Accused –Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh VII and Lance-Daffadar Nand Singh I.

(1) **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh of troop VII.**
(2) Sowar Lachman Singh,** of troop VII.
(3) Sowar Surain Singh of troop VII.
(4) Reservist Sucha Singh of troop VII.
(5) Lance-Daffadar Ganda Singh of troop I.
(6) **Lance-Daffadar Nand Singh of troop I.**

** Sowar, of Shahbazpur, Amritsar in active service in France

Indar Singh (VII) was not able to attend as he had to go to the signaling class. Sucha Singh repeated his story, and said that the members of the *Ghadr* party were anxious to know the geography of the Lahore fort before attacking it. **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh** replied that he would explain everything to an accredited agent of the party. It was then decided to get into closer touch with the revolutionaries and Ganda Singh, who was about to proceed on a few day's leave, was directed to interview the returned emigrant, Sunder Singh, with a view to co-operation between the cavalry and the *Ghadr* party.

11. A few days afterwards on Ganda Singh's return, a secret meeting• was held at the cemetery at 1 P.M. which was attended by the following :–

• Second meeting at the cemetery.
Witness – Surain Singh.
Accused – Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh, and Indar Singh VII.

Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh, troop VII.
Sowar Lachman Singh, troop VII.
Sucha Singh, troop VII.
Maharaj Singh, troop VII.
Indar Singh, troop VII.
Surain Singh, troop VII.
Kesar Singh, troop VII.

Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh informed the meeting that Ganda Singh had returned from leave and had brought back information from the *Ghadr* party that one of their agents would pay the regiment a visit very shortly and discuss all details of the proposed rising.

12. Sucha Singh* visited his village again and returned with the news that the date of the rising had been changed from the 15th to the 17th November. Ganda Singh was informed of this change of date.

* Witness – Ganda Singh and Surain Singh.

13. Shortly afterwards the promised agent of the *Ghadr* party visited the lines in the person of Prem Singh of Sur Singh, one of the leading members of the revolutionary party, and now an absconding accused in the Lahore Conspiracy case. Prem Singh stayed in the quarters of **Sowar Channan Singh of troop III**; and about 8 P.M. that evening **Lachman Singh** was joined in his quarters by Sowars Lachman Singh, Sucha Singh, Maharaj Singh, Kesar Singh, Surain Singh and **Naik Buta Singh, VII**. Surain Singh was sent to bring Prem Singh from **Channan Singh's** quarters. He returned with Prem Singh and was then dispatched to summon Ganda Singh• and **Wadhawa Singh** of troop I, both of whom joined the meeting. **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh** then introduced Prem Singh, after which Prem Singh informed the assembly that the revolutionaries would assemble that very night at Jhar *Sahib*, and that some of the party would come on to Lahore by the night train while others would go to Tarn Taran. He intended to join the latter party and asked **Lachman Singh** to go to the station and meet the Lahore party. He also asked for a sword•• and

Second meeting in Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh's quarters. Prem Singh's first visit.
Witness – Surain Singh, Ganda Singh.
Accused: (1) Lance Daffadar Lachman Singh.
(2) Sowar Channan Singh III.
(3) Naik Buta Singh, VII
(4) Wadhawa Singh I.

• Witness

•• Since recovered from Natha Singh of Sur Singh. Witness – Natha

by **Lance-Daffadars Lachman Singh's** orders Maharaj Singh brought a sword from troop VII and gave it to Prem Singh. The meeting then broke up and Prem Singh left for Jhar *Sahib*. Lachman Singh and Sucha Singh went to the station to meet the revolutionries, but the party did not turn up.

14. About the 13th of November Ganda Singh told **Abdulla,** farrier (who mailed shoes to the horses — Ed.), of troop I and **Budh Singh I** all about Prem Singh's visit and the revolutionary movement and both these men expressed their whole-hearted sympathy and desire to co-operate; and this enlistment of **Abdulla** and **Budh Singh** marks the first stage in the growth of a strong "*Ghadr"* party in troop I under the leadership of Sowar **Budh Singh.**

Accused –(1) Abdulla, farrier, troop I.
(2) Budh Singh (I).
Witness – Ganda Singh.

15. About this time Prem Singh of Sur Singh, accompanied by an unknown* companion, again visited the lines and met Ganda Singh and **Budh Singh** at the former's quarters. After eating their food they adjourned to the quarters of **Sowar Bishen Singh (I)** where they were joined by **Bishen Singh** himself, **Abdulla, Kehar Singh (I)** and **Natha Singh (I)**. Prem Singh informed the gathering that the night of the 23rd -24th had been fixed for the rising, and that an attack would be made on the 24th on Ferozepore. He added that he had come on behalf of the revolutionaries to collect as many men of the regiment as were prepared to participate in the attack. **Lachman Singh** was sent for and consulted and expressed the opinion that the regiment should not join the rising until the *Ghadr* party actually appeared in the lines and made an attack. His advice was followed and the visitors left about midnight.

* Now known to be Kala Singh sentenced to death in the Amritsar bridge case. Prem Singh's second visit and m eeting in Sowar Bishen Singh's quarters.
Accused –
(1) Budh Singh, (2) Sowar Bishen Singh, (3) Abdulla, (4) Kehar Singh, (5) Natha Singh, (6) Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh.
Witness – Ganda Singh.

16. About the same date Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh convened a meeting• at rifle range at about 7 P.M. This meeting was attended by the following men of troops I and VII:—

• First meeting at rifle range.
Accused – (1) Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh, (2) Indar Singh (VII), (3) Indar Singh (I), (4) Nand Singh (I), (5) Wadhawa Singh (I).
Witness – Ganda Singh. Surain Singh

Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh,
Sowar Lachman Singh,
Sowar Sucha Singh,
Sowar Maharaj Singh,
Sowar Indar Singh,
Sowar Kesar Singh,
Sowar Surain Singh,
} troop VII

Lance-Daffadar Ganda Singh,
Sowar Indar Singh (of Jeobala),
Lance-Naik Nand Singh,
Lance-Daffadar Wadhawa Singh,
troop I.

It was announced at this meeting by **Lachman Singh** that the date of the *Ghadr* had again been changed from the 17th to the 23rd November. The revolutionaries were to assemble at Jhar Sahib and split up into two parties — one of which was to March on Lahore and the other on Ferozepore. Sucha Singh and Surain Singh undertook to collect reliable information of intended movements when visiting their homes. **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh** urged upon all those present the necessity of winning the sympathy of more of their comrades.

17. About the same date Mool Singh*, *Granthi*, met **Naik Buta Singh** and **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh** in the lines. Buta Singh told the *Granthi* that as he had to participate in the proposed gathering on November, the 23rd, he had sent away his family to his village and suggested that Mool Singh would be well advised to do the same.

* Witness-Mool Singh, *Granthi*.
Accused–1 Buta Singh (VII). 2 Lachman Singh (VII).

• Second meeting at the Rifle Range:—
Witness – Surain Singh.
Accused – (1) Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh, (2) Indar Singh (VII), (3) Wadhawa Singh (I), (4) Nand Singh (I), (5) Indar Singh (I), (6) Channan Singh (III),
Witness – Surain Singh.

About the 21st-22nd the following men again• assembled at the rifle range at 7 P.M. to discuss the winning over of their comrades to the *Ghadr* cause:–

1 **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh**
2 Sowar Lachman Singh
3 Indar Singh
4 Maharaj Singh
5 Kesar Singh
6 Surain Singh
troop VII.

7 **Lance-Daffadar Wadhawa Singh**
8 Lance-Naik Nand Singh I.
9 Sowar Indar Singh I.

Indar Singh (VII) said that, amongst others, Sowar Channan Singh (III) had joined the *Ghadr* movement. All present promised to exert themselves and win over as many of their comrades as they could.

18. About the 23rd Sucha Singh returned from leave and informed **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh,** Ganda Singh and Surain Singh that the date of the rising had been again changed and had been finally fixed for November, the 27th. About 1-30 P.M. **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh**, Sowars Indar Singh (VII), Sucha Singh, Lachman Singh, Maharaj Singh, Surain Singh, and Kesar Singh met at the cemetery* to discuss the change of date. Sucha Singh informed the meeting of the new date for the mutiny, which he had learnt from Wasakha Singh of Dudhir and Sunder Singh of Chola, and said that he was prepared to desert at once and join the revolutionary party. **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh**, however, advised those present to be patient and not to do anything rash until a suitable opportunity for revolting presented itself. He added that he was shortly going on two day's leave and would bring back really reliable information. At the same time Ganda Singh consulted his own friends, **Abdulla** and **Budh** Singh, and they all came to the conclusion that it was quite impossible to act on the unsupported statement of Sucha Singh. **Abdulla** and **Budh** Singh suggested that they should wait until the arrival of an accredited agent from the *Ghadr* party with definite instructions; and Ganda Singh said that **Lachman Singh** would himself bring back news on his return from leave.

Accused – Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh.
Witness – Ganda Singh and Surain Singh

* Third meeting at the cemetery
Accused – (1) **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh,**
(2) Indar Singh (VII)
Witness – Surain Singh.

Accused – (1) Abdulla.
(2) Budh Singh
Witness – Ganda Singh

19. On the afternoon of the same day Sowar Surain Singh ran up against **Lance-Naik Buta Singh (VII)** in the lines. In the course of the conversation that followed **Buta Singh** informed Surain Singh that the *Ghadr* would take place on the 27th November 1914.

Accused – Buta Singh
Witness – Ganda Singh

20. On the 26th November **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh**, Sowars Indar Singh, Sucha Singh, Maharaj Singh, Lachman Singh and Surain Singh assembled at the cemetery* at 1-30 P.M. and had a discussion as to whether they should go to Jhar Sahib in their horses or on foot. It was decided to go mounted.

* Fourth meeting at the cemetery.
Accused – (1) Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh, (2) Indar Singh (VII).
Witness – Surain Singh.

21. As Surain Singh had made up his mind to desert and join the revolutionaries he asked Sucha Singh to help him dispose of his belongings. Sucha Singh accordingly made over Surain Singh's things to Kalu, Tum-Tum-walla, a co-villager who lives in the Top-Khana Bazar, Lahore Cantonment.

Witness – Kalu, Risaldar Chagat Singh.

22. At about 7 P.M. on the 26th November **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh,** Sowars Maharaj Singh, Surain Singh, Sucha Singh, Lachman Singh, **Indar Singh (VII)**, **Lance-Naik Nand Singh**, and **Lance-Daffadar Wadhawa Singh** assembled at the rifle range• to decide whether they should desert and rise in rebellion that night or join the revolutionaries at Jhar Sahib next day. They eventually decided to desert that night. After roll-call, however, **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh** instructed Surain Singh not to desert that night but to wait till the next morning when they would get definite information of the rising having commenced; and in accordance with these instructions none of the sowars deserted on the night of the 26th November. No news of the proposed rising was received on the 27th November and **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh** proceeded on two day's leave about noon with a promise to Surain Singh•• that he would return with definite information about the *Ghadr*.

• Third meeting at Rifle Range.
Accused – (1) Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh, (2) Indar Singh (VII), (3) Nand Singh, (4) Wadhawa Singh.
Witness – Surain Singh.

•• Witness

23. As *Ganda Singh*¶ expected to receive instrutions from the *Ghadr* party at any moment he removed all the cash (about 6 or 7 hundred rupees) from the military cash box at about noon (27th November) and placed it in his own quarters with the intention of making away with it in the event of the rising taking place. He was

¶ Witness Ganda Singh corroborated in this point by Rissladar Wasawa Singh

able to do this as Rissaldar Wasawa Singh, who was on leave, had left him the keys.

24. On the afternoon of the 27th November Sucha Singh persuaded Sowars Maharaj Singh and Surain Singh to desert, and it was arranged to meet that night at a canal bridge in the Patti road about a mile from the lines. **Indar Singh (VII)** told Surain Singh*; to take Sowar **Channan Singh of Troop III** along with him, as he also was prepared to desert and join the revolutionaries. Accordingly Surain Singh and Channan Singh deserted with their swords and haversacks and left the lines for the arranged rendezvous at about 10 P.M. night. They were joined later at the canal bridge by Maharaj Singh and Sucha Singh, the latter being the last to arrive. The four deserters then left for Jhar Sahib.

* Witness to prove these facts accused Indar Singh (VII) and Channan Singh (III).

25. In the meantime, on the evening of the 27th November, Sucha Singh had informed Ganda Singh that he intended to desert and join the *Ghadr* party at the Jhar Sahib rendezvous, and that the following men were also prepared to desert with him:—

1 Sowar Surain Singh
2 Sowar Maharaj Singh
3 Sowar Indar Singh
4 Sowar Lachman Singh

troop VII.

Ganda Singh replied that he must first consult his friends and take their advise and with this object he convened a meeting• in his quarters at 10 P.M. that night. The following men attended:—

1 Abdulla, farrier
2 Budh Singh
3 Natha Singh
4 Kehar Singh
5 Bishen Singh
6 Bhagat Singh
7 Mota Singh

troop I••

• Meeting in Ganda Singh's quarters on night of 27th November.
Witness – Ganda Singh and Mool Singh, *Granthi*.

•• Accused

26. Ganda Singh placed the facts of the case before the meeting and asked for a decision as to whether they should desert or not. **Budh Singh** addressed the meeting in an excited manner and called

upon those present to saddle up and move off to join the conspirators without further consultation and delay; but, in spite of **Budh Singh's** exhortations a difference of opinion prevailed, some being in favour of deseting at once, and others of waiting until the *Ghadr* party appeared in the lines. The final decision was still hanging in the balance when the voice of the regimental *Granthi*, Mool Singh*, was heard outside and **Budh Singh, Abdulla,** and **Natha Singh,** followed by Ganda Singh, went out to consult him. The Granthi pointed out that such a small body of men could not possibly succeed against the Government, and he advised them to wait until they were confident that the country was at their back. His advice had the desired effect and the men dispersed to their quarters. In addition to the seven ringleaders mentioned above as present inside Ganda Singh's quarters, **Tara Singh** and Wadhawa Singh, with a dozen or more other Sowars, were waiting outside to hear the decision of the meeting.

* Mool Singh and Ganda Singh, witnesses.

Accused – Tara Singh (I), Wadhawa Singh (I).
Witnesses – Mool Singh, Ganda Singh.

27. In accordance with the *Granthi's* advice Ganda Singh, **Abdulla,** and **Budh Singh** decided to try and prevent Sucha Singh and his friends from deseting; but in spite of their efforts (as we have already seen) Sucha Singh, Maharaj Singh, Surain Singh and **Channan Singh (III)** deserted that night.

28. The four deserters reached Tarn Taran on the evening of the 28th November, but could not find any signs of the revolutionary party or of any rising having taken place. Here Channan Singh left his companions and proceeded to his village with a promise that he would join them again at Jhar Sahib next moring; he returned to the regiment instead, however, and his desertion was not reported. Sucha Singh, Maharaj Singh and Surain Singh spent the 29th and 30th November in a fruitless search for the *Ghadr* party in the neighbourhood of Sirhali and Jhar Sahib, and at the latter place they met Prem Singh of Sur Singh and other revolutionaries, similarly employed. On the 1st December these three deserters were arrested by the Civil Police close to Jhar Sahib and were afterwards tried by Court Martial for desertion and convicted.

29. About the 29th November **Lachman Singh, Lance-Daffadar**, returned from leave and told* Ganda Singh that in future no active steps were to be taken unless some trusted member of the *Ghadr* party were sent to them. The same day Rissaldar Wasawa Singh** took away the keys of the cash chest from Ganda Singh and the keys of the rifle rack from **Budh Singh.** About the same time **Abdulla** and **Budh Singh** met the *Granthi**** and upbraided him for interfering on the night of the 27th November.

* Ganda Singh will give evidence.
** Rissaldar Wasawa Singh will give evidence.
*** will give evidence.

30. About the 30th November **Lachman Singh (Lance-Daffadar)** accompanied by sowar **Indar Singh (VII),** went to the Granthi Mool Singh• and informed him that Rissaldar Hissam-ud-din with two troops of Dogras and Pathans had been deputed to move towards Patti in connection with the arrest of men of the *Ghadr* party. Lachman Singh asked the *Granthi* to send his son, Sadhu Singh, to the Mahant of the Jhar Sahib Gurdwara with a message to be conveyed by the Mahant to one Nihal Singh about his taking steps to attack the troops and take possession of their arms. Lachman Singh also wished the message to be conveyed to Sucha Singh and the other deserters who had gone off to join forces with the *Ghadr* party in that direction. The Granthi took the message himself, but learnt on arrival at Jhar Sahib that he was too late, the police having arrested the deserters and Nihal Singh on the previous day. The *Granthi* returned and told Lachman Singh what had happened.

• Mool Singh, witness, here.

31. After roll-call about the 1st-2nd December. Abdulla went to Ganda Singh's quarters and proposed doing some mischief to the British by cutting telegraph¶ wires. Ganda Singh agreed to this proposal and asked Abdulla to make the necessary arrangements. On the following night (the 2nd-3rd December) **Abdulla, Budh Singh, Bhagat Singh** and **Mota Singh** again went to Ganda Singh and informed him that they were just off to cut telegraph wires, Ganda Singh

¶ The cutting of two telegraph wires and breaking of 21 insulators.
Ganda Singh's evidence will be corroborated by that of an official of the Telegraph Department who will testify to the fact that two wires were cut and 21 insulators broken on the night of the 2nd-3rd December.
Accused – (1) Abdulla, (2) Budh Singh, (3) Bhagat Singh, (4) Mita Singh.
The police Special Report of the offences can also be put in as evidence and proved.
L.L TOMMINS.

was not able to accompany them as he was busy with the pay accounts of his Troop. The next day, however, **Abdulla** informed him that they had broken a large number of insulators and had cut the two telegraph wires on the Railway line between Lahore Cantonment and Kot Lakhpat.

32. At 3 P.M. about 6th -7th December three strangers* visited the regimental *Gurdwara*. They were met by Ganda Singh and Sowar Jit Singh and Risaldar Chaggat Singh would not allow them to stay at the regimental *Gurdwara* it was decided to meet on the following day at the Guru Mangat *Gurdwara* and talk over matters. The same evening, however, after roll-call Ganda Singh and **Buta Singh**** had a long confidential talk with the strangers under the trees near the regimental *Gurdwara*.

* These three strangers have since been found to be —
(1) Natha Singh of Sur Singh, (2) Lal Singh of Bhure,
(3) Sunder Singh of Wadali Guru.
No.2 is under trial in the Lahore conspiracy case and (1) and (2) have been found to be prominent revolutionaries.

** Sadhu Singh will give evidence on this point and has identified the three strangers.

33. About the afternoon of the 7th–8th December the strangers were met at the Guru• Mangat Gurdwara by **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh, Budh Singh**, Ganda Singh, and the Granthi Mool Singh. The strangers asked for arms, but **Lachman Singh** said it would be difficult to supply them as the arms and ammunition were kept under lock and key. **Budh Singh** then said that although it was difficult to obtain arms, they would be quite prepared to assist them if they would collect some six or seven hundred men and make an attack in the regimental lines,. It was then decided that in the event of such attack being made parties would be required to be told off for the following purposes:—

(1) The murder of the Sirdars. (Junior Commissioned Officers — Ed.)
(2) The murder of the British Officers.
(3) Breaking open the rifle racks.
(4) Breaking open the magazine and overpowering the quarter guard.
(5) A strong party to combat those of the regiment who remained loyal and sided with the British.

• Guru Mangat Gurdwara meeting: Ganda Singh and Mool Singh, witnessess.
Accused – (1) Lachman Singh (2) Budh Singh

The strangers also spoke about the gathering at Jhar Sahib on November the 27th•• which the men of the regiment were to have joined. They said that between fifty and sixty men of the *Ghadr* party had assembled and started off with the intention of raiding the Sirhali police station and seizing the rifles, but owing to a difference of opinion amongst the members the plan was given up and the party dispersed. One of the strangers, who gave his name as Lal Singh•••, and who is now under trial in the Lahore conspiracy case, upbraided to Granthi for having made the Sowars unsaddle their horses when they were ready for action on the night of the 27th November.

•• Note: A party of conspirators collected and set out to plunder the Moga Treasury on this night. They were met and stopped by Bisharat Ali, Sub- inspector, and Jawala Singh, Zaildar, both of whom were murdered by the conspirators

••• Lal Singh, son of Mihan Singh, of Bhure, Police Station Tarn Taran, Amritsar, accused in the Lahore conspiracy case.]

34. We now come to the enlistment in the regiment of the two returned emigrants, Banta Singh¶ and Balwant Singh. Banta Singh had been working as watchman in Shanghai for about ten years. In the early autumn of 1914 he, like many others, came under the influence of the *Ghadr* party and he was persuaded to join the cause and returned to India for the rising by the inflammatory lectures of Nidhan Singh¶¶ and Mula Singh¶¶¶, both of whom America. Banta Singh sailed from Shanghai on October 30th, 1914, in the ss. *Asuta Maru* with Mula Singh and a large party of revolutionaries. During the voyage plans of campaign were discussed, *Ghadr* pamphlets read out, and seditious lectures delivered. Banta Singh on arrival at his home in the Amritsar district learnt that returned emigrants were being arrested by the police; so he proceeded to Lahore Cantonments to see his brother, Kishen Singh, a Lance-Daffadar in the 23rd Cavalry, who persuaded him to enlist, which he did on December the 14th and attached to troop I.

¶ Banta Singh, son of Gujar Singh, caste Jat, of Roriwallas, police station Sirhali, Amritsar.

¶¶ Nidhan Singh of Chugga, Ferozepore, under trial in Lahore conspiracy case.

¶¶¶ Mula Singh of Khairon, the approver in the Lahore conspiracy case.

35. Balwant Singh* had also been working as a watchman in Shanghai for about three years, where he became acquainted with Mula Singh and Nidhan

* Balwant Singh, son of Indar Singh, Jat, of Barar, Police Station Lopoki, District Amritsar.

** Harnam Singh, alias Arjan Singh of Kahutta, absconder in the Lahore conspiracy case.
*** Vir Singh, of Gurusar, Ferozepore.
• Hari Singh of Kukkar, Lopoki.

Witnesses: (1) Balwant Singh, (2) Puran Singh,

Singh, who were afterwards implicated in the Lahore conspiracy case, and who left for America shortly after his arrival in Shanghai. In the autumn Harnam Singh** and Vir Singh***, emissaries of Gurdit Singh, arrived from Japan, went about among the Punjabis and delivered lectures at the Gurdwara detailing the miseries and troubles to which the passengers of the *Komagata Maru* had been subjected by the Canadian Government and exhorting all Indians to return home, raise a revolution, and expel the English out of India. Influenced by these men and by the inflammatory lectures of Bhai Nidhan Singh, who had just returned from America with Mula Singh, Balwant Singh joined the movement and sailed with Nidhan Singh and Hari Singh•. and a party of 50 or 60 other revolutionaries for India. Throughout the voyage Nidhan Singh, Harnam Singh, and Vir Singh delivered inflammatory lectures in which the passengers were told to commit dacoities for the purpose of collecting funds, to tamper with the loyalty of the Indian Army and to prepare the people generally for a rising against the British Government. Every Sikh took an oath to be true to the cause and funds were collected to defray the expenses of the society. Balwant Singh eventually arrived at Amritsar in company with other revolutionaries. Here he spent some days in the company of Mula Singh, Banta Singh and other returned emigrants and then moved on to Lahore Cantonment to see his brother, Lance-Daffadar Puran Singh of the 23rd Cavalry. He gave his brother full particulars of the movement and Puran Singh passed them in to his intimate friend Lance-Daffadar Wasawa Singh, also of troop III. Both Puran Singh and Wasawa Singh agreed to join the movement and to work for the society and they concurred with Balwant Singh that the best thing would be for him to enlist as he would then be in a unique position to further the objects of the conspiracy by regiment. Balwant Singh, therefore, enlisted on the 18th December and was attached to troop III.

36. Balwant Singh soon discovered that **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh** held views which were opposed to Government and these two used to meet frequently and talk over the revolutionary movement. Lachman Singh was careful not to take Balwant Singh fully

Accused – Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh.
Witness – Balwant Singh.

into his confidence in the beginning, but afterwards, as they became more intimate, he freely admitted his complicity with the *Ghadr* party, and on one occasion briefly related the story of the unsuccessful attempt at meeting on the 27th November, Lachman Singh also introduced Balwant Singh to Madan Singh* carpenter, Lahore Cantonment, a leading member of the *Ghadr* party and now under trial in the Lahore conspiracy case. **Lachman Singh** praised Madan Singh highly as a man who was imbued with correct views; and later he informed Balwant Singh in confidence that 50 or 60 sowars were prepared to join him and take up arms against the British Government.

* Madan Singh, Tarkhan, of Gaga; police station Barki, district Lahore, under trial in Lahore conspiracy case.

37. Balwant Singh kept in constant touch with Mula Singh and other leading revolutionaries by paying short visits to Amritsar; and Harnam Singh, Amar Singh** and other members of the *Ghadr* party frequently visited him in the lines.

** Amar Singh, the approver.

38. Balwant Singh had frequent talks in the subject of the *Ghadr* movement with Sowar Banta Singh; and at one of these interviews Banta Singh informed him that **Sowar Tara Singh (I)** was receiving seditious letters from his brother in Shanghai.

Accused – Tara Singh.
Witnesses – (1) Balwant Singh (2) Banta Singh.

39. About the 21st December, after morning parade, **Lance-Naik Mota Singh** met Banta Singh and had a long talk with him on the subject of the emigrant movement; he told Banta Singh that a large number of men in the regiment were prepared to mutiny, and that **Lachman Singh** was a leader of this party; and he advised Banta Singh to exert himself to induce others to join, but at the same time to work circumspectly. He also informed Banta Singh about the first unsuccessful attempt at a rising on the 27th November.

Accused – Lance-Naik Mota Singh.
Witnesses – Banta Singh.

40. On about the 25th -26th December **Mota Singh (I)** and **Bhagat Singh (I)** took Banta Singh towards the regimental school in the evening. They were afterwards joined by **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh** at an isolated spot behind the school. Here they discussed the revolutionary movement and asked **Lachman Singh** to be in readiness to take up arms,

Meeting behind regimental school.
Accused – (1) Mota Singh, (2) Bhagat Singh, (3) Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh

with as many men as he could collect, as the *Ghadr* party arrived in the lines. **Lachman Singh** assured them of his co-operation and of that of a number of men who were on his confidence, and **Mota Singh** mentioned the names of the following who would join:-

Accused mentioned –
(1) Budh Singh,
(2) Abdulla,
(3) Tara Singh.

Sowar Ganda Singh, Troop I.
Sowar **Budh Singh**, Troop I.
Farrier **Abdulla**, Troop I.
Sowar **Tara Singh**, Troop I.
Recruit Achhar Singh, Troop I.

The meeting lasted about half an hour and those present then dispersed to their quarters.

41. About January 15th, 1915, Banta Singh met **Tara Singh (I)** in the lines, who informed him that Buta Singh, his nephew, a watchman in Shanghai, had instructed him in his letters to hasten the furtherance of the *Ghadr* cause. At this juncture **Mota Singh** appeared and **Tara Singh** repeated what he had said to Banta Singh and **Mota Singh** remarked that a good many men in the regiment were prepared for action when the time came.

Accused – (1) Tara Singh (2) Mota Singh.
Witness – Banta Singh.

42. Shortly after the above incident Ganda Singh took Banta Singh to the rifle range and spoke to him out the object of the movement, and advised him to devote the whole of his energies to getting the men of the regiment to cooperate.

43. About the end of January or the beginning of February 1915, about 10 P.M., one evening, **Abdulla, Indar Singh (I), Bhagat Singh** and Ganda Singh held a meeting round a fire near the quarter-guard. They were discussing plans for the commission of dacoities, etc., when they were overheard by recruit Achhar Singh (I) who was on sentry duty at the time. Achhar Singh went up to them and told them that he had overheard their discussion and was advised not to disclose what he had heard.

Meeting Behind quarter-guard,
Witness – (1) Achhar Singh, (2) Ganda Singh.
Accused – (1) Abdulla, (2) Indar Singh (I), (3) Bhagat Singh.

44. About the 9th of February Prem Singh paid his third visit to the regimental *Gurdwara* and asked Sadhu Singh (the *Granthi's* son) to send for **Budh Singh. Budh Singh** joined Prem Singh at the *Gurdwara,* and after a private talk with him lasting about half an hour be asked Sadhu Singh to accompany Prem Singh to lines of the 27th and 28th Reservists. Sadhu Singh complied and Prem Singh had interviews with the regimental *Granthis*.

45. About this time the first meeting in Abdulla's quarters was held and was attended by-**Mota Singh; Bhagat Singh; Abdulla; Indar Singh (I)**; Banta Singh; and Achhar Singh. At this meeting it was decided —

First meeting in Abdulla's quarters.
Witnessess – (1) Banta Singh, (2) Achhar Singh.
Accused – (1) Abdulla, (2) Mota Singh, (3) Bhagat Singh, (4) Indar Singh (I).

i) to rise in rebellion fully equipped and mounted on the appearance of the *Ghadr* party in the lines;
ii) in the event of the men of the *Ghadr* party failing to appear, to desert from the regimental and commit dacoities and raids on Government treasuries and police stations. The meeting broke up before roll-call at about 8 P.M.

46. Some days later at about 5 P.M., Banta Singh found **Budh Singh** (I) sitting in front of the quarters with **Trumpeter Bishen Singh***. Budh Singh engaged Banta Singh in conversation about the mission of the returned emigrants and Banta Singh related the history of the *Ghadr* movement. **Budh Singh** then encouraged him to continue the good work and stated that he knew all about the progress of the movement in the regiment. He also named men in the regiment who were working for the cause and told Banta Singh that he should join in when the *Ghadr* party attacked the lines. **Bishen Singh** was present throughout the conversation.

Accused – (1) Budh Singh, (2) Trumpeter Bishen Singh
Witness – Banta Singh

* Trumpeter Bishen Singh, No, 1915 not to be confused with Sowar Bishen Singh, No. 1526, also an accused in this case.

47. On the 18th February Amar Singh• called at the lines and informed Balwant Singh that the date of the rising had been changed from the 21st February to the 19th February, and asked him how many men of the 23rd Cavalry would take part. Balwant Singh replied that Lachman Singh had about 50 or 60 Sowars ready for the purpose. Amar Singh then took Balwant Singh to a house•• in Lahore where they met a boy named Sajjan Singh••• and three conspirators. One of these gave Balwant Singh six or

• The approver in the Lahore Conspiracy case.
•• House no, 1 rented by the conspirators near the Mochi Gate. The police raided this house on February 19th and arrested Amar Singh and six other conspirators. Three bombs; a revolver and other articles were also recovered.
••• Sajjan Singh of Narangwal, Ludhiana, under trial in the Lahore conspiracy case.]

seven *Ghadr Sandesa* pamphlets for distribution among the men of the regiment. The rising was fixed to take place on the following day – the 19th February. Amar Singh sent Sajjan Singh with Balwant Singh to arrange to details of the rising with **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh.** They arrived at the lines at 8 P.M., and Balwant Singh took Sajjan Singh to Wasawa Singh's quarters. Wasawa Singh was consulted about the proposed rising, and it was agreed to interview **Lachman Singh** the following morning. Sajjan Singh was lodged for the night in Wasawa Singh's quarters and the *Ghadr Sandesa* notices were left with Wasawa Singh. Early next morning (the 19th February) Wasawa Singh took Sajjan Singh to interview **Lachman Singh.** After parade Lachman Singh informed Balwant Singh that the boy had seen him and departed. He added that the rising would take place that night and ordered Balwant Singh to meet a party of the revolutionaries near the Railway line and to bring seven or eight men back with him to the lines; this party was to remove the swords from the barracks while the men were away at roll-call. A second guide was deputed to lead another party to the quarter-guard of the reservists, where the guard arrangements were supposed to be lax, in order to break open the magazine and seize the rifles and ammunition. This was to be followed by the joining in of the cavalrymen and a wholesale massacre of the Europeans and British Artillery in cantonments. **Lachman Singh** also expressed the opinion that although he had only 50 or 60 men at his disposal it was highly probable that the whole of the cavalry would join in on the outbreak of the mutiny.

Witness – Balwant Singh

48. At about 7 P.M. the same night the regiment was suddenly ordered to "fall in" and **Lachman Singh** asked Balwant Singh to warn the men of the *Ghadr* party, assembled near the Railway line, to disperse quietly as the authorities had got wind of the whole affair. Balwant Singh was proceeding on this errand when he met Wasawa Singh who told him the same thing. Further on he met **Sowar Tara Singh** and asked him to carry the message; but **Tara Singh** refused as he was putting on his uniform. Balwant Singh then went as far as the graveyard but finding no one there he returned. He, however, informed Wasawa Singh at once, and **Lachman Singh,** Puran Singh and **Tara Singh** later on, that he had found the men and warned them. He was afraid to say that he

Accused – (1) Tara Singh (2) Lachman Singh.
Witness – (1) Balwant Singh, (2) Purain Singh (3) Wasawa Singh

had not found the men lest his comrades should think that he had not made a proper search; and, as a matter of fact, Balwant Singh confessed afterwards that he did not go as far as the Railway line and practically made no search at all, as he was afraid of being found absent under suspicious circumstances.

49. On the 20th February a meeting* was held in Wasawa Singh's; and attended by Puran Singh; Balwant Singh; **Jetha Singh** and **Gujar Singh.** The *Ghadr Sandesa* notices were read by all present and **Jetha Singh** and **Gujar Singh**, intimate friends of Puran Singh and co-villagers of Wasawa Singh, were introduced to the movement.

* First meeting in Wasawa Singh's quarters.
Accused – (1) Jetha Singh, (2) Gujar Singh.
Witnesses – (1) Wasawa Singh, (2) Puran Singh, (3) Balwant Singh.

The same day **Mota Singh, Abdulla** and Banta Singh met in the lines and expressed regret at the failure of the rising.

Accused – (1) Mota Singh, (2) Abdulla.
Witness – Buta Singh

50. On about 21st February a second meeting** was held in Abdulla's quarters at which the following men were present:— Mota Singh; Bhagat Singh; Inder Singh (I); Abdullah; and Achhar Singh. Mota Singh spoke and regretted the failure of the rising on the night when the regiment had been ordered to "fall in". He explained that it had been arranged that the men of the *Ghadr* party should enter the lines and stealthily remove the sowar's swords during the absence of the men at night roll-call; they were then to start the rising on which the cavalry men were to join in. He also added that between 100 and 200 men from all troops were prepared to mutiny and mentioned the names of the following:— Daffadar: Jiwan Singh (I); **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh;** Lance-Daffadar Puran Singh(III); Lance-Daffadar Wasawa Singh (III); **Sowars Tara Singh**, Chanan Singh (I), **Bhagat Singh, Inder Singh, Kehr Singh, Budh Singh, Bishen Singh**, and Nazir Beg (II). Mota Singh also added that on the outbreak of mutiny they were first to murder their European Officers, Rissaldar Major Hissam-ud-din and Rissaldar Sher Singh. This was to be followed by a general slaughter of Europeans and an attack on the British regiment, Farrier Abdulla then mentioned having cut telegraph wires on the railway line

** Second meeting in Abdulla's quarters.
Accused – (1) Mota Singh, (2) Bhagat Singh, (3) Inder Singh, (4) Abdulla.
Witness – (1) Banta Singh, (2) Achhar Singh.

Accused mentioned – (1) Lachman Singh, (2) Bhagat Singh, (3) Tara Singh, (4) Inder Singh, (5) Kehr Singh, (6) Budh Singh, (7) Bishen Singh

assisted by **Budh Singh, Bishen Singh, Mota Singh**, and two others. Rissaldar Major Hissam-ud-din and Rissaldar Sher Singh were cursed as eaves-droppers (*chugal khors*) and as the authors of the failure of the attempted rising, and plans for their murder were discussed.

51. About the 22nd February Puran Singh met Ganda Singh, assured him of his *bonafides*, and spoke about the attemped rising ; and the same afternoon he gave Ganda Singh a *Ghadr Sandesa* leaflet which he obtained from Wasawa Singh. Ganda Singh showed this leaflet to **Abdulla, Budh Singh** and **Nand Singh,** and it was read by the two latter who knew Gurmukhi. This leaflet was eventually taken away by Achhar Singh, recruit.

Accused – (1) Abdulla, (2) Budh Singh, (3) Nand Singh.
Witnesses – (1) Ganda Singh, (2) Achhar Singh

52. About the 24th February Prem Singh paid his fourth visit to the regimental *Gurdwara* and Sadhu Singh for Balwant Singh who went to the *Gurdwara*. Prem Singh asked Balwant Singh to accompany him to Lahore and show him the house which had been taken by the *Ghadr* party. During this conversation Sadhu Singh returned with **Lance-Naik Buta Singh** and the latter handed Prem Singh a revolver saying that he had asked the mistri* to repair it, but on account of the strict supervision over him the latter was not able to put it in order.

Accused – Lance Naik, Buta Singh.
Witnesses – Sadhu Singh, Balwant Singh
* Mistri Muhammed Jan who will corroborates this.

53. Balwant Singh then took Prem Singh to Wasawa Singh's quarters• where Wasawa Singh, Puran Singh, Gujar Singh, and Jetha Singh were present. Balwant Singh introduced Prem Singh as a prominent member of the *Ghadr* society. Puran Singh then informed Prem Singh about the arrests of his fellow-workers in Lahore and stated that the arrests were due to his cousin, Kirpal Singh••, having played the traitor. Prem Singh emphasized the fact that Kirpal Singh should be murdered and this was agreed to. Prem Singh then suggested throwing a bomb at the officers' mess and Wasawa Singh volunteered to show him round the mess next morning. Prem Singh showed his revolver

• Second meeting in Wasawa Singh's quarters.
Accused – (1) Jetha Singh, (2) Gujar Singh.
Witnesses – (1) Balwant Singh, (2) Puran Singh, (3) Wasawa Singh.
•• Kirpal Singh, a cousin of Balwant Singh, and the Police spy and witness in the Lahore conspiracy case. The arrests referred to are those of Amar Singh and other conspirators made in houses Nos. 1 and 2 on February 19th and following dates.

and said that nearly every returned emigrant had managed to smuggle a pistol into the country. He also added that one of the Ferozepur men had two bombs in his possession, each of which was powerful enough to kill a company of men. The meeting dispersed at midnight and Prem Singh slept in Wasawa Singh's quarters.

At about 11 A.M. on the morning of the next day Wasawa Singh showed Prem Singh the officers' mess. Balwant Singh and Prem Singh then started for Lahore City where the latter was to be shown the house of the *Ghadr* party. They were joined at the Cantonment Railway station by **Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh (VII)**, who accompanied them to Lahore by train but separated from them at Lahore Station. Balwant Singh and Prem Singh proceeded towards the house of the *Ghadr* party. On approaching the house Balwant Singh was arrested by a Police Sub-Inspector and two constables; but Prem Singh, who was behind, managed to slip away. The Police let Balwant Singh off on his telling them that he belonged to the 23rd Cavalry and had only come to visit the city. He then met **Lachman Singh** near the Delhi gate and returned with him to Lahore Cantonment by the 8 P.M. train. Balwant Singh went straight to the quarters of Wasawa Singh* where he found Prem Singh; Wasawa Singh, Puran Singh, **Jetha Singh** and **Gujar Singh** drinking together. They discussed the narrow escape from the arrest by the Police. Prem Singh then exhorted the others to work heart and soul in the regiment for the *Ghadr* cause. He also urged co-operation with Ganda Singh and **Budh Singh's** party. Prem Singh left that night for Amritsar.

Witnesses – (1) Wasawa Singh, (2) Balwant Singh, (3) Puran Singh.

* Third meeting in Wasawa Singh's quarters.
Witnesses – (1) Prem Singh, (2) Balwant Singh, (3) Wasawa Singh.
Accused – (1) Gujar Singh, (2) Jetha Singh.

54. In pursuance of Prem Singh advice about co-operation Wasawa Singh and Puran Singh approached Ganda Singh of Troop I, and it was decided to hold a meeting at the rifle range. This meeting• was held about the 28th February on 10 March and was attended by Wasawa Singh, Puran Singh, Budh Singh, Abdulla, and Ganda Singh. The reason for the failure of the first rising and plans for the murder of the traitor Kirpal Singh were discussed.

• Fourth meeting at the rifle range.
Accused – (1) Abdulla, (2) Budh Singh.
Witnesses – (1) Ganda Singh, (2) Wasawa Singh, (3) Puran Singh

55. On March 1st Banta Singh was discharged from the regiment on account of his being a returned emigrant.

56. On the 3rd-4th March Prem Singh paid his fifth visit* to the regimental *Gurdwara* when a meeting was held in the *Gurdwara* room. The following were present; Prem Singh; Wasawa Singh; Ganda Singh and **Budh Singh.** Wasawa Singh was summoned to attend by Sadhu Singh who also entered the room and saw Prem Singh exhibiting a large revolver which was out of order. Wasawa Singh on leaving the meeting found **Buta Singh (VII)** outside the room and told him that Prem Singh was inside. **Buta Singh** said that he did not know Prem Singh. Wasawa Singh replied that Prem Singh knew him well, upon which he remained silent. The reason for this evasion was the fact that **Lachman Singh** and his party mistrusted Puran Singh and Wasawa Singh. Puran Singh passed the night in Budh Singh's quarters. The next day (4th-5th March) Prem Singh was lodged in the quarters of **Gujar Singh** and **Jetha Singh,** but moved to Wasawa Singh's quarters in the evening.

* Prem Singh fifth visit and meeting in *Gurdwara* room.
Witnesses – (1) Wasawa Singh, (2) Ganda Singh, (3) Sadhu Singh.
Accused — (1) Budh Singh,.(2) Buta Singh.

57. On the 5th or 6th March a fifth• meeting was held at the rifle range and was attended by Prem Singh, Wasawa Singh, Puran Singh, **Budh Singh**, Ganda Singh and **Abdulla.** Plans were discussed for the murder of Kirpal Singh and Zaildar Bela Singh, and Prem Singh volunteered to carry them out. Puran Singh told Prem Singh to get any assistance he might want from his brother Fauja Singh, lambardar of Barar. Budh Singh, related the story of the first attempted rising on November 27th which had ended in failure.

• Fifth meeting at the rifle range.
Witnesses – (1) Wasawa Singh, (2) Puran Singh, (3) Ganda Singh.
Accused – (1) Budh Singh, (2) Abdulla.

58. On March 6th Balwant Singh was discharged from the regiment and handed over to the police as a returned emigrant. His quarters were searched by the police the same day in the presence of Rissaldar Sher Singh, Lance-Naik Lachman Singh (III) and Daffadar Mula Singh (III)¶. A *Ghadr Sandesa* pamphlet was found, which the Police Officer (Sub-Inspector Jawahir Lal) not knowing *Gurmukhi,* handed to Lachman Singh for examination, who passed it on to Mula Singh after reading it. They then informed the police officer that the paper contained notes and put the paper in his pocket. The same day Puran Singh destroyed his *Ghadr Sandesa* leaflets.

¶ Not to be confused with Lance-Daffadar Lachman Singh of Troop VII, leading accused in this case.

59. On March 7th Puran Singh obtained two days' leave and went to his village. Then he met his brother, lambardar Fauja Singh* and Maghar Singh, carpenter, and learnt to make bombs from the latter. He then asked his brother to buy some potash for bomb making. On about March 9th Puran Singh returned to Lahore and told Wasawa Singh that he had learnt how to make bombs. They decided to experiment in bomb making and accordingly went to the Sadar Bazar and purchased sulphur, manchal, saltpeter and small phials from a *pisari*** and a shopkeeper***. They were not able to carry out the experiment, however, as Fauja Singh had not yet arrived with the potash.

* Fauja Singh, Lambardar of Barar, Police Station Lopoki.
Maghar Singh, carpenter of the same village.
** Man Singh, son of Sukh Dyal Singh, Grocer, Topkhana Bazar, Lahore Cantonments.
*** Ganda Mal, son of Ghasita Mal shopkeeper, Topkhana Bazar, Lahore Cantonment.

60. About the 13th or14th of March Prem Singh paid his sixth visit to the lines and met **Gujar Singh, Jetha Singh**, Puran Singh and Wasawa Singh in the last named's quarters. Prem Singh produced a large revolver which was out of order and stated that Sadhu Singh had promised to get it repaired. The revolver and Rs.2 were given to Sadhu Singh by Wasawa Singh, and the former left at once to get the weapon mended, but soon returned saying that Mistri Muhammad Jan was unable to carry out the repairs at such short notice. Puran Singh then suggested that Prem Singh should get the weapon put in order by carpenter Maghar Singh of Barar.

Prem Singh's sixth visit.
Accused – Gujar Singh, Jetha Singh.
Witnesses – Sadhu Singh, Wasawa Singh, Puran Singh.

61. Prem Singh lodged with **Gujar Singh** and **Jetha Singh** and informed them and Wasawa Singh and Puran Singh that he had not been able to obtain a bomb to throw at the mess, but had found a man named Arjan Singh of Doaba who had instructed him in the process of bomb manufacture. He added that Arjan Singh was living in village close by and would be a very useful man as he also knew to make dynamite. Prem Singh left in the morning and returned in the evening with Arjan Singh and they, with Puran Singh, Wasawa Singh, **Jetha Singh** and **Gujar Singh** decided to manufacture dynamite on the following day.

62. On the afternoon of about the 17th March Prem Singh and Arjan Singh manufactured the dynamite in the quarters of Gujar Singh and Jetha Singh who were both present with Wasawa Singh throughout the whole process. Wasawa Singh and Gujar Singh brought the ingredients from the Saddar Bazar. Puran Singh was not able to attend all the time as he was on duty at the quarter-guard, but he managed to look in at intervals and observed the process and was shown the prepared dynamite after retreat. Arjan Singh explained how the dynamite should be exploded and also showed those present how to make bombs.

Manufacture of dynamite.
Accused – Gujar Singh, Jetha Singh.
Witnesses – Puran Singh, Wasawa Singh.

63. On about March the 19th Wasawa Singh, Puran Singh, **Jetha Singh** and **Gujar Singh** made an experiment with the dynamite by exploding it under the wall of the hearth; the dynamite exploded but was not strong enough to make much impression on the wall.

64. On about the 19th or 20th of March the sixth meeting at the rifle range was held, the following men being present : — Prem Singh, Arjan Singh, Puran Singh, Wasawa Singh, Ganda Singh, **Abdulla, Budh Singh,** and Achhar Singh, recruit. Plans for the murder of Kirpal Singh and Bela Singh, Zaildar, were again discussed and both Prem Singh and Arjan Singh volunteered to do the dead. Prem Singh said that Hira Singh of Charar (a village close to cantonments)was a returned emigrant who knew a lot about the revolutionary movement, and he instructed those present to keep in close touch with this individual. **Budh Singh** volunteered to murder Kirpal Singh should Prem Singh and Arjan Singh fail in their attempt and Puran Singh told Prem Singh that he should call on Maghar Singh and Fauja Singh who would assist him, and that the former would repair his revolver. Prem Singh left that night at 9 P.M. Arjan Singh stayed the night in **Jetha Singh's** quarters and departed in the morning to meet Prem Singh Barar.

Sixth meeting at rifle rang.
Accused – (1) Abdulla, (2) Budh Singh.
Witnesses – Achhar Singh, Puran Singh, Ganda Singh.

65. On about the 22nd and 23rd March Farrier **Abdulla** brought a phial of sulphuric acid and two brass inkpots from the Lahore bazaar, having purchased these articles at Wasawa Singh's request for bomb making. Wasawa Singh took the battle of sulphuric acid away to his quarters.

66. On about the 23rd or 24th March Fauja Singh arrived with the

potash, and it was decided to experiment in bomb manufacture. Wasawa Singh brought the phial of sulphuric acid purchased by Abdulla in Lahore, and he, **Jetha Singh, Gujar Singh**, Wasawa Singh and Puran Singh made an explosive mixture by grinding manchal, saltpeter and sulphur in a mortar. The ingredients were then mixed and a drop of sulphuric acid exploded the whole mixture. All present were satisfied with the experiment which was made in Gujar Singh and Jetha Singh's quarters. The ingredients were then placed in a tin and buried in the verandah of the quarters of **Gujar Singh** and **Jetha Singh.**

Experiment in bomb manufacture.
Accused – (1) Jetha Singh, (2) Gujar Singh, (3) Abdulla (brought sulphuric acid).

67. In accordance with Prem Singh's advice **Ganda Singh** and **Budh Singh** went to Charar to visit Hira Singh about the 26th or 27th March, but did not find him in.

Visit to Charar.
Witnesses – (1) Ganda Singh, (2) Achhar Singh, (3) Wasawa Singh.
Accused – Budh Singh.

68. On about March 28th Wasawa Singh, Ganda Singh**, Budh Singh** and Achhar Singh, recruit, paid a visit to Hira Singh at Charar. Hira Singh gave them an account of his travel and work in Hong Kong, Singapore, Burma Jacobabad, and other places, in connection with the revolutionary movement, and at the same time he advised them to work in the regiment quietly and wait for a suitable opportunity for an action.

69. Four or five days after the above meeting **Lachman Singh** went to Achhar Singh, who was proceeding on leave and asked him to give the *Ghadr Sandesa* pamphlet, which he had obtained from Ganda Singh, to Bhai Nihal Singh, Nihang of Dubli. Achhar Singh gave the pamphlet to one of Nihal Singh's disciples, as Nihal Singh was away.

Accused – Lance-Daffadar Lachman (VII).
Witnesses – Achhar Singh.

70. On about April 7th or 8th Puran Singh and **Wasawa Singh** met **Abdulla,** farrier, and sent him to Lahore to purchase a brass inkpot with which to make a bomb. **Abdulla** went to Lahore and brought back the inkpot. The next day Prem Singh arrived and put up in the quarters of **Gujar Singh** and **Jetha Singh**. Puran Singh upbraided him for not having effected the murder of Kirpal Singh and also asked him not to visit the lines again as his visits might lead to the exposure of all

Abdulla, farrier, buys inkpot for bomb.

their plans. Prem Singh accordingly left next morning taking with him the inkpot brought by **Abdulla** and about a seer of used bullets which he obtained from Wasawa Singh.

71. On about the 9th of April Abdulla brought three tin boxes (dibbias) from Lahore and handed them over to Wasawa Singh. The next day Wasawa Singh and Puran Singh made a bomb in Jetha Singh and Gujar Singh's quarters, but Jetha Singh and Gujar Singh were not present. The bomb was made by filling one of the tin boxes with the explosive mixture of manchal, potash, saltpeter and sulphur and few old bullets. Sulphuric acid was put in a tiny phial which was corked and kept separate. Prem Singh and Wasawa Singh then went to the railway line to test the bomb taking Ganda Singh and **Budh Singh** with them. On arriving at a spot in the Kot Lakhpat forest they placed the phial containing the sulphuric acid in the iron box, tied a cloth around it, and threw it on the railway track. It exploded with a loud report and all present returned to the lines highly satisfied. **Abdulla, farrier**, was on leave that day. Next day Wasawa Singh and Puran Singh proceeded to the spot and looked for the bullets to ascertain the range of the explosion; but although picked up the remains of the cloth, wrapped round the bomb, but they failed to find any of the bullets. Puran Singh informed **Abdulla** of the success of the test bomb on the latter's return from leave.

Manufacture of the first bomb.
Abdulla bring three tin boxes.

Testing bomb on railway line.
Accused – Budh Singh present.
Witnesses – (1) Ganda Singh, (2) Puran Singh (3) Wasawa Singh.
Abdulla farrier told about test bomb.

72. On the 12th April there was a Bioscope performance in the lines which was attended by the officers and men of the regiment. After the performance **Budh Singh** remarked to Puran Singh that it was a very appropriate occasion for throwing a bomb among the European officers, and he suggested that bombs should be kept ready for use on such occasion. Puran Singh mentioned the matter to Wasawa Singh, and on the next day they made two* more bombs in **Gujar Singh** and **Jetha Singh's** quarters. The bombs were made of the same ingredients as before, but some of the bullets used were of miniature ammunition. Before the bombs were quite ready **Gujar Singh** and Jetha Singh turned up and saw the operations. The bombs were placed on a rack in **Gujar Singh's** quarters as his family was away.

Manufacture of two bombs.
Accused – Jetha Singh and Gujar Singh present.
Witnesses – (1) Puran Singh (2) Wasawa Singh.

73. On one occasion, about the end of April, **Budh Singh** and some fifty or sixty men were sitting on the platform of the *Gurdwara* preparing *sardai* for the entertainment of the men about to proceed on active service. **Mool Singh**, the ***Granthi*,** appeared and **Budh Singh**, waiving his hand, upbraided the *Granthi* for his interference on the night of the 27th November. He said that if the *Granthi* had not interfered every one would have seen the result.

Witnesses — Mool Singh, Granthi.

74. Achhar Singh was discharged on May 1st owing to his being a bad rider. He had not yet left the lines when a party of the 22nd Cavalry came to Lahore with two machine guns to be attached to the 23rd Cavalry for active service. The party was invited to dinner by Daffadar Chanda Singh and others. During the feast sowar Jowand Singh of the 22nd Cavalry was sitting on the same charpai as **Lance-Daffadar Nand Singh** of the 23rd Cavalry and the recruit Achhar Singh was also with them. Jowand Singh told **Nand Singh** that Thakur Singh* a returned emigrant from Canada, had enlisted in the 22nd Cavalry with a view to winning over the men of the regiment to the *Ghadr* cause, but that he, Jowand Singh, was the only individual in the whole regiment who had been won over; and he expressed a hope that he would get an opportunity of turning his machine gun on the British instead of the enemy.

Accused – Lance-Daffadar Nand Singh.
Witness – Achhar Singh
* Thakur Singh of Thatta, Sirhali, since discharged from the 22nd Cavalry.

75. The regiment was ordered on active service in April and the luggage was packed in the beginning of May. Wasawa Singh and Puran Singh amongst those ordered to remain behind at the Depot which was under orders of transfer to Nowgong. When packing his luggage Puran Singh placed one of the two bombs in his wooden box, and the other in his trunk for any emergency, as both Wasawa Singh and he thought a suitable opportunity for their use might present itself *en route*. The depot left Lahore on May 10th arrived at Harpalpur Station on the afternoon of May 12th, left for Nowgong by road on the morning of the 13th, and arrived about 2 P.M. the same day. The kit of the depot was taken from the train and loaded up on earts by a fatigue party under Jamadar Usman Khan, and while being loaded the wooden box belonging to Puran Singh was dropped and the bomb inside exploded and lightly injured five men.

76. At about 4 P.M. after arrival at Nowgong Abdulla, farrier,

went to Puran Singh and told him that a bomb had exploded in a wooden box during the loading of the luggage at Harpalpur Station. Puran Singh's other trunk had left Harpalpur by cart but had not yet arrived when Kot Daffadar Vir Singh (III) arrested Puran Singh and Wasawa Singh under orders of the Commanding officer. Before being placed in the quarter-guard Puran Singh managed to hand over his keys to* Saudagar Singh, a recruit who had travelled from Lahore in the same carriage as Puran Singh, and instructed him to remove the tin box (bomb) wrapped in a black cloth from his trunk as soon as it arrived. Saudagar Singh took the keys, removed the bomb on arrival of the trunk and threw it down a well. This bomb has since been recovered and examined by the Chemical Examiner, Punjab Government, Lahore-as were also the pieces of the bomb which exploded in Puran Singh's wooden box at Harpalpur. The Chemical Examiner has reported that both** these bombs were constructed of a mixture of chlorate of potash, red sulphide of arsenic, and leaden rifle bullets.

* to give evidence
** to be produced in a court as exhibits

77. The explosion of the bombs at Harpalpur on May 13th, 1915, led to the institution of enquiries in the course of which the above-mentioned facts have come to light.

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List of Political Prisoners of Ghadr Party who belonged to Army Court Martialed by Commander-in-chief on India Dagshai and sentenced to death, hanged on 3.9.1915

S.No.	Convict No.	Name	Father Name	Village	P.S.	Distt.	Section and code	Date of sentence	Date of Admission in jail
1.	2707	Abdulla*	Alah Din	Tupral	Murdika	Gujranwala	Baluwa/ Mutiny	26.8.15	30.8.15
2.	2708	Bhagat Singh	Bur Singh	Rurewal	Sarhali	Amritsar	-do-	26.8.15	30.8.15
3.	2709	Budh Singh	Hira Singh	Dhotian	Sarhali	Amritsar	-do-	26.8.15	30.8.15
4.	2710	Buta Singh	Chanchal Singh	Kusail	Luhnemal	Amritsar	-do-	26.8.15	30.8.15
5.	2711	Gujar Singh	Nihal Singh	Luke Chukk	Khuranwala	Lyallpur	-do-	26.8.15	30.8.15
6.	a2712	Inder Singh	Jawand Singh	Jiobala	Taran Taaran	Amritsar	-do-	26.8.15	30.8.15
7.	2713	Inder Singh	Bhagat Singh	Shubazpur	Sarhali	Amritsar	-do-	26.8.15	30.8.15
8.	2714	Jetha Singh	Bahadur Singh	Loke	Sarhali	Amritsar	-do-	26.8.15	30.8.15
9.	2715	Lachman Singh	Katha Singh	Choslewar	Patti	Lahore	-do-	26.8.15	30.8.15
10.	2716	Mota Singh	Ishar Singh	Rurewal	Sarhali	Amritsar	-do-	26.8.15	30.8.15
11.	2717	Tara Singh	Sham Singh	Rurewal	Sarhali	Amritsar	-do-	26.8.15	30.8.15
12.	2718	Wadhwa Singh	Surain Singh	Rurewal	Sarhali	Amritsar	-do-	26.8.15	30.8.15

* While the two condemned *Ghadrite* rebels of 23rd Cavalry were awaiting their martyrdom in Ambala Central Jail, a relative of Abdulla, who was a police Sub-Inspector came to meet and had a private talk with him. The moment he left, Dafedar Lachhman Singh suggested to Abdulla, "*Maulvi ji* we are destined to depart in any case, you may save yourself by making a statement."

"Actually, I feel humiliated because from a few millions of Sikhs, eleven of you have staked your lives for the country, whereas from among eight crores of Muslims I am the only one. With the grace of *Allah* I don't want to disgrace myself by deserting you all", was Abdulla's response.

At the time of their execution, Abdulla beseeched the Jailor, "We be not separated after our demise.... Either cremate all of us or bury us all together." But, in fact, the ashes of eleven and mortal remains of one still lie buried in a remote corner of Ambala Central Jail.

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Three Martyrs



Court martial was held at Dagshai which pronounced death sentence to all 18 accused, but later 6 of them were sentenced to transportation for life.

List of 23rd Cavalry of those Awarded Transportation for life

1) Bishan Singh (I) son of Jiwan Singh, Dhotian.
2) Bishan Singh (II) son of Ram Singh, Dhotian.
3) Natha Singh son of Ram Sadda Singh, Dohotian — Cofined in Andamans Jail on April 22, 1914.
4) Kehar Singh son of Kahan Singh
5) Channan Singh s/o Natha Singh, Dhand-Kasel
6) Nand Singh son of Punjab Singh, Rai Ka Burj, Amritsar.

2) 130th Baluchis: Rangoon

Rowlatt Report (p. 170)

Some of the Muhammadans at Rangoon were, during the end of 1914, in a disaffected state. In the month of November, the regiment had arrived from Bombay, having been transferred to Rangoon as a punishment for murdering one of their officers. The regiment consisted chiefly of Muhammadans. Soon after their arrival Muhammadans at Rangoon had contaminated the men with the tenets of the *Ghadr* newspaper and by January 1915 the regiment was thoroughly disaffected and ready for mutiny. The rising was, however, nipped in the bud on the 21st January by timely and drastic action on the part of military authorities who punished 200 of the plotters.

ProB. Oct. 1915, No. 887
Telegram No. 4272—1-B., dated the 20th November 1914.

From — The General Brigade, Bombay,
To — The Adjutant General in India, Delhi.

Regret to report death of Major Anderson, 130th Baluchis, bayoneted by *Mahsud* on boardship in dock. All *Mahsuds* have been disarmed. I am taking further action with regard to them. Please wire sanction to confirm sentence of Field General Court Martial.

FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,
RANGOON BRIDADE, No. 1601—11-A.,
DATED THE 12TH (RECEIVED 19TH) DECEMBER 1914.

Report on the 130th Baluchis.

Your Excellency,

The result of the enquiry by Brigadier-General Johnstone is neither very definite nor very satisfactory. The principal evidence is not given in detail, but General Johnstone gives his views on the whole case.

There is some circumstantial evidence which would seem to prove

that the *murderer was only a tool in the hands of others*. This is given in the separate enquiry into the conduct of the murderer before the murder and what the other *Mahsuds* did about it.

The evidence is fairly strong that the man was really perfectly sane, so that the endeavour to prove him mad was made deliberately with an evil motive. This is General Johnstone's view too. Jemadar Mir Jan, *Mahsud* Aliai, seems to have lied deliberately in his evidence when he said that the reason why Mamak was afraid of the other *Mahsuds* was on account of a blood feud, and that he, Mamak, had mentioned this to the Subadar Major.

It would appear that he was deliberately trying to hide the real reason.

The *Mahsuds* of both classes, including the Indian officers, are now sullen and nothing can be got out of them. I do not, however, think that this proves anything very much except that they won't give away any *Mahsud*.

The other Indian officers probably really don't know very much. *Mahsuds* are disliked and distrusted by other Pathans.

My conclusion agrees with that of general Johnstone that al lot of the *Mahsuds* of both clans, including Indian officers, were in the business. The motive is somewhat obscure.

Possibly *revenge against the British officers* of the regiment for the imprisonment of so many *Mahsuds*, or on account of the general unsettled state of *Waziristan*, or possibly to prevent the regiments being sent on active service.

The British officers of the regiment and the rest of the regiment regard the *Mahsuds* with suspicion and great dislike.

Some 29 *Mahsuds* were sent home on leave, really dismissed, from the depot shortly after the murder of Major Anderson. There have been very *numerous desertions*.

The incident in August when *79 men were tried by Court Martial* and the correspondence about the promotion of Jemadar Salim Khan clearly show that these men have no sense of discipline. Whatever the *Mahsud* in the *abstract* is worth, the *Mahsuds* in this particular regiment are in a thoroughly bad state and worthless.

The Bahlolzais have now been in civil prisons for over a month and the Alizais are under arrest. They have been branded with dishonour.

One thing is perfectly clear to me and that is that the present lot of

Mahsuds cannot remain in the 130th. I would go further and recommend that they *should be removed from the service altogether*. This agrees with the opinions of all those through whose hands the case has passed, from the officers of the Regiment to General Johnstone and General Officer Commanding, Burma.

The next point is what is to become of the men if removed from the service? This is principally a *political* question. Brigadier-General Johnstone and General Officer Commanding, Burma, recommend that they should be *removed to the Andamans* until the war is over. My own view is that this would be a mistake. There are only about *150 of them* and, if they were sent back to the *Mahsud* country, I do not believe it would influence the situation very much or indeed as adversely.

Supposing these men could be sent to the Andamans or interned elsewhere, their being thus confined would excite the *Mahsud* tribe much more as a whole than their return to Waziristan. Of course, they will add 150 trained men to our possible enemies, but I think that this is the lesser evil. We have also to consider the feelings of the other *Mahsuds* who are in our service, some fighting very gallantly in France.

The Foreign and Political Department should be consulted at once.

My recommendations therefore are—

All *Mahsuds* in 130th to be dismissed from the service. No exceptions. Reservists to be included. This will prevent their enlisting again.

Men to be removed under escort to Tank, or beyond, and there released.

There are more questions to be settled such as the following:—

1. How are 130th to be employed afterwards?
2. What class should take the place of the *Mahsuds*?
3. Whether the Commanding Officer and other British Officers have acted correctly?
4. Whether General Officer Commanding Brigade acted properly?

I do not, however, consider that the main issue as to what is to become of the *Mahsuds* of their regiment should be obscured at present by any side issues.

F.J.AYLMER, 21-121914.

His Excellency the Commander-in-chief.

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I am opposed to letting these men return to *Mahsud* country. As fighting men there numbers are negligible. *As firebrands* they might be formidable. Suppposing they are all dismissed the service have I, or has the Home Department, any power of interning them anywhere? I rather doubt it.

B.D[UFF],—21-12-1914.

Adjutant General.

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TELEGRAM FROM THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE, No.172-S.,

DATED THE 24TH (RECEIVED 26TH) DECEMBER 1914.

Expresses his views in regard to the foregoing proposals.

The Foreign and Political Department entirely agree with Mr. Donald that the *Mahsuds* of the 130th Baluchis dismissed the service should not be allowed to return to *Mahsud* country *for the present*.

2. They are inclined also to agree with Mr. Donald that, if possible, they should be sent to *some place other than the Andamans for internment*. The Andamans — the *black water* as they call it — are well-known as the convicts' settlement to the *Mahsuds* and the transportation of these men thither without criminal conviction would be regarded as an act of tyranny which might unduly exasperate the tribe without acting as a deterrent. If, however, there is no other convenient place for the internment of these *Mahsuds*, this Department do not wish to press their objections.

3. As to the legality of their detention, abut which this Department has not been directly consulted, I venture to suggest that an order by the Chief Commissioner under section 21, Frontier Crimes Regulation, would probably most effectively meet the case.

4. The case is passed on to Home Department as desired.

A.H. Grant, — 29.12.1914

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It is suggested that the Criminal Intelligence Department should investigate the causes which led many *Afridis*, and some *Mohmands* and some *Punjabi Mahomedans*, of the 130th to mutiny at Rangoon rather than go on active service.

The Adjutant General in his note of 6th February 1915, paragraph 2, says he has no doubt that *very strong outside influence was used* to corrupt the 130th, and he seems to attribute the causes to somebody working at Rangoon. But the trouble in this Regiment began at Aurangabad, continued at Bombay and came to a head at Rangoon. Further, when the 46th at Nowshera (I think) were ordered to find a draft for the 140th 50 desertions occurred at once.

The behaviour of the mutinous men does not indicate any wild scheme of hostility to or revenge against the white man or his Government: rather an unwillingness to go on active service. Reading paragraph 8 of the Adjutant General's note of 6th February 1915 with his paragraph 3 I take it General Aylmer's opinion is that *outside (i.e., civil) influence* at Rangoon worked strongly on an inside unsatisfactory condition which is not confined to 130th. I think that *prima facie* the inside unsatisfactory condition is more serious and more worthy of diagnosing than the outside influence which was not apparently required to make the men of the 46th at Nowshera behave almost as badly as the men of the 130th at Rangoon.

But before going further I should much like to see the information available as to desertions and other misconduct in the Indian Army since the war began.

C.R. CLEVELAND,—12-2-15.
Director, Criminal Intelligence

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Real causes of mutiny.

The actual causes of the mutiny are *vague*, but they are probably many. A certain general weakness in discipline made men somewhat easy victims to outside influences. The delay in dealing with the *Mahsuds* was doubtless interpreted as weakness. The feeling among Pathans about *fighting against Turks and their allies is undoubtedly very real and strong*. It is dangerous feeling because it will now probably extend *to fighting against Afghans and Frontier tribesmen*.

The *insufficiency of the remuneration* given to the Indian soldier is

rapidly becoming a leading cause of discontent and it is a lever which is easily worked by the agitator and seditionist. The *increase of prices* due to the war intensifies this. I do not much believe in the cowardice theory. To sum up I should say that among the bigoted Muhammadans class the war has become an unpopular one on *account of the religious question*. The losses, too, are known to be very high. Being *pure mercenaries* they do not regard the inducements offered by the Indian Government sufficient to overcome this unpopularity.

Outside Influences.

There is no doubt in my mind that very strong influence had been used to corrupt the 130th. They were shown at once the English illustrated papers with a picture proving (?) that the *Germans had become Muhammadans*. *They urged that their attestation did not force them to serve overseas*, giving a regular *vakil's* reason; the production of the pay question at such a time, in my opinion, rather points to outside influence; they grasped at a slightly indefinite paragraph in the *Fauji Akhbar* (case put up, paragraph flagged). We have heard nothing about the recapture of the 8 or 9 deserters which points to sympathizers in Rangoon; from previous correspondence we know that there are Muhammadans who live at Rangoon who carried on very treasonable correspondence about the Malay States Guides: *Rangoon was always a great German centre and Germans have probably corrupted the local Indians very considerably*.

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From — Brigadier-General A. A. Johnstone, Commanding Rangoon Brigade,

To — The Adjutant General in India, Delhi.

In accordance with your No. 23771-6-A.G., Camp, of 25th November 1914, to the General Officer Commanding, Burma Division, I have the honour to make the following report direct to you, as ordered by the Divisional Commander.

2. I have examined the British and Indian officers and many of the Non-commissioned officers of the 130th Baluchis, and I give below the information required, under several headings:

Mahsuds as soldiers. — Lieutenant-Colonel Mennie gave particulars in his letter of 10th April 1914 to his Brigade-Commander. The general

opinion of the Regiment has been that they are *dirty in their habits* and are very much governed by their *uncertain moods*. Very *clannish*, will not give evidence against their own class, do not mix with the other classes, consequently it is very difficult for a Subadar-Major to keep his Commanding Officer informed of their state of feeling. Very careless about overstaying leave, have no *real sense of loyalty to Government or of "esprit de corps"*, are entirely concerned with their own affairs and their pay, and have *no wish to serve the interests of Government*. Naturally they are unpopular in the Regiment and, being a trans-border people, are distrusted.

In 1912, some got heat apoplexy at Multan and the others got alarmed.

Recruiting ceased.

At the Delhi manoeuvres in 1912, they fell out frequently and there were signs of malingering.

All other classes have considered them treacherous, and were horrified at the murder of Major Dodd by his own orderly; also at the looting of the quarters of a British officer of the Regiment by his *Mahsud* orderly.

Dangerous feeling among the Mahsuds. — On August 14th, 1914, they showed a *threatening manner* in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel Price, when that officer's prompt action prevented a possible outbreak. On 17th August 1914, the attempt to *break into a rifle kote/armoury* was probably carried out by a *Mahsud*, as the perpetrator escaped into the Mahsud's lines.

At this time, at Aurangabad, there were about an equal number of *Mahsuds* and other classes. The possibility of this undesirable proportion was pointed out in Lieutenant-Colonel Mennie's letter of 10th April 1914, to his Brigade Commander.

After the Court Martial of 14th August, they appeared to have resumed their normal state.

On 2nd November 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel Mennie received one anonymous letter, through his Brigadier, stating that the Commanding Officer would be shot when the Regiment proceeded on active service. He was told by Lieutenant-Colonel Price that, after the Court Martial of 14th August, his orderly (Punjabi Muslim) warned him that the *Mahsuds* might do him injury. These officers did not take the threats very seriously and decided to risk any danger, thinking that the *Mahsuds* might settle down on service.

Vernacular letters to the Regiment, suggesting that *Mahsuds* should combine to secure Jemadar Salim Khan's promotion to Subadar, were attached to the Commanding Officer's application for that officer's discharge.

Desertions and failure of Reservists to rejoin. — About 8 out of the 35 Reservists have rejoined. The Commanding Officer's letter of 10th April 1914, to his Brigade-Commander, anticipated a result of this kind.

Jemadar Salim Gul and 4 men on recruiting duty have failed to rejoin. Five (5) men have not rejoined from leave. Two (2) men have overstayed their leave and have been struck off. Three (3) men deserted after the outbreak of war.

Reports of absentees were regularly reported by the Commanding Officer to the Brigade, after mobilization orders were received.

Condition of Mahsuds previous to the murder of Major Anderson— It is possible that they may have been unsettled by the various orders issued to the Regiment for its despatch to Europe, then to the Persian Gulf, and finally to East Africa; also by the report that Government would not trust a *Muhammadan regiment to fight against the Turks*.

Other probable causes of unrest would be —

(1) The forfeiture of the tribal allowances on account of the murders at Tank in April 1914.

(2) The report about an early expedition into the *Mahsud* country.

(3) The passing over of Subadar Hayat for the post of Subadar-Major, and the excitement caused by the incidents of 12th-14th August 1914 at Aurangabad. After the order was given not to go to the Persian Gulf, one (unidentified) of a *Mahsud* group of men was heard by a British officer to say, in *Pushtu*, "Now we shall be shot by the Germans".

About 4 P.M. on 20th November 1914, Mamak (the murderer) having asked Major Dyke, his Double Company Commander, for a transfer to another Company, was promised his return to the Depot on the next day. This was heard by the other *Mahsuds*. If, as seems probable, this man was being forced to murder a British officer, Major Dyke's promise may have precipitated matters.

That also they claimed for all ranks the same pay as the British soldier from the day of enlistment and that, unless they got this before departure, they refused to go.

On Colonel Mennie's return — the evening of the 18th instant —

both Colonel Mennie and Colonel Price went to the lines and again interviewed the *Afridis* and some Punjabis who had made the same request.

The *Afridis* were still of the same mind and refused to leave India unless their request was granted: the Punjabis of "F" Company of the same Double Company as the *Afridis* also siding with the *Afridis*.

On Tuesday, the 19th, Colonel Mennie and Colonel Price, wishing to ascertain from every man in the Regiment his views, visited all the forts and detachments and ascertained that 50 per cent of the *Yusufzais* and 70 per cent of the *Mohmands* refused to go on active service, the *Yusufzais* giving as an excuse that the *Turks were in Africa*, and that the *Germans having embraced Islamism* they refused to fight against them.

The *Mohmands* gave the same reason.

All the *Punjabis were loyal* and said they would serve anywhere and against anyone.

The absolute falseness of these statements being pointed out, especially regarding the Germans, and Turks, the one answer received was that it was true, as they had read it in the "Fauji-Akhbar", and had also seen papers with pictures of Germans inscribed with the "Koran Sharif".

On Wednesday,*(*Tuesday) the 19th instant, Colonel Price again interviewed every man in No. III Double Company at Rangoon. The Punjabis in "F" Company had now come round and were willing to go anywhere. *The Afridis were in a more troublesome mood and absolutely refused to serve out of India, unless they got British soldiers' pay*. They, in common with all the Pathans, said that in their attestation/swearing in the term **"Hindustani Fauj"** *meant service in India*, and not abroad, and that they had not taken on for service abroad. Their demeanour was more insubordinate than before, so Colonel Price reported the matter to General Johnstone, and went in the afternoon to the forts to interview the men of "C" and "H" Companies. They were still of the same mind, and "C" Company made a collective demonstration, shouting they were not going on active service.

On Colonel Price's return to Rangoon, he received a report that the *Afridis* who had been sent for a *route* (long) march for exercise on the evening of the 20th, had refused to go very far and returned quickly to the lines, as a man had said to them, "We are fools to leave barracks, this is a plot, let us get back at once, or else the soldiers will take charge of our rifles in our absence."

Colonel Price, as he had in addition *129 Mahsud prisoners to guard*, reported the *situation as serious* and, on Wednesday night, all the Pathans of "C", "E", and "H" Companies, both in Rangoon and in the forts, were *disarmed, made prisoners, and put on board the "Mayo"*.

On the 21st instant, Colonel Price made a final visit to the men on the "Mayo" and about 80 men returned to serve willingly, *viz.,* 56 *Yusufzais* and 24 *Mohmands*. The *Afridis, numbering 104*, with the exception of two, refused absolutely to go on service out of India, and said they would sooner suffer any punishment than do so.

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DIARY OF EVENTS IN THE CASE OF THE 130TH BALUCHIS.

Monday, 18th January 1915.

About 8 P.M., Mr. Chisholm, Deputy Inspector-General of Police for Railways and Criminal Investigation, informed the Brigade-Major at the Gymkhana Club that it had been reported to him that certain men of the 130th' Baluchis had been heard to declare at a coffee-shop in the town that they would not go to the war.

The Brigade-Major at once took this information round to General Johnstone's house where he found General Johnstone in conversation with General Raitt and Colonels Mennie and Price on the *same subject*.

General Johnstone subsequently had a conversation with the Subadar-Major of the Regiment on the same subject. The latter stated that the *Afridis* of the Regiment were unwilling to go to the war, reports having readied them of the very large number of *casualties* amongst their friends and relations, and also because they did not wish to fight against their *brother Muhammadans*.

In the morning, the Southern Army Commander had inspected the Companies of the Regiment who were stationed in the River Defences. He was to have inspected the remainder of the Regiment the next morning. The latter parade was cancelled.

Tuesday, 19th January 1915.

At 8-30 A.M., there was a conference "at Government House, the Southern Army, Divisional and Brigade-Commanders being present with their staff. Colonel Mennie's report on the 130th Baluchis was discussed.

Colonel Mennie and Colonel Price spent the day in investigating the case and interrogating the men, returning late in the evening.

By order of the Adjutant General in India, Colonel Mennie was relieved of the Command of the Regiment, and was ordered to hand over the Command at once to Colonel Price, and proceed to Delhi for other duties.

Wednesday, 20th January 1915.

At 8 A.M., there was a conference at Government House, the same officers being present as on the 19th, with the exception of Colonel Mennie.

Lieutenant Jacob, Adjutant of the 130th Baluchis, reported that he had been informed that Naick Sarfaraz of the 91st Punjabi Light Infantry, who was passing through Rangoon on his way to a School of Musketry, had, the previous evening, stated in the lines of the 130th that the *91st and the Gurkhas were disaffected and would not fight*.

Naick Sarfaraz was arrested, but subsequently released, there being no evidence procurable against him, and he, having, in the presence of Lieutenant Jacob and several Indian officers and Non-Commissioned officers of the 130th Baluchis, offered to swear on the Koran that he had made no such statement. All the Indian officers and men present stated their conviction that he was speaking the truth.

Colonel Price spent the day interrogating the men.

At 3-30 P.M., he reported to General Johnstone that the *Afridis* (with the exception of one man, the Subadar-Major's orderly) definitely *refused to go on service,* and that he had heard from Major Dyke that the *Yusufzais* were doubtful.

After reporting this, he went to Syriam and King's Bank to see the men there. He had good hopes of persuading the *Yusufzai* and *Mohinand* Companies.

At 5-45 P.M., Lieutenant Jacob reported that the men at Headquarters (*Afridis* and Punjabi Mussalmans) had been ordered to go a short route march that afternoon, that the men had gone 400 yards and *sat down, declining to go any farther,* that, on being urged by the Indian officer in charge (an *Afridi* Jemadar), they went another short distance

and sat down again. This time they finally refused to go farther until the time for parade was up, when they went back to barracks.

The above was the Jemadar's story.

The Non-Commissioned officers, both Punjabi Mussalmans and *Afridis*, on being questioned by Captain Woodward, 130th Baluchis, stated that they had merely obeyed orders, and that they did not disobey any orders.

Both Captain Woodward and Lieutenant Jacob stated, that they did not like the look of the men and urged that, at least, *the guard over the Mahsuds be taken over by British troops*.

At 7-30 P.M., Colonel Price returned and. made a very *grave report*. He stated that both *Yusufzais* and *Mohmands* refused to go on service, the *Mohmands* being very insolent in their manner, falling in, and shouting at him that they would not go.

This was communicated to General Raitt, who directed that the Army Commander be at once informed. General Johnstone, Colonel Price, and the Brigade-Major proceeded to Government House.

About 8-30 P.M., General Raitt was summoned by telephone.

At 10 P.M., the Army Commander decided that the Pathan Companies of the 130th Baluchis be *disarmed* forthwith.

General Raitt, General Johnstone, and Colonel Price then proceeded to Minto Mansions Hotel and the following were immediately summoned:— Principal Port Officer, Officer Commanding, and Adjutant, 4th King's Shropshire Light Infantry, Officer Commanding and Adjutant, Rangoon Volunteer Rifles, and Mr. Poison, Managing Director of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company.

The following plan was decided on :—

At 2 A.M., the King's Shropshire Light Infantry, and as many men of the Rangoon Volunteer Rifles as could be summoned, would fall in on their parade grounds.

275 men of the King's Shropshire Light Infantry would march straight to Morton Street Jetty and embark there on three launches of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company. 100 would proceed to Choki, 100 to Syriarn, and 75 to King's Bank.

The remainder of the King's Shropshire Light Infantry would be divided as follows :—

50 men to take over the guard over the *Mahsuds* in Barracks.

30 men to take over the quarter guard in the 130th lines.

The remainder in reserve under Colonel Price, to be used as required.

Rangoon Volunteer Rifles (parade 213 all ranks).

60 men to march up to Government House and disarm the guard there.

20 men to disarm the guard over the Indian Infantry Hospital.

The remainder to act under the orders of Colonel Price with the Reserve of the King's Shropshire Light Infantry.

Forts to be warned by telephone and directions (attached) given as to procedure to be adopted on approach of launches bringing the King's Shropshire Light Infantry.

After disarming of the guards, all the Pathans to be made prisoners, and to be disposed of as follows :—

129th *Mahsuds* (from barracks and jail) to be placed on board the hired river transport "China", remainder *Afridis*, *Mohmands*, and Tusufzais on the R.I.MS. "Mayo", as soon as she could be brought alongside. "Mayo", after embarking *Afridis* in Rangoon, to go below the Hastings and anchor, when the prisoners from the forts will be taken to her.

Orders were issued at midnight 20-21st January.

Thursday, 21st January 1915.

At 2 A.M., the troops fell in, in accordance with orders and the disarming was carried out as planned.

By 5-30 A.M., all Pathans had been disarmed and made prisoners, both in Rangoon and the River Forts.

All went well and the men of the 130th submitted quietly.

All men of the Rangoon Volunteer Rifles were dismissed at 6-30 A.M., except the men on guard at Government House and the Indian Infantry Hospital. These were relieved by the King's Shropshire Light Infantry at 9 A.M.

The King's Shropshire Light Infantry remained on guard over the *Mahsud prisoners* and in the quarter guard of the 130th Baluchis until all prisoners had been removed, also at the Indian Infantry Hospital.

12 NOON. 129 *Mahsud* prisoners were embarked on the hired river transport " China" and despatched to Bassein Creek, orders having been received from Army Headquarters to despatch them to *Thayetmyo*.

The escort consisted of :—

1 Officer and 50 other ranks from the King's Shropshire Light Infantry.

2 British officers, 2 Indian officers, and 75 other ranks of the 79th *Carnatic* Infantry.

1 P.M. *Afridi* prisoners embarked on the R.I.M.S. "Mayo". Escort 3 officers and 100 other ranks of the King's Shropshire Light Infantry.

4 P.M. "Mayo" anchored below the Hastings and prisoners from the forts were transferred to her. The escort was reinforced by 2 officers and 100 other ranks of the King's Shropshire Light Infantry.

The remainder of the King's Shropshire Light Infantry returned to Rangoon.

6 P.M. Colonel Price recommended that about 90 Pathans who were willing to go on service be removed from the " Mayo, " returned to the Regiment, but not armed.

This was sanctioned and carried out at 10 P.M.

(56 *Yusufzais*, 24 *Mohmands*, 80 in all, returned).

Friday, 22nd January 1915.

2 P.M. A Summary General Court Martial was assembled on board the "Mayo" to try 7 prisoners, under the orders of the Southern Army Commander.

A second Summary General Court Martial (composed of the same members) was assembled under the orders of the Brigade-Commander to try the remainder of the accused. This Court Martial followed immediately on the conclusion of the above.

Saturday, 23rd January 1915.

Both Courts Martial were completed by 2-45 A.M.

The proceedings of both Courts Martial were confirmed by the convening authorities.

1-15 P.M. The Brigade-Major proceeded to the "Mayo", where all the prisoners found guilty by both Courts Martial were *handcuffed*, and proceedings of the Courts Martial promulgated. This was completed by 3-30 P.M.

Two prisoners condemned to death were taken to Syriam Fort and there *executed* in the presence of 50 men of the Royal Garrison Artillery and one Double Company of the 130th Baluchis. The firing party consisted of 12 men from the Royal Garrison Artillery.

The condemned men were :—

Jemadar Khushal Khan (Mohmand).

Havildar Sattar Khan (*Afridi*).

Sentences on the remainder varied from death (commuted to **transportation for life) to 12 years' transportation**.

The number convicted was **202**.

Sunday, 24th January 1915.

The 202 prisoners above referred to were transferred to Rangoon Jail.

11 A.M. The-Regiment embarked on the hired transport "Thongwa" under orders for Mombassa.

8 Punjabi Mussulmans deserted on the night 23rd-24th and have not yet been arrested.

Monday, 25th January 1915.

" Thongwa" sails from Rangoon.

One *Mohmand* deserted in the night and has not yet been apprehended.

Copy of directions referred to on page 3 of the Diary of Events.

(These instructions were issued by the Brigade-Major, Rangoon Brigade, by telephone. In the case of each fort, the Brigade-Major first called up the Royal Garrison Artillery officer and instructed him not to send any message, but personally to fetch the Officer Commanding the detachment 130th Baluchis in the fort concerned; in each case, orders were given that *no one was to be allowed near the telephone*).

The Royal Garrison Artillery officer in each fort was ordered to rouse his men, order them to dress and fall in with rifles and ball ammunition, and keep them in their barracks until he knew of the approach of the launch; in the meantime, *no lights* were to be allowed, nor any noise that would alarm the guard of the 130th Baluchis.

On the approach of the launch, the Royal Garrison Artillery officer was instructed to march his men down in front of the guard of the 130th Baluchis, sending one party straight down in front of the sentry at the

Fort Jetty to prevent the possibility of his firing on the men landing. He was further to order the guard to hand over their arms immediately and was told that any man resisting was to be *bayoneted*, but that, in case of necessity, he was authorized to fire.

After the men on guard had been disarmed they were to be kept prisoners, and none of the men of the 130th Baluchis were to be allowed to leave the forts until further orders.

The Officer Commanding detachment 130th Baluchis in each fort was ordered to fall in any reliable men as soon as the Royal Garrison Artillery marched to the guard and assist in every way possible. He was instructed that all Pathans were to be disarmed, and that he was to lead the detachment of the Shropshires to wherever his men might be. Further, he was instructed that, if there was any demur or talk of any kind among his men, any man appearing to be a leader was to be carefully noted and the attention of reliable witnesses was to be drawn to his conduct.

Prob. Octr. 1915 no. 961 Diary No. S-3145
Telegram P., No. 118-8,, dated (and received)
the 12th February 1915.

From — **The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, North-West Frontier Province, Peshawar,**

To — The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

(Received in War Section (G.S. Branch) at 7-45 P.M., 13th February 1915).

I was interviewed to-day by the Adam Khel *Afridi Jirga* in connection with the incident relating to the 130th King George's Own Baluchi Regiment which is now at Rangoon. *Wildest rumours* are afloat that large numbers of men belonging to this Regiment have been *executed* and that Remainder of regiment is gradually being *drowned in the sea* daily. These rumours are, being put into circulation by mischief makers. The *Jirga* displayed a reasonable attitude and asked that they may be informed of names of men of their tribe who are closely concerned in the matter, or have been imprisoned, or are awaiting their trial; they also

wanted to know whether the 130th were still stationed in Rangoon or whether Regiment had sailed for the front. I consider it important that *Jirga* should be reassured and given full information as early as may be possible on these points.

No. 1601 — 26-A., dated the 28th January 1915.

From — Brigadier-General A.A.J. JOHNSTONE, General Officer Commanding, Rangoon Brigade, Mandalay,

To — The Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Burma Division.

The refusal of the Pathans of the 130th Baluchis to go on field service in East Africa is, in my opinion, caused by their disinclination to face the heavy casualties of which they have recently heard accounts, *i.e..,* they fear the effect on their own bodies, as well as the devastation that is being caused in their families by the death of the male members. They naturally do not like to confess their fear so they have put forward reasons to justify their action :—

(1) They have read in the *Fauji Akhbar* that the German/*Kaiser* and his subjects are now Musalmans, and they have seen pictures of Germans wearing "Koran" badges on the arm. *Pathans cannot therefore fight against the Germans* or the Turks, and they expect to meet both in East Africa.

(2) Indian troops should receive British rates of pay in Europe and this should be promised by Government with retrospective effect from, date of enlistment, before the Regiment sailed from Rangoon.

These reasons are both *preposterous*, and the Pathans know well that Government could not accept them.

2. In this **mutiny**, the *Afridis* undoubtedly gave the lead to the *Yusufzais* and *Mohmands*, and practically the whole of them remained obstinate, while about 90 *Yusufzais* and *Mohmands* have accompanied the Regiment. This action on the part of the *Afridi* is not surprising. He is an excellent fighter from behind cover but it is not his practice to risk his skin. He approaches to close quarters only when his enemy has no ammunition or can be easily surprised.

3. This is my explanation of the recent incident in the 130th Baluchis, but it is probable that the treatment of the *Mahsuds* of this Regiment may have given some encouragement to the other Pathans to

behave as they did. In my report to the Adjutant General I stated that the *Mahsuds* appeared to be unwilling to go on active service and that they had promoted the incidents of August and November last in order to *prevent the Regiment going on service*. The *Mahsuds* have been under arrest for about two months, and it is just possible that the other Pathans thought that they would be released on the departure of the Regiment, the *Mahsuds* thus avoiding active service without incurring any serious military punishment for their actions.

4. The British Officers and remaining Indian Officers have done excellent work during this crisis in the Regiment, and it is directly due to their efforts that the Regiment was able to leave in good spirits (sic!) on the 25th instant for East Africa.

5. I do not think that Colonel Mennie can be held responsible for the troubles in this Regiment since the outbreak of War, though I now think that the selection of Subadar *Sultan Mir* (*Afridi*) for the post of Subadar Major was not a happy one. He is quite loyal but not sufficiently strong or straight.

6. Colonel Price's work was excellent. He had a very trying and anxious time and did everything in his power to turn the Pathans from their disloyalty.

The Regiment left in an **apparently** satisfactory spirit.

No. 48-Camp, dated the 26th January 1915.

From — Major General H.A. RAITT, General Officer Commanding, Burma Division, Mandalay,

To — The General Staff, Southern Army, Camp, Mandalay.

The enclosed reports from the Officer Commanding, 130th Baluchis and from the General Officer Commanding, Rangoon Brigade, give a full account of the events in that Regiment from the time the order was received on the 14th January 1915 for their embarkation for East Africa until the actual departure of the Battalion in the S. S. "Thongwa" yesterday morning.

During the whole of this period I was in close touch with Brigadier-General Johnstone and Lieutenant-Colonels Mennie and Price, and received frequent reports from them. I would call special attention to the daily increasing gravity of the events recorded. On Monday the 18th instant, Lieutenant-Colonels Mennie and Price were

of opinion than nothing more than a respectful combined representation to the Army Commander was contemplated. On Tuesday, Lieutenant-Colonel Price, who succeeded to the command, expressed the opinion that the effected companies would lay down their arms, and passively refuse to embark, but in reply to a definite question from me he said he anticipated no resistance if it was decided to disarm them. On Wednesday, he considered the events of the day most serious, and declined to renew his assurance that disarmament would not be resisted.

It was this *continually increased gravity of events*, and the doubt expressed by Lieutenant-Colonel Price as to the possibility of resistance to an Order to disarm that led me to ask the Army Commander for authority to carry 'out the disarmament during the night of the 20th-21st January, when it seemed to me improbable that any serious resistance could occur.

I considered it desirable that *only British troops should be employed* on this duty, so I called out a sufficient number of the Rangoon volunteer Rifles to enable me with them, the Royal Garrison, Artillery and the 4th King's Shropshire Light Infantry, to employ such a force that resistance would be manifestly useless in case it should be contemplated.

Since the Summary General Courts Martial were held I have discussed the evidence with Lieutenant-Colonel Pullen, who was President of both Courts, Major E. M. Taylor, 22nd Cavalry Frontier Force and General Staff, who was Interpreter at both Courts and Lieutenant-Colonel Price, who was present throughout. They agree in stating that **not a single man convicted ever said to the Court that he was willing to go to East Africa, except on conditions. Many of them said they were willing to go provided they were paid at the same rate as British soldiers. The whole of the men, therefore, persisted in their act of mutiny up to the time of their conviction.** Moreover Lieutenant-Colonel Price informs me that every man had three chances offered; him on the 21st[*[*21st, *vide* telegram from G.S.O. Burma Division], instant to come away with him from the "Mayo" by promising to go to East Africa as ordered.

The main grievance seems to have been the *question of pay*. The *enormous casualties* suffered also seem to have been an important factor to married men. The *religious objection* to fighting against the Sultan of Turkey and his Allies is considered by Lieutenant-Colonel

Price to have some weight among the Pathan companies, *but none at all among the Punjabis Mussulmans*.

I suggest that all real and imaginary grievances have been *utilized* by outside influences to cause discontent. I would particularly call attention to the fact that pictures of the brassard with the Muhammadan "Kalima" stated to be worn by the Germans in Turkey were only to be seen in certain English illustrated papers received in Rangoon on Saturday, the 16th instant. Lieutenant-Colonel Price told me that the whole Battalion had heard of them or seen them, and were saying *that a photograph could not lie*. It does not seem to me possible that they would ever have heard of this picture if their attention had not been called to it from outside.

I would suggest that the question of some increase of pay for men serving beyond the seas is worthy of attention. A fine regiment like the 130th Baluchis is worth a great deal in Europe at present, and as a matter of policy it is desirable that men should think that they have not only been treated with justice but with *generosity* by the Empire in these times. I feel certain that the British people would willingly contribute some extra allowance if they realized that the Indian Army thought they were entitled to it.

So far as my knowledge and information go no responsibility for these unfortunate events rests on Lieutenant-Colonel Price and the British Officers of the Regiment. During the short time they have been under my command they have all very favourably impressed me. I think the long delay in deciding the action to be taken about the *Mahsuds* was unfortunate and afforded time for outside influences to be brought to bear, while it seemed that the original culprits would escape punishment.

I would like to place on record, as I have already verbally mentioned to the Army Commander, my appreciation of the excellent services rendered by the 4th King's Shropshire Light Infantry, the Rangoon Volunteer Rifles, and by Mr. Polson of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company.

The 4th Shropshire Light Infantry is a Territorial Battalion from which the promptitude and order of a Regular Battalion could hardly be expected. The Rangoon Volunteer Rifles had to be assembled from all parts of Rangoon without previous notice. It must have been about midnight when the Commanding Officers of these two Corps left the

Minto Mansions Hotel where the orders were drafted. My instructions were for all troops to move at 2 A.M. At 2-3 A.M., they were all reported by telephone to the Rangoon Brigade Office to have marched off. To Mr. Polson we are indebted for the provision by 2 A.M., of three launches for the conveyance of the detachments to the River Ports. He came himself to the Hotel, and then went personally to supervise the arrangements.

I consider that Brigadier-General Jhonstone and his Staff. Officers, and Lieutenant-Colonel Price all rendered excellent service. They had incessant work throughout the week, and on two nights the Staff and Lieutenant-Colonel Price had practically no sleep.

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ProB. Octr. 1915 No. 971
Office memorandum No. 33,
dated 22nd January 1915.

From — General JOHN NIXON, Commanding Southern Army,
To — The Adjutant General in India, Simla.

Forwarded. The accounts enclosed give the facts of this mutiny as they occurred. The situation contained dangerous factors when I ordered General Raitt to take steps to disarm the Pathans of this Corps. The necessary arrangements were very well made and the disarmament effected without any resistance on the part of the men, and great credit is due to the manner in which the 4th Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry and the Rangoon Volunteers carried out this duty.

I am addressing you a separate letter regarding this very regrettable occurrence, and here content myself with the following remarks:—

1. The delay in the settlement of the case against the *Mahsuds* undoubtedly led the Pathans to believe that nothing would be done to them, *if as a body they misbehaved*.
2. Great care in the editing of the *Fauji Akhbar* is necessary. I have not seen the issue which is supposed to have had a mischievous effect and cannot therefore pass an opinion. If, however, this paper has had this effect, it should be possible to use its columns to combat it and to show things in their proper light.

3. I hear a *rumour* that excitement is caused among natives by the exhibition of cinema pictures showing anti-British war scenes; these are said to be greatly applauded. I suggest that further powers be taken in India, as have been taken at Home by the extension of the Defence of the Realm Act whereby the seditious newspapers in **Dublin** were lately suppressed.
The impression left in my mind regarding this Corps is that discipline generally speaking cannot have been screwed up to the right pitch for many years, but I **trust that the examples now made will have a salutary effect for the future.**

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TRANSFER OF 129 *MAHSUDS* IN CONFINEMENT AT THAYETMYO TO CIVIL PRISONS IN INDIA.

[ADJUTANT GENERAL'S BRANCH.]

We have 129 *Mahsuds*, of 130th, in confinement at Thayetmyo. They are to be dispatched very soon to various civil prisons in India, where they will be kept during the war, prisons mostly in Punjab and North-West Frontier Pronvince. They must be sent to these prisons under military escort. We want the movement to attract as little notice as possible. The *Mahsuds* would be dismissed from the Army directly they enter the civil prisons.

Please have the question worked out as to how this is to be carried out, from Burma to those prisons must be considered.

F.J. AYLMER,—28-1-15.

What about those steamers that are going to Basra?

N.WOODYATT,—29-1-15.

There are two steamers being prepared in Burma for Persian Gulf under Quartermaster General's orders.

We might send case to Quartermaster General and ask if these two steamers may be used for bringing the *Mahsuds* to an Indian *port*, preferably *Karachi*.whence the men could be railed to prisons in Punjab and North-West Frontier Province. This would ensure the transference being carried out *most quietly*.

If Quartermaster General agrees, General Officer Commanding,

Burma, to be asked to provide necessary escort.

A.D.COX,—29-1-15.

Quartermaster General's Branch.

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COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM QUARTERMASTER GENERAL TO DIRECTOR, ROYAL INDIAN MARINE,

No.186-5 W.S., DATED 1ST FEBRUARY 1915.

Asks if steamers available.

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COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM DIRECTOR, ROYAL INDIAN MARINE, TO QUARTERMASTER GENERAL,

No. Q-654, DATED 2ND FEBRUARY 1915.

Reports steamers at Burma quite unsuitable.

The Director, Royal Indian Marine, reports that the two river steamers which are being fitted in Burma are quite unsuitable to carry passengers at sea. Copies of the telegrams are placed on the file.

C.Roe,—2-2-15.

Adjutant General's Branch.

Proceedings of the ARMY DEPARTMENT, WAR 1914-15

Interment under the Foreigners Ordinance of 129 Mabsuds from the 130th Baluchis

No. C.O. 8-15, dated 1st March 1915 (*Secret*) No. 15889

From — Captain F.W. Mowton-Marshall, Commanning Depot, 130th Baluchis,

To — The Adjutant General in India, Delhi.

Your No. 25896-6 (A.G.-10 Camp), dated the 25th February 1915.

The nominal roll forwarded under your above number is herewith returned duly corrected.

Nominal Roll of Prisoners of the 130th Baluchis of Thayetmyo

Regimental No.	Rank and Name	Father's name	Class	Vllage
	Subadar Hayat Khan	Shah Slim	*Mahsud* Allizai	Uspas Wazirastan
	Subadar Bahadur Khan	Mohammad Afaz Khan	”	Valma ”
	Jemadar Zarmast	Surkamand	”	Karama ”
	Jemadar Mirjan	Gul Mohammad	”	Abdul Wadani ”
4376	Havildar Hassan Khan	Libas	”	Shinkai ”
4740	Naik Gulshahid	Mamaki	”	Abdul Wadani ”
3683	Lance-Naik Reshmin	Azam Khan	”	Chunkhel ”
3687	Rest Said Mir	Sher Khan	”	Batakai ”
3855	Sepoy Amal Khan	Bazar	”	Malakmela ”
4367	Sepoy Pashkai	Amir Khan	”	Thangai ”
4548	Sepoy Zarif Khan	Ghusman	”	Shankai ”
4655	Lance Naik Gatt	Mir Akbar	”	Shankai ”
4656	Lance Allah Jan	Azad	”	Malakmela ”
4729	Sepoy Alim	Bai	”	Sega ”
4795	Sepoy Sada Khan	Mirakhel	”	Khaisora ”
4863	Sepoy Alim Gul	Shahzam	”	Kitali ”
4901	Sepoy Madali Khan	Shah Mohammad	”	Kitali ”
4935	Sepoy Mazal Khan	Utashi	”	Gurgorai ”
148	Sepoy Tor Khan	Usman	”	Khedeb ”
149	Sepoy Himarkai	Mirakbar	”	Badar ”
202	Sepoy Gulakai	Mirgul	”	Nirbabu ”
203	Sepoy Guldad	Shahzor	”	Katali ”
211	Sepoy Pirdal	Namwar	”	Kam-kurram ”
4725	Sepoy Shahgaz	Zawar Khan	”	Spin-Mazhak ”
3452	C. Havr. Jabari	Zarshah	”	Manu ”
4810	Havildar Zarmin	Pirai	”	Malakmela ”
35	Naik Kadam Khan	Bahawal Khan	”	Karama ”
4203	Sepoy Asd Khan	Ganga Rai	”	Razio ”
4562	Sepoy Afta Khan	Ali Khan	”	Gargorai ”
4771	Sepoy Yazafzai	Mirazan	”	Karama ”
4905	Sepoy Zabta Khan	Gwad	”	Khaisora ”
4650	Lance-Naik Wazir Khan	Gul Khan	”	Karama ”
4972	Lance-Naik Sadik Khan	Khan Gul	”	Mazarai ”
44	Sepoy Abdulahjan	Mirawaz	”	Malakmela ”
147	Sepoy Gul Shan	Gulabas	”	Malakmela ”
151	Sepoy Mohmed Akbar	Mir Hamza	”	Raghzai ”
152	Sepoy Mir Abar	Mir Hamza	”	Raghzai ”
163	Sepoy Ayoob Khan	Makhar	”	Karama ”
213	Sepoy Makhmad Ali II	Regnal	”	Malakmela ”
219	Sepoy Muhammad Nur	Mobat Khan	”	Karama ”
4850	Sepoy Lali Khan	Yakam Khan	”	Khaisora ”
196	Sepoy Gul Khan II	Pindia Khan	”	Abdul Waduni ”
3863	Havildar Umraz Khan	Dadar	”	Mirgand ”
4768	Lance-Havildar Nekam Khan	Mirakbar	”	Shoran ”
4375	Sepoy Nazar Khan	Gulan	”	Mirgaudkai ”
4377	Sepoy Ibrahim	Nur Muhammad	”	Khaza ”
4770	Sepoy Dilbarshah	Makhar	”	Shoran ”
4781	Sepoy Kadirdad	Patol	”	Jawakai ”
4782	Lance-Naik Tor Khan	Mitha Khan	”	Walma ”
3415	Rest. Guldad	Mirpayo	”	Khaisor ”
4924	Sepoy Hakim Khan	Zalmi Khan	”	Kazai ”
4969	Sepoy Gul Khan I	Shaizar	”	Kote ”
39	Sepoy Niamat Khan	Makhabat	”	Gideri ”
138	Sepoy Shell Khan	Gulrez	”	Talabkhel ”
144	Sepoy Azar Khan	Daud Shah	”	Mirjiond ”
145	Sepoy Jin Gwal	Shah Alam	”	Mirjiond ”
146	Sepoy Amir Khan	Psildor	”	Dreilmir ”
164	Sepoy Pasta Khel	Yaran	”	Kot ”
204	Sepoy Guljan	Sahib Khan	”	Khavara ”
205	Sepoy Dauran	Khansherin	”	Kaja ”
3866	Havildar Duro Gul	Husain	”	Malakmela ”
4739	Naik Bazid Khan	Sahib-Gul	”	Thaghikai ”
4666	Lance-Naik Amal Mir	Gulabzer	”	Khunkhel ”
3416	Sepoy Walizar	Makhsh	”	Khaisor ”
3423	Sepoy Dardanai	Galisashai	”	Khaisor ”
3549	Sepoy Shahiad Khan	Imar Khan	”	Gurgrai ”
4175	Sepoy Mamak	Khajawars	”	Khaisora ”
4722	Sepoy Saifalli	Azad	”	Sege ”
4945	Sepoy Ghita Gul	Shere Gul	”	Boikhel ”
41	Sepoy Raza Khan	Fateh Raz	”	Gurgurai ”
42	Sepoy Tarkhi Gul	Wamkai	”	Paikhel ”
43	Sepoy Aidal-Khel	Showagar	”	Abdulwaduni ”
177	Sepoy Shawal Khan	Barak	”	Shankai ”
178	Sepoy Yusaf Khan	Pshai	”	Abdulwaduni ”
179	Sepoy Fateh Khan	Makhmad Din	”	” ”
180	Sepoy Majan	Fazal Khan	”	Abdulwaduni ”
197	Sepoy Kutannai	Madakel	”	Abdulwaduni ”
218	Sepoy Zariban	Gulaband	”	Izakachka ”
226	Sepoy Musajan	Fazal-Khan	”	Shanki ”
4745	Havildar Khanawaz Khan	Mamak	Mahsud Bahlolzai	Mardaralgad ”
4790	Naik Alim Khan	Sher Gul	”	Mardaralgad ”
10	Naik Ghabedin	Kabal Khan	”	Mardaralgad ”
4744	Sepoy Naghim	Zali Khan	”	Amezhawar ”
4746	Sepoy Samtala Khan	Mamak	”	Mardaralgad ”
4772	Sepoy Zarwali	Alliband	”	Kotkai ”

4798	Sepoy Mash	Khanai	”	Shoran	”
4875	Sepoy Atta Mir	Shama Nir	”	Gharlama	”
4882	Sepoy Fazal Mir	Shama Nir	”	Gharlama	”
4946	Sepoy Hakim Shah	Minarshah	”	Boikhel	”
4947	Sepoy Badshah Mir	Shama Nir	”	Kamalkhel	”
5	Sepoy Fazal Khan	Saidazam	”	Mardaralgad	”
6	Sepoy Aqib Khan	Raz Guli	”	Mardaralgad	”
7	Sepoy Ghulam Haidar	Amar-Din	”	Mardaralgad	”
8	Sepoy Amin Khan	Macho	”	Mardaralgad	”
98	Sepoy Naza Mir	Shaijsum-Khan	”	Manitoi	”
102	Sepoy Gul Bat	Jang Bahadur	”	Katkai	”
110	Sepoy Madalim	Ramdud	”	Mardaralgad	”
157	Sepoy Sarfaraz	Dadan	”	Khatso	”
174	Sepoy Saadat Mir	Shaikh-Hassan	”	Boikhel	”
176	Sepoy Awalzar	Mandi Gul	”	Boikhel	”
200	Sepoy Makhmad Shah	Bangar	”	Boikhel	”
214	Sepoy Sahib Mir	Guldar Khan	”	Kazakai	”
215	Sepoy Zangi Khan	Babu Rai	”	Malai	”
216	Sepoy Alam Khan	Madakbar	”	Malai	”
217	Sepoy Gul Khadin	Rakhim	”	Malai	”
97	Maza Khan	Saidazam	”	Boikhel	”
4769	Naik Gulaman	Lalgai	”	Mardaralgad	”
4955	Naik Shamahjan	Tawar Shah	”	Badar	”
4767	Lance-Naik Akbar Shah	Mandai	”	Splitoi	”
4952	Sepoy Bazid Khan	Shungrai	Mahsud Allizai	Kikarai	”
4954	Sepoy Idar Khan	Birai	”	Warza	”
4984	Sepoy Ashiq	Sheikh	”	Khaser	”
4904	Sepoy Mama Gul	Shikhar	”	Terjin	”
2	Sepoy Kamar Gul	Shahgul	”	Khaisor	”
133	Sepoy Mani Khan	Awal Din	”	Warza	”
134	Sepoy Sadiq Khan	Hassan	”	Warza	”
166	Sepoy Mian Khan	Zakar Khan	”	Mastang	”
168	Sepoy Hassan	Shakar	”	Spinkai	”
169	Sepoy Silat Khan	Amin Gul	”	Spinkai	”
170	Sepoy Umar Khan	Kaderi	”	Spinkai	”
171	Sepoy Gulajan	Nir Shah	”	Spinkai	”
173	Sepoy Rakhmat Khan	Wari Khan	”	Urmarkhel	”
189	Sepoy Zakim Khan	Dad Gul	”	Khaisia	”
190	Sepoy Nazir Shah	Jamal Shah	”	Khaisia	”
191	Sepoy Zabta Khan	Nikarab	”	Khaisia	”
192	Sepoy Mada Min	Pawindah	”	Khaisia	”
209	Sepoy Hakim Khan	Gula Khan	”	Manosalai	”
210	Sepoy Iti Khel	Madazam	”	Manosalai	”
158	Sepoy Kahlim	Warai	”	Ghundakai	

TELEGRAM TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING, DEPOT, 130TH BALUCHIS, No. 23771-31, DATED THE 17TH FEBRUARY 1915.

(Extract from Karachi Brigade Intelligence Summary, dated 8th February 1915.)

Officer Commanding, Depot, 130th, Baluchis, brought for instructions a telegram from Mir Alam Khan asking after his brother Jemandar Khusal Khan of the 130th, who according to a report just received from the Headquarter of his regiment had been shot by sentence of a Court Martial for mutiny at Rangoon on the 22nd January.

Note by Karachi Brigade.

Following telegram sent to General Officer Commanding, Peshawar, (557-W.) (P.). would you kindly convey urgently to the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, the following message:—Intimation has been received by the Officer Commanding, Depot, 130th Baluchis, from the Headquarters of his reginment that Jemadar Khusal Khan was shot by sentence of a Court Martial for mutiny at Rangoon on January 22nd. He is the son of the late Mahomed Shah Khan, a Torakazi Mohmand, address, Jangirpura Street, Gul Badshah, Peshawar. His brother Mir Alam has telegraphed from Lachi to Officer Commanding, Depot, asking for news of his brother. Pending a reply from you as to whether you prefer that the first news to his relatives should come from the Political Authorities; no reply has been sent. Please telegraph your wishes.

3) 5th Native Light Infantry Revolt: Singapore

Rowlatt Report (Feb. 1915):–

"About the 28th December 1914 letters were intercepted from one Kasim Mansur, a Gujrati Muslim of Singapore, to his son in Rangoon. One of these letters forwarded an appeal to the Turkish Consul, Ahmed Mullah Daud from the *Malay States Guides*, one of the two regiments in Singapore, informing him that the regiment was prepared to mutiny against the British Government and fight for the Turks and requesting that a Turkish ship be sent to Singapore. Information of this correspondence was given to the authorities at Singapore in time to transfer the *Malay States Guides* to another place before any mutiny occurred, The authorities were not, however, able to prevent a serious mutiny of the other Singapore regiment, the 5th Infantry, which too had been contaminated by Muslim and Hindu conspirators belonging to American *Ghadr* party. Some of the plotters left for Rangoon soon after the mutiny. Among them was one Mujtaba Hussain *alias* Mul Chand who had been a *ziladar* in the Court of Wards at Kanpur. He then appears to have found his way to Manila (Philipines), where he came in touch with the *Ghadr* party and then came to Singapore and helped to promote the mutiny." (P. 170).

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Mandley – Burma Conspiracy Case Supplementary Judgement of 6th July, 1917:

Excerpts:—

Of the four accused —

1) Mujtaba Hussain *alias* Mul Chand, s/o Sajjad Hussain of Jaunpur, U.P.
2) Amar Singh (*Engineer*) s/o Wariam Singh, Jat of Sherpur Kalan, Police Station Jagraon, District. Ludhiana.
3) Ram Rakha s/o Jawahar Ram of Sasoli, P.S. Sadar, District Hoshiarpur.

Amar Singh 'Engineer'

and 4) Ali Ahmed Sidiqi s/o Qurban Ali Pathan of Shahzadpur. Police Station Akbarpur, District Faizabad, U.P., **Mujtaba Hussain** and Ram Rakha are said to have appeared In Manila – Phillipines and from there to have gone in January 1915 to Bangkok-Siam whence they were sent to assist the mutiny in Singapore. It is said that the former was present at and took part in the mutiny and from there he went to Rangoon – Burma where he met others who had come through Siam. (Page 186)


Ali Ahmed Sidiqi

We next find accused **Mujtaba Hussain** at Singapore…. They had spoken of the Subedar of the 5th Regiment and on 15th February that regiment revolted. He and one Gian Chand were out all day and on their return expressed opinions in favour of the mutineers and rejoiced over the death of Europeans… On the 16th February, they discussed the accounts of the mutiny in the papers, saying that the press minimized the results….

The accused left for Rangoon on the 18th February. (p. 189)

At the Gurdwara at Rangoon he **(Mujtaba Hussain)** got into touch with Hassan Khan (S/o Maula Dad, Rajput of Panjlasa, Police Station Naraingarh, District Ambala — an approver in the Main Mandley Case) and Chet Ram (S/o Bishan Das Arora of Vairowal Police Station Sambrial District Sialkot. Accused No. 2 in Main Case), for whom he wrote an account of the mutiny in concerning **Ram Rakha**, one of the three charges against him read:– (3) that he was sent by Sohan Lal Pathak (s/o Chanda Ram of Patti, District Amritsar) one of the leaders of *Ghadr* in Siam who has already been convicted, and hanged on February 10, 1916, and Jiwan Singh (s/o Isher Singh, Brahmi of Philloke Police Station Qila Didar Singh, District Gujranwala – accused No. 3 in Main case, sentenced to transportation for life for the purposes of the conspiracy and that he actually went to Singapore with Jiwan Singh to work for the *Ghadr* Case. (p. 196).

Pt. Ram Rakha

"… that he left Bangkok to go to Singapore with Jiwan Singh a

month before a mutiny actually occurred there, that on the way to Singapore they stayedat the house of an admitted seditionist Santokh Singh at Bandon, and they did actually go to Singpore (p. 198).

[Note: Ram Rakha was transported to Cellular Jail, Port Blair, Andemans along with his co-convicts, where he arrived on 11th February 1918 as prisoner No. 41054: He had to resort to hunger strike upon forcible removal of his sacred thread the 'Janeu'and laid down his life: His Martyrdom has been duly commemorated in the Andeman Cellular Jail Museum by including him among the 6 eminent martyrs of the jail." — (Ed.)]

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SINGAPORE MUTINY

Source:– (SINGAPORE: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD, NEW YORK — 1984)

R.W.E. HARPER
HARRY MILLER

Excerpts:—

MONDAY, 15 February 1915 dawned with the promise of being a perfect day for enjoyment in Singapore. It was a public holiday in celebration of Chinese New Year with its noisy festivities. A pre-dawn shower had cleared, and as the sun rose the island was soon sweltering in humid heat.

The population of that vast area known as Chinatown, situated immediately behind the city, prepared itself for a final round of feasting and merry-making by setting off hundreds of long strings of tiny red fire-crackers suspended from upper floor windows of terrace houses. Each street vied with the next to see how long each could keep up the racket. Louder explosions from more powerful fireworks and rockets came from open ground.

Other nationals turned to their own amusements. The European community, composed mainly of British, German, French and Dutch, went swimming, played golf, tennis or polo, met friends at hotels or clubs and quaffed their beer and gin-slings before lunch. Many others planned to relax at home in the morning, and then after lunch and a siesta to go for a drive by motor-car or pony-trap or to set off for a long walk through the pleasant suburb in which they lived.

At 8 o'clock that morning out at Alexandra Barracks, a military cantonment situated in undulating countryside to the south-west and about 5 miles from the city, a ceremonial parade began. Smartly dressed ranks of the 5th Light Infantry, Indian Army, commanded by Col. Martin snapped to attention and gave the general salute as the General Officer Commanding, Singapore, Brigadier-General Dudley Howard Ridout, arrived at the saluting base. He was inspecting the regiment for the last time, as it was due to leave for Hong Kong the following day after ten months'garrison duty in the colony.

Ridout was aware of a certain amount of *discontent* in the regiment, but Col. Martin had never told him that the *unrest was serious* and that it had been aggravated by deliberately-spun *rumours that the 5th Light Infantry, a wholly Muslim regiment, was being sent westwards to fight Turkey, a Muslim country, which had become an ally of Germany* in the war against Britain and France. The rumour-mongers had agitated for the strongest possible resistance to what they described as a piece of British 'trickery'on the grounds that Muslim soldiers should not fight one another. *The real enemies were, they claimed, not Germany and Turkey but Britain and France.*

Ridout was to say later that if he had any inkling of the restlessness of the sepoys because of the supposed uncertainty of their destination, he would have 'made it quite plain that it was eastward they were to go'.

When the parade was over, Ridout mentally noted that the Right Wing did not march off 'at all smartly', as he put it later. He heard talking in the ranks and assumed it had arisen out of points in his speech. Some Indian officers winced, however, for the remarks were of a most derisory nature.

After the inspection, which took one hour, Ridout returned to his official residence in Tanglin, Flagstaff House just over a mile away. The regiment turned to its final preparations for its embarkation the next day. But at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, mutiny exploded suddenly and without warning.[1]

AT 3 o'clock on a sweltering hot afternoon in Alexandra, Barracks, Sepoy Ismail Khan, a young Rajput, left his sentry post at the quarterguard hut and moments later fired a shot. This was later taken as the signal which set the men of the Right Wing (Rajput) of the 5th Light Infantry on their road to mutiny.[2]

Saturday, 20 February

A government *communique* declared:—

The local forces, assisted by a detachment of the Malay States Volunteer Rifles and the Johore Military Forces, with the help rendered by crews from ships of our Allies, have *quelled the riot* which commenced on the afternoon of the 15th, and now there remains the work of rounding up scattered batches of mutineers.

A number of them have been arrested in Singapore island and also by the *Sultan* of Johore in the state of Johore where they have attempted to escape. There has been no damage to property, but the government deeply regrets to record that there has been *a number of lives lost*. It has been very difficult to obtain a correct list of casualties owing to the large and scattered areas of the country where the murders have occurred.

The statement added that thirty-three people had been killed and nine others wounded. Two officers of the 5th Light it Infantry, Captain Boyce and Lieutenant Elliott, were 'missing and believed dead'.

The government offered rewards for the 'marking down' or the capture of mutineers and for the recovery of rifles. These were: $200 for marking down large bodies of mutineers; $20 for the capture or surrender of mutineers up to ten in number; $500 for the recovery of the body of Captain Boyce; $5 for the recovery of each rifle proved to be the property of the 5th or the Malay States Guides; and $1,000 for the capture of each escaped German.

Finally, the *communique* announced the appointment of a Court of Inquiry into the events and the causes of the mutiny.

Extensive sweeps for mutineers during the day reported 'sightings' but few successes. Late in the evening, the final reinforcements of six companies of the King's Shropshire Light, Infantry arrived by ship from Rangoon. The next day they were employed in mopping-up operations in the western part of the island.[3]

On 8 March, the British community deemed that life had all but resumed its pre-mutiny normalcy when the Provost Marshall sanctioned the reopening of golf clubs.

It was a useful peg for the *Straits Times* to hang a critical editorial which, however, was blandly headed *Recent Events*. It said, *inter alia,*

'Three weeks have passed since the *fatal 15th* and all is quiet again in Singapore. So quiet are we that even the golf courses have been reopened. We are pretty much as we were, though the anxious task of sifting a mass of conflicting evidence and meting out punishment where it is due still remains.

…No doubt a time may come when questions of responsibility may have to be discussed and points, debated as to the efficiency of the measures taken to secure the safety of the general population.

For the present, it is enough to say that the *danger was grappled with swiftly*, that the naval men rendered us a service which can never be forgotten, that the Volunteers were in arms and on full duty more promptly than we could have dared to hope, seeing that the trouble arose on a public holiday, that the response to the call for town guards were hearty and that these guards, as a whole, did the works assigned to them with cheerfulness, fidelity, and intelligence.[4]

The following is a short summary of the Court's main findings. It found that the prime or principal cause of the mutiny had been 'the very unsatisfactory state of discipline which had prevailed in the 5th Light Infantry apparently for some time'.

On a contributory cause, it considered there had been 'a good deal of force in Colonel Martin's contention that the dispersion all over Singapore of his regiment, had lent itself to his men being subjected to the evil influences of seditionists who were passing to and from the Far East and America'.

It raised little doubt that Germans in the camp had a hand in bringing about the mutiny, but any *German collusion* had been confined 'to a select few who probably fostered mutinous ideas amongst their late guard to their own initial advantage'.

It dismissed as 'highly improbable' that the failure to give Imtiaz Ali the promotion he had been promised, had been a primary cause of the mutiny.[5]

Although the mutiny of the 5th Light Infantry in Singapore failed, it is historically important in that it was the only (Sic!) *success achieved by the revolutionaries in their grandiose and over-ambitious scheme to wrest India from the British Crown by military means*. Because of the war raging in the West against the Germans, the public at large, and especially in Singapore, were led by the British Government to believe that the mutiny was a purely local affair when *it was really all part of a much wider Indian revolutionaries' plot*.[6]

References :

1. Ps. 1-3.
2. P. 40.
3. Ps. 179-80.
4. P. 188.
5. P. 216.
6. P. 240.

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PUNISHMENTS: Particulars

(A) SHOT DEAD IN PUBLIC

Sr. No.	Rect. No.	Rank	Name	son of	Home Address
1	2184	Sep.	Abdul Ghani Khan	Said Khan	Jatusana, Gurgaon
2	2652	Sep.	Abdul Ghani Khan	Saidu Khan	Kaluwas, Jind
3	2594	L/NK	Ahmed Khan	Makhan Khan	Burtana, Hissar
4	2904	HAV	Inayt	Bali Mohan Khan	...
5	1754	Hav	Ibrahim	Nazar Khan	Jamalpur, Hissar
6	2687	Sep	Ibrahim	Chhailu Jat	Turani, Rohtak
7	1792	Sep	Imtiaz Ali	Ghulam Rasul Khan	...
8	1950	Sep	Ismail	Makhan Khan	Bainsi, Rohtak
9	2770	Sep	Umrao Ali	Makhan Khan Pathan	Karmpur, Gurgaon
10	1933	NK	Ghafar Ali Khan	Hakim Khan	Paten, Hissar
11	...	Jem	Chishti Khan	Mussalam Khan	Kirawad, Hissar
12	2457	Sep.	Jamalludin	Baksh Khan	Jatauli, Gurgaon
13	...	Sub.	Dunde Khan	Khan Mohd. Khan	Bajpur Gurgaon
14	2058	Sep	Taj Mohd Khan	Ghulam Mohd Khan	Baniani, Rohtak
15	...	Sep	Nathe Khan	Daree Khan	Kusini, Muzzaffar Nagar
16	...	Sep	Nawab Khan	Haider Khan	Tusani, Hissar
17	2061	NK	Niyaz Mohd	Ali Akbar Khan	Kanahaur, Rohtak
18	3051	Sep	Nishan Ali Khan	Mazhar Khan	Rorr, Karnal
19	3113	Sep	Nur Mohd.	Makhan Khan	Jatsuana, Gurgaon
20	2102	L/NK	Fazal Ali	Kabira Khan	Chang, Hissar
21	2637	L/NK	Feroz Khan	Alladitta Khan	Kheri Nangal Gurgaon
22	2544	Sep	Faiz Mohd.	Rahimali Khan	Sama Gopalpur Rohtak
23	2649	Sep	Basharat Ali	Ranmast Khan	Balliya Ali, Hissar
24	2574	Sep	Baqar Ali	Ummed Khan	Gajram, Hissar
25	2925	Sep	Bhure Khan	Faiz Khan	Rajput Partal, Nabha
26	2112	NK	Munshi Khan	Mazhar Khan	Balyali, Hissar
27	1352	HAV	Murad Ali Khan	Karam Ali Khan	Jamalpur, Hissar
28	2463	Sep	Mohd Baksh	Jan Mohd Khan	Jamalpur, Hissar
29	2999	Sep	Rasul Ali	...	...
30	1890	HAV	Rehmat Ali	Lakhmir Khan	Jhobri, Rohtak
31	2715	Sep	Rahim Dad	Ghaffar Khan	Chanhi, Hissar
32	2323	Sep	Rukun-u-Din	Fariq Khan, Jat	Kani, Rohtak
33	3048	Sep	Lal Khan	Karim Baksh Chohan	Gujrani, Hissar
34	2997	Sep	Saied Mohd	Lashkri Khan	Baiyali, Hissar
35	2819	Sep	Rafi Mohd	Amar Ali Khan Chohan	Jatsuana, Gurgaon
36	1891	Hav	Sammad Khan	Sahjad Khan	Chaudhariwas, Hissar
37	2894	Sep	Shamsuddin	...	Baniyani, Rohtak
38	2462	Sep	Suleman Khan	Rasul Khan	Balnali, Hissar
39	2406	Sep	Suleman Khan	Imanudin Khan	Garhi, Rohtak
40	2885	Sep	Suleman Khan	Mehbub Khan	Kahnaur Rohtak
41	2311	Sep	Hakim Ali	...	...

HANGED

1	2856	Sep	Moman	Asta Khan	Bas Patiala
2	2982	Sep	Rafi Mohd	Nawab Ali Khan	Kalanaur, Rohtak
3	1824	Sep	Shamudin	Maniudin	Meham, Rohtak

(File No. Home 1916 Confidential No. 18/1916
Home 1917 Political A. November. 75)
P.A. Section, National Archives of India, New Delhi — File No. 76 (Manuscript: Hindi), pp. 12-14.
Source: Prof. Phul Chan Jain

JAIL SENTENCES:

Besides death sentence on the aforelisted 44 soldiers of 5, nl.1 rest of those who were court-marshaled, were given varying imprisonment sentences the kind of imprisonment being RIGOROUS in all the cases. These sentences were pronounced on 16.3.1915, and thereupon the Provost Magistrate issued warrants of their transfer to different jails on 23.3.1915; 50 of them were sent to Hazari Bhag jail (then in Bihar, now Jharkhand), and the rest of Muzzaffarpur (Bihar) and other jails.

(A) TRANSPORTED FOR LIFE = 63

Sr. No.	Rect. No.	Name	son of	Home Address	Jail
1	2259	Mubarak Ali Khan	Karam Ali Khan	Chaudhriwas, Hissar	Arrah
2	3142	Zafar Ali Khan	Yusuf Khan	Kahnaur, Rohtak	Darbhanga
3	3053	Umarao Ali	Makha alias Mubarak Ali Khan	Jamalpur, Hissar	Arrah
4	2438	Aliahdad Khan	Sikander Khan Chohan	Nigana, Hissar	Hazari Bagh
5	2967	Zahurali Khan	Umao Ali Chohan	Kirawad, Hissar	Hazari Bagh
6	2500	Himayat Ali Khan	Faiz Mohd. Khan	Jatsuana, Gurgaon	Hazari Bagh
7	2998	Deedara	Rahimali Khan	Parrtal, Nabha	Hazari Bagh
8	2817	Zafar Ali Khan	Rahim Ali Khan	Khatauli Gurgaon	Hazari Bagh
9	2082	Abdul Ghafur	Abdulla Khan	Partal, Nabha State	Muzzafarpur
10	2327	Sher Mohd. Khan	Ghafoor Khan	Nangla, Gurgaon	Sambalpur
11	2503	Phul Khan	Karim Baksh Khan	Matsana	Bankipur
12	1724	Wali Mohd. Khan	Niyaz Mohd. alias Faiz Khan	Jatsuana, Gurgaon	Bankipur

13	2166	Makhmul	Ali Baksh Khan	Nangla Gopalpur, Gurgaon	Bankipur
14	1940	Muzaffar Khan	Sikander Khan	Jatsuana, Gurgaon	Bankipur
15	2147	Hakim Ali	Mardan Khan	Surganw Alwar	Arrah
16	2860	Rahim Dad	Samdal Khan	Jatsuana, Gurgaon	Muzzafarpur
17	2983	Farid Baksh	Shehzada	Shori, Patiala	Muzzafarpur
18	1811	Jamal-udin	Khande Khan	Hissar	Muzzafarpur
19	2559	Nasra Khan	Kamrdi Khan	Urani Kalan, Karnal	Hazari Bagh
20	2041	Nazra Khan	Kamurdin Khan	Urana Khurd, Karnal	Hazari Bagh
21	2064	Jalal Khan	Shabzad Khan	Bersal, Karnal	Ranchi
22	2651	Dost Mohd. Khan	Ghulam Ali Khan	Banyani, Rohtak	Hazari Bagh
23	1734	Manawar-Ali-Khan	Makmul	Godha, Rohtak	Ranchi
24	2766	Fateh Mohd. Khan	Jahangir Khan	Baliyali, Hissar	Hazari Bagh
25	2547	Ghafoor Khan	Jeewan Khan	Baliyali, Hissar	Buxar
26	2685	Shafi Mohd. Khan	Kalimulla Khan	Kahnaur, Rohtak	Hazari Bagh
27	2977	Shekhawat Khan	Ghulam Rasul Khan	Baliyali, Hissar	Sambalpur
28	2205	Asghar Khan	Allah Baksh Khan	Satira, Hissar	Sambalpur
29	2854	Sher Mohd. Khan	Allah Dad Khan	Jatsuana, Gurgaon	Sambalpur
30	3121	Karimudin Khan	Imam Ali Khan	Porotal, Nabha	Sambalpur
31	1809	Khuda Bakhsh Khan	Makhu Khan	Dona Kalan, Hissar	...
32	1808	Nur Mohd. Khan	Saidu Khan	Kheri, Rohtak	...
33	2367	Dost Mohd. Khan	Didar Baksh Khan	Kahnaur, Rohtak	...
34	2042	Faiz Mohd. Khan	Nawab Ali Khan	Ratora, Hissar	...
35	2905	Mohd. Rashid Khan	Shamsher Khan	Kheri, Gurgaon	...
36	2137	Ali Mohd. Khan	Ashraf Khan	Khatauli, Gurgaon	...
37	2879	Nur Mohd. Khan	Ghulram Hussain	Khabasa, Hissar	...
38	1905	Abdur Ghaffar Khan	Lakhmir Khan	Hajipur, Hissar	Buxar
39	3105	Dost Mohd. Khan	Umda Khan	Jamalpur, Hissar	...
40	2121	Arshad Khan	Ahmed Khan	Chuhar, Gurgaon	...
41	2411	Shafi Mohd. Khan	Mehbub Ali Khan	Kheri Manjal, Gurgaon	...
42	2523	Fazal Azim Khan	Abdulla Khan	Baliali, Hissar	...
43	2741	Abdul Khan	Nazhar Khan	Baliali, Hissar	...
44	1999	Silaru Khan	Mir Baksh	Jamalpur, Hissar	...
45	2930	Mehfuz Ali	Ghulam Rasul Khan	Baliali, Hissar	...
46	2474	Mohd. Khan	Rasulla Khan	Baliali, Rohtak	...
47	2276	Allah Baksh	Abdul Khan	Rasdhan, Alwar	...
48	3107	Kasim Ali	Imam Ali Khan	Khatauli, Gurgaon	...
49	2191	Jan Mohd.	Nabi Khan	Khaneki, Hissar	...
50	2056	Hashim Ali Khan	Arshad Khan	Kalanaur, Rohtak	...
51	2393	Taj Mohd.	Sujawal Khan	...	...
52	3070	Jan Mohd.	Maula Baksh	...	...
53	1872	Mazhar Khan	Kinla Khan	Chang, Hissar	...
54	1755	Taj Mohd	Safdar Khan	Khanik, Hissar	...
55	2092	Maqsud	Fayaz Khan	Dhulkot, Gurgaon	...

56	2587	Zafar Ali Khan	Karim Baksh Khan	Kaluwas, Jind	...
57	2657	Fazal Ali	Sipahi Khan	Khag, Hissar	...
58	2703	Niyaz Mohd. Khan	Maskeen Khan	Chandi, Rohtak	...
59	1770	Karm Khan	Mardan Khan	Nigana, Rohtak	...
60	1759	Chishti Khan	Mardan Khan	Chandi, Rohtak	...
61	2091	Imamudin Khan	Mushtaq Khan	Nagal, Rohtak	...
62	2173	Mardan Khan	Naurang Khan	Partal, Nabha	...
63	2069	Nur Mohd.	Kalandar Khan	Jatsuana, Rohtak	Ranchi

SENTENCED TO 20 YEARS OF TRANSPORTATION = 9

64	3118	Mubarak Ali	Khub Ali Khan	Jatsuana, Gurgaon	Buxar
65	1186	Suleman Khan	Mohd. Ismail Khan	Fateh Kapurwa, Sultanpur	Chhapra
66	2502	Ghaffar Khan	Karim baksh Khan	Patan, Hissar	Sambalpur
67	3133	Mughali Khan	Mehboob Khan	Baliali, Hissar	Buxar
68	3122	Nazar Mohd. Khan	Dost Mohd. Khan	Talai, Rohtak	...
69	2746	Mazsad Khan	Balidad Khan	Siwani, Hissar	Buxar
70	3112	Nazar Mohd. Khan	...	Parkal, Gurgaon	Buxar
71	2059	Fateh Mohd. Khan	Niaz Mohd. Khan	Baniani, Rohtak	Buxar
72	2473	Nazar Ali Khan	Jamardi Khan	Chag, Hissar	Buxar

SENTENCED TO 15 YEARS OF TRANSPORTATION = 25

73	2577	Bhure Khan	Nabi Baksh Khan Chohan	Dagkila, Hissar	Arrah
74	2725	Chand Khan	Ahmed Khan Chohan	Dagkila, Hissar	Muzzafarpur
75	1775	Karim Baksh	Ashraf Khan	Shivani, Hissar	Motihari
76	1854	Kale Khan	Mohd. Yar Khan	Thilaya Barely	Darbhanga
77	1911	Abdul Khan	Rukan Khan	Gopalpur, Gurgaon	Muzzafarpur
78	3182	Abdul Ghaffar Khan	Niyaz Mohd. Khan	Gurgaon	...
79	2749	Alladin Khan	Sikander Khan	Jatsuana, Gurgaon	Sambalpur
80	2648	Ramzan	Indu	Naurangpur, Rohtak	...
81	2362	Nihal	Bhuru	Didhal, Rohtak	Sambalpur
82	3027	Qabool	Mirali	Naurangpur, Rohtak	...
83	2858	Wahid Ali Khan	Fayal Mohd. Khan	Jakbola, Rohtak	...
84	2263	Ata-Mohd. Khan	Fayaz Mohd. Khan	Jakbola, Rohtak	...
85	1761	Sher Mohd.	Talwar Khan	Chanch, Rohtak	Buxar
86	1554	Taj Mohd.	Ahmed Khan	Khanik, Hissar	...
87	2882	Barkat	Niwad Ali Khan	Jamalpur, Hissar	...
88	2993	Bhura	Nur Mohd. Khan	Partal, Nabha	...
89	2611	Himayat Ali Khan	Nawab Ali Khan	Kirana, Jind	...
90	2031	Rahim Dad Khan	Mehand Khan	Bhan, Rohtak	...

91	2235	Nazir Khan	Karim Khan	Patan, Hissar	...
92	1990	Basharat Khan	Mardan Khan	Shivani, Hissar	...
93	2793	Munshi Khan	Hussaina	Gujrani, Hissar	...
94	1903	Abdul Ghani Khan	Jan Mohd. Khan	Jamalpur, Hissar	...
95	3180	Rehmatulla Khan	Jamaradin Khan	Chang, Hissar	...
96	3106	Kutbi Khan	Ashraf Khan	Khatauli, Gurgaon	...
97	3125	Wali Mohd. Khan	Bhola Khan	Dang Kalan, Hissar	...

SENTENCED TO 10 YEARS OF TRANSPORTATION = 34

98	2520	Ghulam Rasul Khan	Shah Mohd.	Guriani, Rohtak	...
				Pathan Khan	
99	2219	Mohd. Ali	Ali Baksh Rajput	Nigara, Rohtak	Darbhanga
			Khan		
100	2160	Ramzan	Mirla Jat	Parunda, Rohtak	Arrah
101	3017	Manzoor Ahmed	Ejaz Mohd. Khan	Guriani, Rohtak	...
		Khan			
102	1958	Subhan Khan	Hussain Khan	Titran, Saharanpur	...
103	2812	Mohd. Sidqi	Kali Khan	Guriani, Rohtak	...
104	2614	Joond	Bau	Murdar ki Jhoni,	
				Hissar	...
105	2326	Abdul Razak Khan	nizam Mohd. Khan	Jakbala, Rohtak	...
106	1338	Taj Mohd. Khan	Rehmatulla Khan	Nigana Rohtak	...
107	2068	Suleman Khan	Rasul Khan	Baniani, Rohtak	...
108	2238	Taj Mohd. Khan	Karim Ali	Baniani, Rohtak	...
109	2037	Fayaz Mohd. Khan	Mehbub Khan	Guriani, Rohtak	...
110	2430	Mana	Khuda Baksh	Chandol, Rohtak	...
111	2572	Inayat Khan	Badlu	Deenpur, Delhi	...
112	2952	Abdul Ali Khan	Sanwal	Roshanpura, Delhi	...
113	2353	Ruknudin	Dhalsara	Dadoo, Rohtak	...
114	1493	Imam Baksh	Ghulam Hussain	Khanik, Hissar	...
			Khan		
115	2252	Hussain Ali Khan	Buland Baksh	Talwandi, Rohtak	...
116	2861	Afzal Khan	Muzaffar Khan	Danshi, Rohtak	...
117	2906	Maqsud Khan	Ghaffoor Khan	Partal, Nabha	...
118	1849	Sher Khan	Muradali Khan	Baliyani Hissar	...
119	2018	Jabbar Khan	Shamdakha	Shishawala, Hissar	...
120	1836	Kutbi	Mazhar Khan	Chandi, Rohtak	...
121	2127	Fazal Ali Khan	Karm Baksh Khan	Padtal, Rohtak	...
122	2932	Murad Ali Khan	Mehtab Ali Khan	Assandh, Karnal	...
123	2284	Nizam Mohd. Khan	Mustqim Khan	Murandi, Rohtak	...
124	1986	Yasin Khan	Ashraf Ali Khan	Baliyani, Hissar	...
125	2490	Allah Baksh Khan	Jandi Khan	Patan, Hissar	...
126	2859	Sohrab Ali Khan	Nabi Baksh Khan	Khatauli, Gurgaon	...
127	1955	Taj Mohd. Khan	Mussallam Khan	Baniyani, Rohtak	...

128	2117	Zafar Ali Khan	Yuday Khan	Sanyal, Rohtak	...
129	1901	Niaz Mohd. Khan	Ghulam Ali Khan	Kahnaur, Rohtak	...
130	2570	Nur Mohd. Khan	Nawab Khan	Meham, Rohtak	...
131	2690	Karim Baksh Khan	Nawab Ali Khan	Khera, Hissar	...

SENTENCED TO 7 YEARS OR TRANSPORTATION = 10

132	2034	Shah Mohd. Khan	Shahabzada Khan	Khandara, Rohtak	...
133	2404	Inayat Ali Khan	Ghamin Khan	Tala, Rohtak	...
134	2892	Najir	Faiz Mohd. Khan	Partal, Nabha	...
135	2822	Kutbi Khan	Faiz Ali Khan	Chandi, Rohtak	...
136	1876	Feroz	Imam Ali Khan	Nigana, Rohtak	...
137	2402	Mohd. Jamil Khan	Ranjit Khan	Guriani, Rohtak	...
138	2795	Mohd. Razak Khan	Didar Khan	Khedi Gurgaon	...
139	2994	Maqsud Ali Khan	Jamal Khan Khedi	Khedi Gurgaon	...
140	2792	Hoshiar Ali Khan	Murad Ali Khan	Baliyani, Hissar	...
141	2939	Said Mohd.	Nur Mohd.	Bhattatanduwas,	
				Hissar	...

SENTENCED TO 5 YEARS OF RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENT = 3

142	2386	Idrahim Khan	Rahim Baksh Khan	Madhawa Rajput,	
				Ratik, Karraul	...
143	2846	Edee	Baharu	Bigal, Rohtak	...
144	2167	Khwaja Mohd.	Faizudin	Guriana, Rohtak	...
		Khan			

SENTENCED TO 3 YEARS OF RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENT = 2

145	2948	Saudagar Khan	Faiz Mohd. Khan	Chang, Hissar	...
146	2877	Amar Ali Khan	Kale Khan	Hirka, Patiala	...

SENTENCED TO 2 YEARS OF RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENT = 9

147	3090	Abdul Sammad	Sabdual Khan	Jakhal, Rohtak	...
		Khan			
148	2763	Jamal	Samir Khan	Jamalpur, Hissar	...
149	3031	Rahimudin	Kalandar Khan	Jamalpur, Hissar	...
150	2929	Nur Mohd. Khan	Amir Khan	Khedi, Gurgaon	...
151	3043	Bhopal Khan	Pinjari Khan	Sipore, Hissar	...

152	3354	abdul Sattar Khan	Ghulam Hassan Khan	Sabsiyawas, Rohtak	...
153	2665	Ali Mohd. Khan	Mohd. Ali Khan	Bahadurgarh, Rohtak	...
154	3091	Mohd. Khan	Fazal Ahmed Khan	Jakhola, Rohtak	
155	2834	Mohd. Sadiq Khan	Ghulam Mohd. Khan	Jhanda Nangla, Saharanpur	...

SENTENCED TO 1 YEAR OF RIGROUS IMPRISONMENT =4

156	1865	Niaz Mohd.	Faiz Mohd Khan	Karorri, Rohtak	...
157	3023	Sundar II	Mohd.	Gharsul, Hissar	...
158	2987	Rehmatulla	Faiz Mohd.	Bhalalwal Ludhiana	...
159	3165	Ismail	Mohd.	Mohalla Taliali, Ludhiana	...

PERIOD OF SENTENCE NOT KNOWN = 2

160	2609	Bhopal Khan	Bhikha Khan	Shivani, Hissar	...
161	2079	Nur Mohd. Khan	Kalandar Khan	Jatsuana, Rohtak	...

AQUITTED

162	2848	Karim Baksh	Khuda Baksh	Kawaspur, Rohtak	...

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Contemporary Newspaper Reports
The Straits Times, February 20, 1915
Situation in Singapore

The following official *communique* is forwarded by Mr. W.H. Lee-Warner, Private Secretary to H.E. the Governor, for publication:

The local forces assisted by a detachment of the Malay States Volunteer Rifles and the Johore Forces, with help rendered by crews from ships of our Allies, have quelled the riot which commenced on the afternoon of the 15th February, and now there remains the work of rounding up scattered batches of the mutineers.

This is being successfully carried out and a number have been arrested in Singapore Island, and also by the Sultan of Johore in the State of Johore, where they have attempted to escape.

There has been no damage to property but the Government deeply regrets to record that there has been a number of lives lost.

It has been very difficult to obtain a correct list of casualties owing to the large and scattered area of the country where the murders have occurred.

The following is a complete list of the casualties which have occurred as ascertained to date :

KILLED

ROYAL GARRISON ARTILLERY: Major R.H. Galwey., Captain F.V. Izard, Captain M.F.A. aclean (attached Malay States Guides), No. 8814 Corporal J.R.V. Beagley , No. 85514 Gunner J. Barry, 78th Co.

NAVAL FORCES: Stoker C.F. Anscombe.

ARMY SERVICE CORPS: No. 15976 Sergeant E.H. Sexton.

SINGAPORE VOLUNTEER ARTILLERY: Gunner P. Walton.

SINGPORE VOLUTEER RIFLES: 2nd Lieut. J.Love Montgomerie, provat F. Drysdale, Private J. Harper, Private A..J.G. Holt, Private G.O. Lawson, Private B.C. Cameron.

SINGAPORE VOLUNTEER MEDICAL COMPANY: Lieut. A.F. Legge.

MALAY STATES VOLUNTEER RIFLES: Captain P.N. Gerrad, Private W.H. Leigh.

JOHRE FORCES: Captain Jabar, Corporal....., Private Jacub Bin Fali.

CIVILIANS: C.V. Dyson, Government Service, S.S., Dr. E.C. Whittle, Government Service, Warder J. Clarke, Government Service, Mr. G.B. Woolcombe and wife, of Eastern Extension Tel. Co., C. Smith, of Eastern Extension Tel. Co., G. Wald, of Eastern Extension Tel. Co., J.B. Dunn, Guthric and Co., D. MacGilvray, Guthric and Co., E.O. Butterworth, Guthric and Co., D.J. Marshall, China Mutual Ins. Co.

DIED OF WOUNDS: Captain H. Cullimore, Johore Forces. F. Geddes, of Topham, Jones and Railton.

WOUNDED AND MISSING BELIEVED DEAD, Capt. P. Boyce, 5th Native Light Infantry.

MISSING, BELIEVED DEAD: Lieut. N.S. Elliott, 5th Native Light Infantry.

WOUNDED: Severe.— Private A. Gardener, Malay States

Volunteer Rifles, No. 26206 Gunner A. Hind, 80th Co., R.G.A., No. 3269 Sergeant G. Keeble, R.G.A. Private W.N. Little, M.S.V.R.

Serious — No. 3011 Gunner F.W. Saby, 80th Co., R.G.A., T.A. Flett, 1st officer, Cable Ship Recorder, Private R.L.V. Woodhouse, S.V.R.

Slight.— Sapper W. Flint, S.R.E. (v.), Private James Robertson, S.V.R.

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The Straits Times, February 22, 1915

Situation in Singapore

His Excellency the Governor authorises the publication of the following information:

> "It is notified for public information that the Secretary of State for the Colonies has been kept informed of the casualties that have occurred.
>
> These will be published in the British Press after the nearest relatives have been informed by the Colonial Office."

The following is also officially communicated:–

A British Regiment has arrived in Singapore.

Numerous captures (of the mutineers) continue to be made, some sixty men having been brought in yesterday from Johore alone.

Several parties have been located in the west of the island and are being rounded up.

The trial of individual mutineers has commenced before a summary court-martial.

Correction in casualty list: E.E. Litts (M.S.V.R.). The bodies of Capt. P. Boyce and of Lieut. H.S. Elliott, 5th Light Infantry, have been found.

PROCLAMATIONS

In the name of the king.

Author: Young, Governor and Commander-in-Chief.

Martial Law is hereby proclaimed throughout the Settlement of Singapore in supremacy of all Civil Authority. Major Thompson is hereby appointed Provost-Marshal with authority to act.

Dated this 15th day of February, 1915.

In the name of His Majesty King George V, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India.

Brigadier-General Commanding Troops, S.S. Headquarters, Govt. House, February 20,1915.

PROCLAMATION

Under Martial Law by Major AM. Thompson, Provost-Marshal.

February 20,1915.

All Indians of whatever race (Sic?) will report to the Police Station of their district for the purpose of obtaining passes to protect them from arrest.

Each man must produce substantial evidence that he is not a soldier.

List of Registering Police Stations :

(A) Central Police Station.
(B) Kandang Kerbau.
(C) Rochore.
(D) Sepoy Lines.
(E) Orchard Road.

Registration between the hours of 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. daily.

[This only applies to males over 18 years of age.]

It is notified for public information that the Secretary of State for the Colonies has been kept informed of the casualties that have occurred.

These will be published in the British Press after the nearest relatives have been informed by the Colonial Office.

PROCLAMATION UNDER MARTIAL LAW

Whereas it has been brought to the notice of the Brigadier-General Commanding the Troops, Straits Settlements, that certain individuals are spreading wild rumours and discussing the same openly.

The attention of all is directed to the following section of the Army Act:

Section 5: Every person subject to military law who on active service commits any of the following offences; that is to say:

> "(5) By word of mouth, or in writing, or by signal or otherwise, spreads reports calculated to create unnecessary alarm or

despondency, shall on conviction by court martial be liable to suffer transportation for life, or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned."

The attention of the public is directed to the fact that under Proclamation every person within the Straits Settlements in subject to Military Law. The Provost-Marshal has received the orders of the Brigadier-General to arrest summarily such persons as commit this offence.

Given at Headquarters, Government House, this 21st day of February, 1915.

A.M. THOMPSON, Major,
Provost-Marshal.

NOTICE

The letting off of crackers, bombs, or fireworks of any description is strictly prohibited during the period of Martial Law.

By Order,

A.M. THOMPSON, Major,
Singapore, February 17, 1915. Provost-Marshal.

PROCLAMATION

A.H. Young, Governor and Commander-in-Chief

Whereas certain of the Indian officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers stationed in Singapore have committed the offence of mutiny and are at large in the Colony;

And Whereas, it constitutes an offence for any one resident or being in the Colony to receive, harbour, relieve, comforter assist any one who has committed the offence of mutiny;

Now, therefore, I, Sir Arthur Henderson Young, Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of the Straits Settlements and its Dependencies and High Commissioner for the Malay States under His Majesty's protection, do hereby warn all persons resident or being in the Colony, who receive, harbour, relieve, comfort or assist any such Indian officer, non-commissioned officer or soldier who has committed the offence of mutiny, that they will be liable to be apprehended and *dealt with as criminals and will be proceeded against with the, utmost rigour of the law.*

Given at Singapore this nineteenth day of February, 1915.

By His Excellency's Command,
R.J. WILKINSON,
Colonial Secretary.

God save the king!

MARTIAL LAW

By order of Brigadier-General D. Ridout, Commanding the Troops in the Straits Settlements, an Information Bureau has been opened.

The public are requested to forward to the understated written statements, of—

1. Any events in connection with the recent outbreak in Singapore from the commencement thereof witnessed by any person; for example, the murder or wounding of any person or persons, the shooting at any person, the identification of any mutineer found with arms or ammunition, the discovery of the dead body of any European (Only!), etc.; and
2. Any information or disclosure of any event or events prior to the outbreak which may suggest a reason for the same. A report of rumours or gossip even will be accepted.

All communications in any language should be addressed to:

Information Bureau D.P.P.'s Office,
Central Police Station.

By Order,
G.G. SETH,
Officer in charge of Information Bureau

NOTICE

By Brigadier-General D. Ridout, Commanding Troops, S.S.

Major A. Chancellor, I.G.P., The Hon. Sir Evelyn Ellis, M.L.C., and Lieut. Strover, 6th Light Infantry, have been appointed this day to form a Court of Enquiry to collect evidence concerning the Mutiny of the 5th Light Infantry.

They will sit under directions to be issued by the President.

The Hon. Sir Evelyn Ellis, M.L.C., is hereby appointed President

of the said Court of Enquiry.

DUDLEY RIDOUT

NOTICE

Notice is hereby given that the following rewards are offered:

$ 200 for the marking down of large bodies of mutineers consisting of ten and upwards.

$ 20 for the capture or surrender of mutineers up to ten in number.

$ 500 for the recovery of the body of Captain Boyce, 5th L.I.

$ 5 for each rifle which can proved to have been the property of native infantry or the Malay States Guides.

$ 1,000 tor the capture of any German prisoner.

$ 50 for information leading to the capture of any German prisoner.

A.M. THOMPSON, MAJOR,
Singapore, February 20,1915 Provost-Marshal.

The Straits Times, February 25, 1915.

Situation in Singapore

OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS

The situation continues completely satisfactory.

The clearing of the districts and the extension of the safe area progresses. Captures and surrenders continue and some have taken place through burning the bush.

The detachment of the 86th Sikhs has been actively employed during the day in searching for parties marked down in the dense country.

Further casualty: Mr. H. O 'Shaughnessey Collins of the Straits Bulletin. It has been definitely proved today that Mr. Collins lost his life near Alexandra Barracks on the 15th inst., when the first murders took place.

NOTICE FOR THE PRESS

The sentence of death by shooting passed upon two Sepoys of the 5th Light Infantry - by Summary General Court Martial for joining in a Mutiny, was carried into effect yesterday afternoon (February 28) at 5 P.M.

NOTICE

By His Execellency Brigadier-General, D.H. Ridout, Commanding Troops, Straits Settlements

The public are hereby notified that two of the 5th Native Light Infantry were shot at Singapore on the 23rd inst.

These men were found in the act of shooting at peaceful citizens and has been tried by a properly constituted Court Martial and found guilty of Mutiny.

Dated at Singapore, this 24th day of February, 1915.

A.M. THOMPSON, Major,
Provost Marshal

PROCLAMATION

The following proclamation has been issued by the orders of the Brigadier-General D. Ridout, Commanding the Troops, Straits Settlements:

Any rumours that these men were shot for refusing to go to fight in other parts of the empire and untrue.

The Regiment was to have proceeded to Hongkong on Tuesday, the 16th, to form part of the Garrison there. The men had expressed no objection to that, but it is known that there was jealousy in the Regiment concerning promotion.

The Government recognises with gratitude the steadfast behavour of the Detachment of the 86th Sikhs which happened to be here and of the Sikh and Malay Police and of the General Public of all classes.

A.M. THOMPSON, Major,
Provost Marshal.

PRESS BUREAU ACCOUNT OF THE EMEUTE

Reuter's Telegram

London, February 28, 9.20 P.M.

The Press Bureau issues the following:

Owing to jealously about recent promotion, a portion of the Fifth Light Infantry (late Fifth Bengals) at Singapore refused to obey orders, causing a serious riot. This was quelled by the local forces assisted

by British and Allied ships.

The casaulties were – Killed: Six officers, fourteen British soldiers and fourteen civilians.

Wounded: Nine British soldiers.

Some of the rioters were killed and a large number surrendered and were captured. There has been no destruction of property.

All is now quiet.

Tokyo: Japo-French warships assisted to quell the Singapore riot. Some Japanese were wounded.

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Singapore Mutiny Execution

I

The Japan Times, March 19, 1915

HOW SINGAPORE MUTINEERS DIED

Two Publicly Shot After Court-Martial for Murder
- A Grim Example

The *Asahi* correspondent writes from Singapore that two ringleaders of the mutinous Indian soldiers were executed in the open grounds **behind the Banda Prison on February 23.**

The event **brought crowds of spectators to the place from the city**. After they had waited for some time, a British officer made his appearance and read aloud the sentence before the motley audience. The gist of it was that one of the two killed a citizen at the outbreak of the mutiny, while the other killed or wounded more than ten persons, and that therefore they were sentenced to be shot. The document was in the name of "Lieutenant-Colonel A.B. Garnett, President of the Court-Martial." It was then interpreted, in Chinese, Malay, and other languages.

Presently the condemned stood before the prison wall nonchalantly, and assumed the right posture at the word of command. About four paces apart, the firing party often Scottish soldiers was drawn up. Ajailor went forward to tie the legs of the mutineers with pieces of white cotton. Amid grim silence the word of command was given, and at the first volley the smaller man of the two fell forward dead. The bigger man was still leaning the wall, and another volley was immediately fired.

A while later came stretcher-bearers, and the dead Indians were removed to the prison for the formalities of the inquest. Some of the crowd ran to the spot, covered with blood, to scratch the soil to find bullets.

II

The Straits Times, March 23, .1915

THE MUTINY

SENTENCES ON TWENTY-ONE INDIAN SOLDIERS

Five Public Executions

A huge crowd, estimated to number **six thousand people**, assembled on Outram Road and on the heights of the Sepoy Lines golf course yesterday afternoon to hear the promulgation of sentences on twenty-one men found guilty of participating in one or another in the recent mutiny of the 5th Light Infantry, and to witness the public execution of five by shooting — (1) Subedar Dunde Khan, (2) Je Mader Chishti Khan, (3) Havildar Rhmat Ali, (4) Sepoy Hakim Ali and (5) Havildar Abdul Ghani. It was an exceedingly well behaved crowd (Sic!), mainly Asiatic in composition, and its very silence and absorption was indicative of the profound impression created by the proceedings.

The Volunteers paraded at nearly their full available strength and, with two companies of the Shropshire Light Infantry and detachments of regulars from the forts, composed a square enclosing the scene of the

promulgatioas and executions. Major Hawkins of the Shropshires was in command of the whole parade and Major A.M. Thompson, Provost-Marshal, represented the military authority. At 5.10 P.M. the four Malay States Guides and twelve 5th Light Infantrymen were brought into the square under an escort of Sikh police. Major Hawkins promulgated the following in English and translations were read in Malay, Chinese and Hindustani:

MARTIAL LAW STATEMENT

"In the case of 4 men of the Malay States Guides, Lc. Naick Ahmad, Mazhar, Sultan Ahmad, Abdul Rahman, for joining in a mutiny, took up arms against His Majesty The King, and in that they were absent from their lines for three days, and when found had in their possession arms, some belonging to the 5th Light Infantry.

III

The Straits Times, March 26, .1915

THE MUTINY

EXECUTION OF TWENTY-TWO RENEGADES

Transportation for Others

The sentences of the court-marital on the batch of 45 mutineers of the 5th Light Infantry were promulgated in public yesterday afternoon outside the walls of Singapore prison and, in the case of those who were condemned to death and sentences were **executed on the stage**. An enormous crowd, reliably estimated to number **15,000 people**, was packed on the slopes of Sepoy Lines looking down on the scene. The square as before was composed of regulars, local volunteers and Shropshire under the command of Colonel-Derrick, of the S.V.C. The firing party consisted of men from the various companies of S.V.C. under Capt. Tongue and Lieuts. Blair and Hay.

The first 28 mutineers were brought from the prison shortly after 5 o'clock, under the escort of Sikh Police commanded by Mr. Dewar. When they were paraded Col. Derrick read the statement of their crime and promulgated the sentences of transportation for varying periods. The pronouncements were translated into Malay, Chinese and Hindustani for the benefit of the Asians among the spectators, and the prisoners were then taken back to their place of confinement.

The condemned men, 22 in number, were placed against the stakes, at interval of about four feet apart, at 5.25 P.M. the order to fire was given at 5.30, after the reading of the sentences, and the men of Capt. Frascr, R.A.M.C, examined the body and it was found necessary in several cases to give the final despatch with revolver shots. The stretcher party was composed of Mohammedan prisoners from the jail. Their bodies having been removed, the parade was marched off and the large crowd dispersed in good order (Sic!).

*New **York Times*** **Commentary on the Mutiny**

2nd May, 1915

Straits Settlements, March 8*

[*New Yourk Times, 2 May, 1915.]

*On Wednesday, the 17th of February, the Press Bureau issued a communique stating that, owing to internal jealousies, a native regiment stationed in Singapore had "given trouble" and that a riot had resulted, but that the situation was well in hand and could not be termed serious.**

As far as we in the East can ascertain, this brief, bald announcement is the **only news that has been given to the outside world** of the wave of bloodshed which has passed over this colony during the past month. The failure on the part of the authorities to give a more intelligent and detailed explanation of the situation in Singapore is a vivid indication of the significance and importance which they attach to it - an indication of **their unwillingness to allow a true account of the affair to reach other British possessions, where it might be acted upon as a precedent by the native population.**

Contrary to the mass of information offered for public consumption, **India and Burma have been the scene of grave disturbances** ever since the entrance of Turkey into the theatre of hostilities, and the knowledge of the happenings in Singapore, it is feared, would act as a spark to the already-laid fuse of riot and rebellion.

Singapore which has just been the scene of a mutiny second only to that of the Sepoy rebellion of 1857, is a city of 386,000 inhabitants. Situated on an island at the extreme end of the Malay Peninsula, and at the point of convergence of all the trade routes between

* The report is obviously deceptive and misleading. — Ed.

the Far and Near East and Australia, it ranks as the fifth largest shipping port in the world. On this account it has been very strongly fortified by the English Government, so strong, indeed, that it is some times known as the **Gibraltar of the East.**"

At the commencement of hostilities in Europe it was from this port and Hong Kong that the English and French China squadrons radiated in their endeavours to intercept that portion of the German fleet stationed in this vicinity ever since, and it is due to this fact, and to this fact alone, that Singapore is not a mass or ruins at the present moment. **Had their marines been unavailable it is hard to imagine what would have been the result.**

Version of New York Times

On Oct. 10, 1914, the Fifth Native Light Infantry arrived in Singapore from Madras. It had been sent to replace the King's own Yorkshire Light Infantry, which had been ordered for France. From the moment of its arrival indications of unrest and discontent were everywhere apparent — a condition of affairs by the way, prevalent **in more than one Indian regiment at the present time.**

There had been some slight trouble, to be sure, regarding certain promotions which had taken place. That the resulting mutiny, however, should be ascribed to this in absurd. The fundamental cause lay far deeper and were of a far more complex nature, so complex, indeed, that space does not permit of their discussion here. Suffice it to say that this was the very regiment, alongwith three others, that years ago started the great Sepoy rebellion in India in 1857. Well has it lived up to its traditions!

As far as can be gathered at the present time, the thought of actual mutiny was not bruited about the regiment until news of its proposed transfer to Hong Kong was received — around the first of January. If was this, added to the fact that the Singapore garrison had been depleted until 200 of the Royal Garrlong Artillery and 50 sappers were the only regular European troops remaining, that gave rise in the native mind to the belief that actual mutiny was feasible.

These vagaries of thought rapidly crystallized into shape upon the receipt of word that the transport **Nile** was on her way out to embark the regiment for its new station. The **Nile** was due to arrive on Feb. 18. The rebellion was, therefore, scheduled to take place at mid-night of the 17th – before a chance had been given to the authorities to remove the supply of ammunition stored in the barracks.

Imagine the surprise of the mutineers when the **Nile** steamed into the harbour on the morning of the 15th, three days ahead of time. All their plans were upset and they were face to face with the necessity of acting very rapidly.

By this time the military authorities had an inkling that trouble was in the air and it was decided to remove the ammunition and place it on board the **Nile** before nightfall. Accordingly, at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 15th, four motor lorries were sent to Alexandra Barracks whizzed away without the slightest murmur arising. It was as the second was being filled that the trouble started. As if by magic a squad of troopers sprang up and started to fire on the men loading the ammunition. The affray was short-lived. Almost immediately the mutineers were in possession of the lorry and its contents, its guardians killed, the fight was on.

Those of the regiment who were not under arms streamed into the barracks to get their guns. Those that were, commenced to supply themselves with all the cartridges they could conveniently carry. A squad of them ran to the southern end of the building, where a portion of the interned Germans were confined. Taking the Europeans on guard by surprise, they succeeded in killing the lot.

The gates were then opened and the Germans allowed to escape, or not, as they desired. Two European officers of the regiment present in the vicinity at the time, Captain Boyce and Lieutenant Elliott, were shot down as they ran out of their quarters. The immediate surroundings, as far as the mutineers were concerned, were now cleared.

Alexandra Barracks is situated on a slight rise about four to four and one half miles from the town. To a force of men desiring to attack the town two courses of action are possible — that of approaching it direct by roads which follow the shore line, and are therefore subject to attack by sea, or that of executing what might be termed a flank movement and reaching the principal portions of the town *via* the residential section to the north and Tanglin Barracks. Opinion among the mutineers seemed to have been divided as to which was the better course to adopt and, as a result, about half (approximately 550) went one way and half the other.

The news that mutiny had broken out among the Fifth Light Infantry reached headquarters in a very short time. It was immediately realized by those in command that a very critical situation had to be met and that

the means at their disposal for so doing were seriously inadequate. However, there was not the slightest hesitation. Nobody funked or lost his head, and it is due to the prompt and efficient manner in which the early stages of the mutiny were handled that the European population of Singapore owe their lives and property.

A general alarm was set off and the entire garrison of the forests in the harbour ordered to proceed to the Government wharves. A company of Malay States Volunteers Rifles, stationed in the city itself, was ordered to meet and delay that portion of the mutineers advancing directly along the shore roads. Shortly afterwards the Royal Garrison Artillery and the Sappers arrived from the forest and were moved up in support. A very severe ditch to ditch, house to house, tree to tree engagement ensued, in which the regulars were gradually forced to give ground.

Luckily, however, at that hour of the afternoon most of the men who were members of the Singapore Volunteers were in their offices or at their clubs and were, therefore, the more readily mobilized. Within an hour this (numbering about 150 men) placed in the firing line and had served to check and further appreciable advance of the Fifth Native Light Infantry in that quarter.

While these events were occurring every effort was made by automobile and telephone, to warn the inhabitants of what was going on. All women reordered to proceed onward to merchantships in the harbour and these were rapidly filled to overflow. Every civilian who volunteered was given a rifle and a cartridge belt and they were sent in squads to hold various portions of the town.

By this time as H.S. *Cadmus,* which had been laying just outside the harbour, had landed in full quota of marines and blew with machine guns. These men were ordered to get in touch with that portion of the mutineers who had reached the northern part of the city and had captured Tanglin Barracks, Freed the Germans interned there, and were occupied in killing all the European they could find.

This was a more difficult proposition than appears at first glance. The area to be covered was very large and the custom of the East — that every house have a compound surrounding it — afforded an attacking force abundant cover and increased the chance of ambuscade tenfold. Therefore, but little was done in this direction other than holding all the streets leading to the more thickly populated area.

All during the night of the 15th the fighting was very severe, with

varying results. More and more civilians kept volunteering and squads of these men were sent out as quickly as they could be equipped to bolster up the weak points in the lines or were held in the city for policing purposes. From the stand-point of military operations the honours up to this point were slightly in favour of the mutineers. The authorities, however, had gained a much needed breathing space, and that night was spent in "tagging down the rag ends." Every possible precaution was taken to prevent rioting on the part of sympathizers.

No sooner had the trouble broken out than Admiral Jerram, then in Singapore, had got in touch with all the **men-of-war** cruising in near-by waters. The Russian cruiserAMreJ was located in Penang

(480 miles away) and ordered to proceed to Singapore as rapidly as possible. The -French cruiser *Montcalm,* which had left Singapore the previous day, was recalled. A Japanese cruiser patrolling the coasts of Java was also instructed to head for Singapore at full speed. These ships arrived during the afternoon of the 16th, their marines were landed, and the crisis was past.

The mutineers were now considerably outnumbered and many of them were beginning to feel the effects of the awful struggle -on empty stomachs. As a result resistance weakened perceptibly during the night of the 16th, and by noon of the 17th all serious resistance had ceased. Many mutineers surrendered during the next few days.

Those that remained at large either spent their time in trying to escape across to the mainland, (where they were met by the forces of the Sultan of Johore) or carrying on a guerrilla type of warfare in the less thickly populated portions of the island.

By the 19th the authorities had the situation well in hand, although over 600 men were still unaccounted for. The safe area was now considerably extended and an efficient system of patrolling created. The armed civilians were now relieved and replaced by regular troops, and that portion of the city including the business and a small part of the residential section was declared habitable.

On Sunday, the 21st, the Shropshire Light Infantry (territorials) arrived from Rangoon. With its advent the situation resolved itself into merely tracking down the mutineers group by group, man by man, and this work, with the aid of native trackers, proceeded very satisfactorily.

Perhaps no better idea of how affairs stood could be obtained than that published by *The Straits Times* on Feb. 22 — the first publication of

this paper, by the way, since the outbreak :

All goes well in Singapore. Trouble which might have assumed very, very grave aspects was checked with surprising rapidity, and, now that we have a British regiment and other resources at our "disposal, a feeling of confidence has been restored. The situation now existing is simply that a number of the men of the Fifth Native Light Infantry are still at large, and until they are accounted for, it is not considered safe to let Europeans occupy the ir residences.

From that time up to the present this policy of tracking down small parties has continued. On Feb. 27 only 147 mutineers remained at large. By the 1st of March this number had been reduced to 113, and by the 7th of March to 51. Of the latter number it is evident that a large proportion are in hiding, disguised, or have made good their escape.

Of the interned Germans (approximately 250) only thirty-five made use of their opportunity to escape. Ten of these have since been recaptured. The remainder, including a Lieutenant, a boatswain, and five sailors of the *Emden,* are still free, and a reward of $1,000 per man has been offered for their apprehension. Unless they succeed in reaching the coast of Sumatra — Dutch territory -it is only a question of time before they will be back in their quarters in Singapore.

And now let us consider **what the results of this affair have been or** are likely to be. In the first place a spirit of uncertainty and fear has been aroused in the minds of the residents of Singapore which is almost sure to outlast the war.

Every one realizes that had the trouble started at midnight, as scheduled, instead of at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, a general slaughter would have ensued. To every one has been brought home the danger of a similar occurrence on a large scale **taking place in India**. Singapore is out of the zone of real Mohammedan agitation; the general atmosphere of the place is peaceful; the bazaars are comparatively free from rumours of a dangerous nature; it is a station which has always been well liked by all regiments stationed there.

If this mutiny was possible under such conditions and at a place at which naval reinforcements were rapidly available, what might happen at some of the interior stations in India? Conditions there at present are far from tranquil. What may we expect in the future?

4) 12th Cavalry Meerut — March 1915

A Confidential letter from U.P. Govt. to Home Secretary, Govt. of India

Lucknow, the 6th March 1915.

My dear Wheeler,

I am desired to enclose for the information of the Government of India an advance copy of a paragraph which will appear in the United Provinces Secret abstract of today's date, regarding an attempt to incite men of the cavalry regiments at Meerut to revolt. The pamphlet is entitled *'Ailan Jang'* and it is understood that the Government of India have already seen it.

Yours sincerely,
Sd/-

The Hon'ble Mr. H. Wheeler, C.S.I., C.I.E.,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Home department.

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Advance copy of a paragraph to appear in the United Provinces Secret abstract dated the 6th March 1915.

Meerut no. 9 of 27th February 1915. Yesterday (the 27th) a Sowar of the 12th cavalry came secretly to the bungalow of Colonel Wintle commanding the regiment and informed him that during the last few days three Sikhs of the *"Komagata Maru"* had been visiting the lines of the two cavalry regiments here, and inciting men to revolt. They informed this Sowar, who pretended to be disaffected that *three hundred men of the 21st cavalry* here had been persuaded to join the movement, and that on a day to be fixed later, there would be an organized attack on the Europeans in the station. They said that they would go to Ferozepore and on returning from there would name the date for the enterprise. The Sikhs are said to have left on the 24th .

I have spoken to Colonel Wintle and other officers of the regiment about the matter and also questioned the Sowar who gave the information.

Though there may be truth in the story, there are points which cast doubt on it. Proper arrangements are being made to watch for the arrival of Sikhs. I enclose translation of a leaflet said to have been left behind by them (Not sent). The original is with the military authorities.

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Report by C.R. Cleveland, Director, Central Intelligence

Note on the discovery of 10 bombs in a quarter in the Lines of the 12th Cavalry at Meerut on 24th March 1915 and on the persons implicated or arrested in this connection.

During February and March efforts were made by the Ghadr party to provoke mutiny and rebellion on the part of the Indian troops at Meerut, as well as at several other places in the north of India. We know now that 3 members of the *Ghadr* party went to Meerut early in February and there got into touch with some sepoys and sowars. This party consisted of (1) *Kartar* Singh of Soraba, Ludhiana, a returned emigrant and a prominent leader of the *Ghadr* party, (2) a man known by the names of Sham Lal, Dhanpat Singh, Dhulip Singh and Marhata. His real name is however *Vishnu Ganesh Pingley*. He is a native of the Poona district, a member of the *Ghadr* party and a returned emigrant. (3) Sucha Singh of Bholapur, Ludhiana, son of an Indian officer now fighting in France, and himself a student of a school at Ludhiana who has not been abroad but who joined has the *Ghadr* party after the war began.

Kartar Singh Sarabha

2. No.3 – Sucha Singh – had two cousins named Amar Singh, trumpeter, and Kehr Singh, sowar, in the 12th Cavalry, and the party had no difficulty in getting into touch with the Indian soldiers at Meerut. Towards the end of February after having visited Meerut twice Sucha Singh was arrested by the Punjab Police for conspiracy and actual crime committed by himself and his associates in the Punjab and from time to time has made statements as to what he and his companions did at Meerut.

Before, however, Sucha Singh's statements had been recorded information as to the doings of the emissaries had been given by an N.C.O. of the 12th Cavalry to his own British Officer which had been communicated by them to us. We therefore had two independent sources of information as to what was happening in Meerut, and I may say here that the information from both sources agreed in a very remarkable manner. *Inter alia* it was quite clear that the emissaries to the Meerut troops in the beginning of February had been *three persons* whose names I have mentioned above.

3. On the 3rd March *three Sikhs* were arrested in information given by the Native Officer in charge of the 22nd Cavalry Horse-Run in the Shahpur district of the Punjab to the effect that they had been trying to tamper with the loyalty of his men. One of these Sikhs was found to be *Kartar* Singh of Soraba, No.1 of the three person listed above*. Thus at the beginning of this month 2 out of 3 emissaries to Meerut were in the hands of the police. The remaining emissary however still went on with the programme, being satisfied that he was making good progress. In the night of the 23rd-24th March the officer Commanding the 12th cavalry, acting in accordance with the pre-concerted scheme, in which some Sowars of the Regiment took a very clever and plucky part, suddenly raided one of the Sowar's quarters in his lines and found in it *Pingley* alias Sham Lal etc., together with one Sikh and 3 Pathan Sowars of the Regiment. The three Pathan Sowars were of course the Loyal helpers of the Officer Commanding, while the Sikh sowar was one of those who had been *corrupted* by Pingley and his friends. In the room at the time of the raid was a box containing no less than 10 picric *bombs* of the well *known Delhi pattern*, together with detonating caps, phosphorus solution, fuses etc. etc. This box of bombs and the accessories **had been brought from Benares** by Pingley who had gone 3 days earlier from Meerut to fetch them accompanied by one of the Pathan Sowars. On being arrested Pingley refused to give his name and would only say

Vishnu Ganesh Pingley

* The other two were Harnam Singh (Bhatti-Goraya, Sialkot), who was hanged on 16.11.1915 with 'Sarabha', and Harnam Singh Tundi Lat (Kotla Naudh Singh, Hoshiarpur), who was transported to Andamans in December, 1915.

that he was a *Khatri* by caste. Our previous information had led us to believe that this particular emissary would most probably be found to be one Vishnu Ganesh Pingley and when a C.I.D. Officer taxed him with owning this name and identity he admitted it. He however refused to give anything away, sometimes pleading entire loss of memory and at others telling absurd falsehoods or merely refusing to answer.

4. From the two sources of information at our disposal, that is the loyal Pathan Sowar and Sucha Singh, the emissary, it was known that some half-a-dozen sowars and *one or two sepoys of the Meerut Garrison were pretty deep in the seditious plots which Pingley and his friends had engineered.* These men were arrested and their quarters searched, but the searches failed to yield the seditious papers, mutiny flag etc which we knew had been given to the men by the emissaries.

5. I now proceed to note briefly on some aspects of this case which are of particular interest or importance.

6. From what Sucha Singh has told the Police and from what the loyal sowar informant has reported of the sayings of the emissaries themselves we know that **these and other emissaries have toured extensively in almost the whole of the north of India visiting the Cantonments and Native troops. Sucha Singh claimed at one time that 11000 troops were available for the purposes of the *Ghadr* party.** As regards Meerut itself the number of disaffected sepoys and Sowars is said to be between 300 and 400. the Officer Commanding the 12th Cavalry on the other hand is entirely convinced that the disaffection has reached only a handful of his men. He has been in the Regiment for a great number of years and say that if any considerable number of his men had been touched by the propaganda he must have heard of it through the Native Officers. From the other U.P. Cantonments visited by the emissaries, i.e. Agra, Fyzabad, Bareilly, Lucknow, Benares, no information has been received either of the visit of the emissaries or any disaffection among the troops from the local Military officers. *Sucha Singh on the other hand thinks that his party had a certain amount of success at some of these places. The loyal Pathan Sowar of the 12th Cavalry also seems to think that in Meerut the success of the emissaries has been very considerably greater than the enlistment of the sympathies of a mere handful of sepoys*.

7. I should like to take this opportunity of recording my sincere appreciation of the clever and prompt action taken by the British Officers

of the 12th Cavalry in this business. I would also like to say that General Roberts, Commanding the Cavalry Brigade at Meerut, was a tower of strength. At the same time I am not convinced that the Officer Commanding the Regiment is correct, in his estimate of the very small extent of the success of the emissaries. Sucha Singh would naturally over-rate his own success and his statement may be discounted. The opinion of the loyal Pathan Sowar is however not to be got over very lightly, he must have heard a great deal of talk and he and his friends appear to be generally of opinion that they are in very great danger from the Sikhs of Garrison in consequence of their assistance to the authorities in the arrest of Pingley and in the frustration of his plans. Pingley has had more to do with the Indian soldiers at Meerut than any of the other emissaries. He will not tell us what he thinks but one cannot overlook the fact that though he had made sufficient progress to justify him bringing into the Lines himself a box full of first-class bombs obtained without a doubt from some very important leaders of the big conspiracy. *I should find it hard to believe that the very cunning and experienced Bengalis who run the bomb depot at Benares would send off 10 of their best bombs to the Meerut Lines unless they had pretty good reason for supposing that there were sufficient people there to make the required use of them.*

[Note: Bombs were to be used for beginning the attacks on messes, houses and barracks; also to facilitate getting possession of ammuniation from the quarterguards and magazines. Sd/- C.R.C.].

The fact that the Native Officers at Meerut did not report the fairly frequent visits of the emissaries in February and March or the disaffection that these visits were creating does not seem to me to prove that there were no disaffection any more than it proves that there were no visits. There is no means that I can think of testing the breadth and depth of the disaffection that these emissaries may have created. As practical people we must hope that the present arrests and discoveries will nip the evil in the bud, but at the same time we must certainly prepare to the best of our ability to meet further trouble if it should come.

8. I spent the whole of the 24th March at Meerut together with several Officers of my department. We hoped that either from Pingley's statements or from the information that the loyal Pathan sowar could give, or from correspondence that might be discovered at the searches we might find sufficient to lead us straight to the bomb depot at Benares

before the gentlemen running the latter could hear of the disaster at Meerut. **But unfortunately we were disappointed. Pingley proved obstinate.** The loyal sowar had been blindfolded and confused by being led through mazes of streets at Benares while no papers referring to Benares were discovered, and therefore to our great disappointment no opportunity for the much required coup at Benares presented itself. When he was taken to the house in Benares in the dark the Pathan Sowar was introduced to a Bengali leader who cross-examined him, and on being satisfied that he was a genuine mutineer ordered that the bombs should be given and also told him various things about the plans of the revolutionaries. Among other things he said that, he had made 300 bombs for the 12th Cavalry but had distributed them elsewhere as a squadron of the regiment had gone away (an allusion to detachment of the squadron of Hardwar). Again he said that a lot of bombs had been prepared but as someone had given information about them they had been thrown into water. He also explained to the Sowar the method of using the phosphorus solution to make slow fuses for the bombs. From the sowar's description of this Bengali as well as from other facts it is not impossible that the name of the gentlemen was **Rash Behari Bose**, who we know for certain was a month ago guiding the operations of the Lahore revolutionaries at Lahore.

Rash Bihari Bose

9. The investigation into the Meerut affair is still in an early stage, but it looks as if the best method f disposing of the case will be for Pingley to be sent to Lahore where he is wanted for a hanging offence, while the half-a-dozen sepoys and Sowars arrested at Meerut ought to be tried by summary general court martial which can I believe, inflict death penalty for preparation for mutiny. **The capture of Pingley and the bombs at Meerut will form a very important link of evidence in the big conspiracy case now being prepared at Lahore.**

10. As the investigation proceeds it is possible that some of the present obscurities will be cleared up. Among the arrested sowars are two cousins of Sucha Singh, mere youths, and it is not improbable they will follow Sucha Singh's example and make statements: also it is possible that among the letters found at the searches, which have not yet been

thoroughly examined, there may be some which will give valuable information. Sucha Singh himself can also probably help us still further.

11. In conclusion I would say that in my opinion the Meerut captures and discoveries are very promising. I believe there is sufficient evil feeling and intention about to make us welcome the piecemeal frustration of the schemes of the *Ghadr* party and their friend and converts.

(Sd/-) C.R. Cleveland

25.3.15

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1) The following note is for the information of the Government of India and Provincial authorities in continuation of my letter of 25th instant.

2) The investigation by the military and police officers has not disclosed any wide participation on the part of the troops in the schemes for mutiny and revolution. A sowar and an infantry sepoy have made statements admitting their conversation by the emissaries. The sowar, **Ishwar Singh of the 12th Cavalry**, declares that Pingley was induced to bring up the bombs by the attitude and assurances of the Pathan N.C.O. who accompanied him to Benares.

3) There has been no sign of unrest or excitement among the troops during the past few days. *The arrested sowars and sepoys have been kept in the civil jail at the request of the military authorities as it was thought that their detention in military buildings was undesirable.* At night the arrested sepoys and sowars have communicated with each other by shouting from their cells. Ishwar Singh himself shouted out to his fellow prisoners that the whole story was known to the authorities and that he was going to relate his own share in it.

4) The investigation in the Punjab into the doings of the *Ghadr* party has brought out a great deal about Pingley. One **Mula Singh** of Mirankote, Amritsar, a leader of great influence and importance, was arrested in the middle of last month and has since made very interesting disclosures which are supported by evidence. Mula Singh was at school for 3 years and in 1900 passed the Vernacular Middle School Examination and then enlisted in the 28th Regiment. After 4½ years service, which included a medal for Waziristan, he resigned and went to the Malay States where he served for 21 years in the Malay States Guides as signaller, company clerk and drill instructor. In 1908 he enlisted in the Shanghai

Police and served for 2 years. He was dismissed for misconduct and then worked as a watchman in Shanghai. In 1912 he moved on to the Philippines and in May 1913 he went to America. Here he soon joined the *Ghadr* party then in the making and through force of character became a recognized leader. When the war broke out he was short of funds but the *Ghadr* people at once financed his return to India so that he might carry out their plans there. He and a number of other members of the party *arrived at Colombo on 18th November 1914* and in Amritsar at the beginning of December. The next 2 months were very full of work for Mula Singh. He rented a big house in **Amritsar** which served as headquarters and then proceeded to rally as many of the party as possible. His leadership was the more readily accepted as so many other prominent persons had been already arrested under Ordinance V. The chief items on the programme calling for immediate attention were the collection of funds and arms and the organization of the scattered emigrants so that they could work on a definite plan. After a while the Amritsar Head Quarters became a well known rallying point and the most active and determined members of the *Ghadr* party began to meet there. Among the multitude of names I may mention Pingley, Kartar Singh of Soraba and Parmanand of Jhansi. All these had been working in one direction or another. Parmanand said that arms could be obtained from Native States while Kartar Singh suggested an application to Bengal, Mula Singh said funds were an immediate necessity and was in favour rising a loan while others advocated looting tehsil treasuries. All seem to have been agreed that **explosives** were essential to their further plans. **Dacoities** were then committed and a certain amount of money collected which it was decided to invest in buying chemicals and manufacturing bombs. This was carried out. Then Mula Singh started the campaign with the troops by sending Kartar Singh to **Ferozepore** (January). Kartar Singh went there and returned to report to Mula Singh that he found the Indian soldiers in Ferozepore quite ready to join them when the proper time arrived. Just then Pingley turned up again. Mula singh's statement at this juncture runs as follows:—

> "Next day I met Pingley, Marhatta, in the bazaar, who was accompanied by another man who appeared to belong to the United Provinces and called himself Sanjal (Sanyal?). I took them both to Gulab Singh's Dharamsala where Doctor Mathra Singh and Harnam Singh of the 'Komagata Maru' were present. I took Pingley and Sanjal to the upper storey, where the former told me that he could get 4 or 5 pistols but added that he needed money to bring Bengali friend of his who knew how to manufacture **high explosive bombs like the ones used for viceroy at Delhi.** I asked Pingley if his Bengali friend was the same man who perpetrated the Delhi outrage, but he smiled and told me it was unnecessary for me to know that, I told Pingley that I had no money to spare then and he said he would go down to Doaba and collect money from some of the returned emigrants whom he know."

5) A few days later a number of freshly returned emigrants came to Amritsar and Mula Singh appealed to them successfully for funds and was then able to pay over Rs.500 to "Sanjal" to bring pistols and the Bengali bomb-maker mentioned by Pingley. Sanjal departed on his mission to Benares.

6) At this time Mula Singh and his friends decided that it was advisable to move their headquarters to **Lahore and they proceeded to rent 2 or 3 houses** where they could meet and manufacture bombs etc. they also paid a good deal of attention to the troops in **Lahore cantonment**. Pingley who had been moving about on various errands now went of in the wake of "Benagli" to bring up the Bengali bomb-maker from Benares and returned 3 days later. Mula Singh tells the story in the following words:—

> "The next day Pingley arrived with **another Bengali**. Sanjal, however, was not with them.
>
> I took Pingley and his companion to my house. The latter, Pingley told me, was named **Chuchidra Nath Dutt**. He was fat and short statured, with a sallow complexion, prominent eyes and the ring finger of either his right or left hand was stiff. He had bushy moustaches, shaved beard and a broad forehead. There was scar on his right foot, probably a burn mark. His age was about 40. He was wearing English dress with a puggree on his head. Once in the course of conversation I asked him if he knew the author of the Delhi bomb outrage and he said "yes". Afterwards **Ram Saran of Kapurthala** told me that he was



Ram Saran Das, Kapurthala

the man who threw the bomb on the Viceroy. Pingley also told me that he was the same man. **This Bengali said that the bomb in question was thrown from the street and not from a house as people generally believed. He afterwards himself admitted that he had thrown the bomb and that he was dressed up like a Marwari at the time.**

The same day **Hirda Ram** returned from **Jullundur** and told me that the Indian troops whom he had interviewed were willing to join us. Next day I sent Hirda Ram and "Rao" to **Benares** to fetch bombs and pistols. The same day Ram Saran came to my house and visited the *fat Bengali* who sent him on to Lahore to fetch somebody. In the evening Ram Saran returned with another man* [*possibly Bhai Parmaand. Sd/- C.R.C.] whom I could not see. The *fat Bengali*, Pingley, and Ram Saran kept talking to this man in the *chaubara* and nobody else, even myself, was permitted to go there. They sent him back to Lahore by the night train, but I do not know why Ram Saran also left for **Kapurthala** the same night.


Hirde Ram 'Bhai'

Next day Hirda Ram, "Rao" and another man who, I was told, was a **servant** of the *fat Bengali* and called himself Ram Singh, a miserable looking youth, arrived from Benares. They brought four revolvers with them and a biscuit tin which they said contained two Bengal bombs. There was also a small tin box which had been filled up with earth on which rested a square phial with stopper secured with wax, said to contain an acid, a drop from which could burn paper as soon as it dried on it.

Amar Singh (accused) was also present that day. He "Rao" and the *fat Bengali's servant* were sent to Lahore by the noon train with instructions to stay there, till the *fat Bengali* joined them. The same afternoon **Harnam Singh of the "Komagata Maru"** met me in Gulab Singh's Dharamsala and said that some of them the men in the 35th Regiment, which was then stationed at **Bannu**, were willing to join us. I sent back again in the same derection to stir up other Indian regiments. I then

went to Doctor Hardit Singh's shop where I found Kartar Singh whom I took to my house. He said they had committed 2 or 3 decoities, and in one place they had managed to secure some ornaments which he made over to me. I left Kartar Singh in my house with the *fat Bengali* and Pingley and took the ornaments to a certain goldsmith who melted them into two lumps of gold which were 45 or 46 Rupees in weight. Next morning I returned to my house with these. Amar Singh (accused), the *fat Bengali*, Pingley and Kartar Singh were present. I showed them the two pieces of gold and suggested selling them somewhere. Amar Singh said he could dispose of them in Lahore. I then handed over the gold bars to Amar Singh for sale at Lahore.

After this I returned to Gulab Singh's Dharamsala where all the men, who had accompanied Kartar Singh to Ludhiana for committing dacoities, were present except Rurlia Singh of Sarabha. Besides these one Bir Singh, who was probably a resident of Pech Nangal (?) in the Jullundur District, was also present. They informed me that some local men including **students** had joined them and that they had committed dacoities in Sanhewal and Mansuran with much success at the latter place. They had still 2 of the bombs out of the four I gave them. They told me that one bomb did not explode at Mansuran as it was thrown by mistake on slushy ground. They further said that the villagers threw brickbats at them and Jowand Singh of Doaba had received an injury on the forehead while Kartar Singh was hurt in the ear. Kartar Singh mentioned that they got a few sovereigns also which were distributed at the rate of 1 sovereign to each member of the gang.

Next day Amar Singh (accused) returned from Lahore and gave me Rs.40 in part payment of the sale of gold and said that he had given the gold to a broker and expected it to be sold in a days or two. He then went back to Lahore. Ram Saran was present that day and I gave him Rs.15 I think, and he brought *a Primis stove, an aluminum basin, a spoon and bottle of spirits of wine. These things were brought for the fat Bengali as he intended preparing picric acid.*

Next day Amar Singh (accused) returned from Lahore and

said that the gold had been sold for Rs.1,013 (one thousand and thirteen) out of which he retained Rs.500 and he handed the balance over to me.

"Rao" accompanied Amar Singh that day. The *fat Bengali* suggested that "Rao", Pingley, Kartar Singh and one or two other educated men should go down to **Meerut or Allahabad** and stir up the Indian troops stationed there. I mentioned that there was a young man sitting at Doctor Hardit Singh's shop, who looked like a student. Kartar Singh said he was Sucha Singh a student of Ludhiana. Kartar Singh then suggested that on their way to Meerut they should pick up Dalip Singh from Ludhiana. The *fat Bengali* told "Rao" to introduce Kartar Singh and others with him to some Bengalis in the United Provinces and then come back himself. Amar Singh (accused) was present when this matter was discussed. I then paid Rs.200 to Pingley and Kartar Singh to cover their expenses after which they all dispersed."

7) **It was after this that Kartar Singh, Pingley and Sucha Singh went off to Meerut for the first time (2nd February).** Sucha Singh had two cousins in the 12th Cavalry: we know now that Kartar Singh had a co-villager and correspondent in it, while Pingley was the link between the *Ghadr* party and the Bengali gangs. The *"fat Bengli"* of Mula Singh's statement, who had come from Benares to Amritsar with Pingley, was evidently Rash Behari Bose. Scraps of notes in his handwriting were found 3 weeks or so later in one of the Lahore houses taken by Mula Singh's party when they shifted their headquarters from Amritsar to Lahore. Mula Singh has also identified the photo of Rash Behari as the likeness of his *"fat Bengali"*.

Ram Saran of Kapurthala mentioned in this above quotation from Mula Singh's statement is a cousin of Dinanath the informer in the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy case whom Dinanath wanted to save: he is now under arrest at Lahore. Hirda Ram, mentioned by Mula Singh,has been arrested and has made a statement in the course of which he describes his visit to Benares to fetch revolvers and bombs. *Ram Singh*, a miserable looking youth" is really **Jamnadass** who figured prominently in the Mahant murder case of last year at Arrah and has long been used as subordinate tool by the revolutionaries in India. He has been arrested and has made statements. The "Rao" mentioned by

Mula Singh is still at large. We think he is a rather important Benares conspirator who is now evading arrest. Amar Singh has been arrested and has made a statement which I have not yet seen.

Sachindra Nath Sanyal

"Sanjal" is probably an important Benares leader who has not yet been brought to book.

8) While the Meerut party were away the *fat Bengali* remained in close touch with Mula Singh and the others, first at Amritsar and then at Lahore. After some days the Meerut party returned and they, Mula Singh and the *fat Bengali* met in one of the Lahore houses. Mula Singh's statement runs as follows:—

"The fat Bengali mentioned that as a number of Indian troops were to be sent abroad on 1st March we should endeavour to start the revolution before that date so that the troops might join us. Kartar Singh and Pingley said that they had sounded the troops in Bengal* [*'Bengal' of course includes the U.P. Sd/-C.R.C.] and they were sure of their help. They suggested a **national flag** and it was agreed upon to combine yellow,red and blue, similar to a national flag we had seen in the **Yugantar Ashram**. The 21st of February was fixed for a general revolution and I was asked to ascertain the number of men who would join us from the Central and Northern Punjab, while they would arrange for Bengal and other provinces. (Quotation from Mula Singh's statement continued).

I asked about Doctor Mathra Singh and Amar Singh and the others told me that they had sent him to the ***Afridi* country** with Rs.200 to agitate the *Afridis*. I was also told to make the flags. Amar Singh, **Harnam Singh with the missing arm** and I went to the other house, where Hirda Ram opened the door for us. We slept there that night. Next morning Harnam Singh and I returned to Amritsar where we found the following men collected in my house. Jhanda Singh of Chajalwadi or Tabirpur, Sohan Singh his companion, Jowand Singh of Doaba, Rur Singh of Sangwal, Balwant Singh of Sathiala and Udham Singh, alias Hari Singh of Wiringan. Bir Singh was

still there, and Prem Singh of Sur Singh was also present together with Kharak Singh and Sajjan Singh, **students** of Ludhiana. Prem Singh of Sur Singh gave me a revolver which, he said, he had brought from a friend, he also gave me a rifle bullet and a revolver cartridge which did not fit his revolver.


Parma Nand, Jhansi

I directed him and all the others except Kharak Singh and Sajjan Singh (students), Bir Singh (wounded) and Udham Singh, alias Hari Singh, to get about and ascertain how many men were prepared to join us. I told them to let me by the 17th February 1915 at the latest. In the meanwhile Parma Nand of **Jhansi** turned up and told me that he had been arrested on the Jhansi side but managed to obtain his release. He further informed me that revolvers, swords and guns could be had free of cost as members of the revolutionary party were working there. I told him I would send Hirda Ram with him to bring arms.

I went to Naurang Singh's shop and showed him a copy of "Sandesa *Ghadr*"[*] [*A copy of the Sandesa *Ghadr* was found in the quarter of sepoy Phula Singh of the 128th Pioneers at Meerut. Sd/- C.P.C.] which I had brought with me from Lahore. After a few minutes I returned and left the "Sandesa *Ghadr*" together with a revolver which I had in my pocket in the house.

I took my food and returned to Naurang Singh's shop. I asked Naurang Singh to make some flags for us and explained the design to him. He consented and I gave him a sovereign to buy the cloth and directed him to make five flags. I then gave two sovereigns to Doctor Hardit Singh in exchange for 20 rupees and a 10 rupee note. On my way back to my house I **was arrested and taken to the Railway station**."

9) Mula Singh arrest on the 13th February was followed by many other arrests and disclosures but the *fat Bengali* and some others escaped and apparently made their way back to Benares, where they lay low for a time. **The plans for an outbreak about the 21st February had been frustrated by the action of the Punjab Police.** But the Meerut story shows that the Benares party including Pingley still continued working and early in March decided to send Pingley again to Meerut. It is possible

that the part played by the N.C.O. of the 12th Cavalry encouraged the Benares conspirators to go on but it is more probable that they had already modified their plans and **were again preparing to attack undiscouraged by the break up at Lahore**. We have some indications of **Delhi** having been used by Pingley but our information of the general plan is deficient although the Meerut story helps to an appreciation of the plan for that place.

Pingley, obviously, could tell us a very great deal *but so far he will not speak*.

10) The above note shows, I think, that the **Meerut programme was a mere item in the big scheme of the combined *Ghadr* and Bengali party.** They have had to work against very big odds. Before the *Ghadr* people could really get to work in India they *kept on losing their leaders*. When they did get to work their members kept on giving away their secrets to the Police. Just as they seemed to be succeeding with the troops at Meerut they have found out that the most substantial part of their seeming success.viz. the whole-hearted support of a Pathan N.C.O. who told them he had a goodly following behind him, was a mere trap. They have been short of arms and money all through and they have had to work so secretly that they have had but little chance of starting any big popular movement. *The Sikhs and Mohamedans of* the *Ghadr* party are so prone to be ostentatious and to make statements when arrested that their Bengali allies will possibly feel nervous before long of trusting them very far. **A most urgent requirement is the discovery and destruction of the nest at Benares.**

11) It is interesting to speculate how **Pingley** came to be such an efficient link between the *Ghadr* and Bengal parties. In America Pingley was certainly an important member of the *Ghadr* party. Not very long ago information was received from a secret but reliable source that a combination had been arranged between the *Ghadr* people and the Bengal party by a Bengali named Satya and a *Mahratta*. This information came to us before Pingley's activities in India had been discovered. Now it is a fact that Pingley returned to India in November last and that one of his fellow passengers was Bengali of the name of *Satya* who might, from his history, very well have been in a position to introduce Pingley to the inner circle of the Bengali conspirators.

It is noteworthy that Pingley seems to have made no attempt to form any connections with his own people : he is a Mahratta Brahmin

(Deshust) of Poona.

12) The case against the sowars and sepoys is being investigated by Captain Keen of General Staff Branch. The case against Pingley in Meerut is under investigation by the Supdt. Of Police, Meerut. Mr Richardson, D.I.G. of Police, U.P., is on special duty to supervise the Police work in the U.P. in connection with the general conspiracy. He is in close touch with the officers of my Department including myself. It is not quite certain whether the Meerut case against Pingley should give way to the Lahore case of conspiracy in which Pingley is wanted as an accused. I understand the U.P. Govt. are asking for the application of the new Act so that wherever Pingley is tried it will be by a Tribunal constituted under the Act.

Delhi — Sd/-
31-3-15. — C.R. Cleveland

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Report No.4 on the Meerut Bomb Affair (previous reports dated 25th and 31st March and 14th April 1915).

The Court Martial sat at Meerut a few days ago and completed the trial in one long whole day's sitting. There were 4 accused, 2 Sikhs of the 12th Cavalry and 2 of the 128th Pioneers. Two other Sikhs, younger men and more lightly implicated, were pardoned and gave King's evidence became approvers. The charge against the accused was, I believe, that they had known of a conspiracy to mutiny and had not informed the authorities. **All 4 accused were found guilty and sentenced to be hanged.** The sentences were confirmed yesterday by His Excellency the Commander-in-chief.

2. As the result of a military investigation held into this matter at Meerut it was found that altogether only about 15 Indian soldiers were involved. But with the exception of the 4 accused and the 2 approvers the remainder were very lightly implicated and their offence will be dealt with regimentally. It will not be necessary for me to issue any further reports on this subject.

3. The Meerut enquiries have however led to the discovery of conspiracies in Delhi and some other places, which it would be premature to discuss fully at the present moment as the matter is only half investigated.

Sd/- C.R.Cleveland

Copy of Report No.4,dated 22-4-15, forwarded, with compliments, in continuation of my previous report of 14-4-15.

Delhi, 22-4-15 — Sd/-
Director, Criminal Intelligence.

The Hon. Mr. H. Wheeler, C.S.J, C.J.E.,
Secretary to the Govt. of India,
Home Department, Simla.

The following papers are submitted for His Excellency's perusal—

a) Sir C. Cleveland's note dated the 31st March.
b) His letter (and enclosures) dated the 6th April.

H. Wheeler, 13.4.15.

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Confidential. — D.O.No. 843

Naini Tal, 4th May 1915.

My dear Wheeler,

In your telegram no. 1222, dated the 6th April 1915, it was stated that the Government of India would be glad to consider favourably the issue of a *communiqué* about the discovery of a seditious conspiracy at Meerut. No reply was sent immediately as this Government had no definite information as to the procedure which was to be adopted in regard to **Pingle** and the military prisoners. Bevan-Petman's statement in opening the conspiracy case at Lahore appears sufficiently definite regarding Pingle, and the Government of India in the Army Department have issued the final orders of the court martial on the military prisoners. His honour considers that this is sufficient publication for the present. It would be difficult to say more about **Pingle** and about the minor incidents connected with the conspiracy in other cantonments of this province without running a danger of interfering with the course of justice at Lahore.

Yours sincerely,
Sd/-

The Hon'ble Mr.H.Wheeler, C.S.I.C.I.E,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Home Department

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Confidential No.

From

Lieut-Col.C.A.Muspratt-Williams, R.A.
Chief Inspector of Explosives with the
Government of India.

To

L.L.Tomkins, Esquire,
Deputy Inspector-General of Police,
Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab,
Lahore dated, 27 March 1915.

Sir,

On the morning of the 24th March at Meerut Sir Charles Cleveland, Director of Criminal Intelligence, Mr.Denham and Mr. Petrie and Mr. Vincent of the Imperial C.I.D. and Major Keen of the Army General Staff drove up in two motors to the house of Brigadier-General Roberts, Commanding Meerut Cavalry Brigade, with whom I was staying. I was informed **that 10 bombs had been found in a box in a house in the 12th Cavalry Lines and had been removed to the Sadar Bazaar Police Thana** where I was taken by Sir Charles Cleveland. On arrival at the Thana Mr. Wilkinson, Superintendent of Police, Meerut, showed me 2 paper firing caps similar to the exhibit in the **Delhi Conspiracy**, one bottle of liquid with flakes of yellow in it, ten empty perfume bottles, and some cotton yarn and then took me to a little room where a brown tin box container the bombs was placed. I was told all these things were found in the house in the Lines. I lifted one of the bombs out of the box and found it had on a paper firing cap and I immediately replaced to as gently as possible as the bomb was in a highly dangerous state and ready for firing. I noticed that the bombs had cloth round and between them presumably to keep them steady and that were there also some more paper caps on the bombs. I then had the brown tin box carefully filled up with water. In a short time the water became quite black from the composition in the paper caps which I believe to be a mixture of chlorate of potash and sulphide of antimony and some of the caps became detached in the water. I then removed such caps or portions of caps that there were and noticed that some of the bombs had only bits of paper and not caps over the cotton yarn in the central hole. As far as I could judge **five of the bombs were fitted with caps and were ready for throwing**. The other bombs could have been made ready for throwing either by having

paper caps fitted over them or could be made effective as bombs by a mixture of phosphorus in bisulphide of carbon being used to wet the gun cotton yarn in the central hole of the bombs in which case on evaporation of the bisulphide of carbon the phosphorus on the yarn would take fire and light it, setting the bomb off. Judging from sight I believe the bottle of Liquid found contains this mixture and it will be sent to the Chemical Examiner of the Punjab Government for analysis. The ten empty bottles are probably intended for containing small quantities of this Liquid for handy use. After removing the caps from the bombs, I took ten bombs out of the water in the box and saw that they were exactly similar in type to the bombs used in the different outrages in Bengal and at Delhi and Lahore, except that five of the bombs had five clamps instead of (missing)

4. Otherwise wiring, clamps, 2 rows of loom needles, 4lb. tobacco tins were similar to those used on previous occasions, I took the cloth out of the box. It appeared to be two *dhotis* and there was a layer of paper at the bottom of the box. I placed one of the two bombs with five clamps in a vessel full of water removing the gun cotton yarn from central hole and instructed the police to put the remaining nine bombs in a tub full of water. The police were very busy on the 23rd conducting searches, &c., and could not attend to me, but I arranged with Mr. Richardson, Deputy D.I.G. of the United Provinces, who was taking over the case, to call for me on the morning of 25th and take me to the Thana again, which he did. I, there, in the presence of Mr. Richardson and Mr. Wilkinson took the bomb to pieces which I had placed in a separate receptacle of water. I half emptied the tobacco tin of the explosive compound in it, which from the intense yellow stains on my hands I believe to be picric acid or some compound of picric acid, probably picrate of ammonia. I then filled the tin with water and instructed these officers to send this tin also one of the spare paper caps which I had not destroyed by immersing, the cotton yarn which I believe to be gun cotton yarn, and the bottle of Liquid to Colonel Black, Chemical Examiner to the Government of Punjab, as he has had unique experience in dealing with the analysis of compositions, liquids, &c., used with these bombs. I showed these officers how they should be packed. I then went to the tent containing the other nine bombs, removed the gun cotton yarn from the central channel, and with a bit of stick inserted in this channel stirred up the composition in each of the bombs as much as I could and put the bombs in the water again. The water immediately began to turn intensely yellow.

I told Mr. Wilkinson to change the water daily and to stir up the composition and that by degrees in this way, though it would take some time, all the composition in the bombs could be taken out as has been done on previous occasions. The bombs are now comparatively safe as long as the composition inside is not allowed to get thoroughly dry and I explained how the bombs could be packed up for sending away safely even if the whole of the composition had not been removed. Mr. Richardson agreed with me that it was not desirable to take these bombs to pieces, though it could be done quite safely by anyone in this wet state, as they would lose their value as exhibits.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
C.A.Muspratt-Williams
Lt. Colonel,
Chief Inspector of Explosives
with the Government of India.

No.1.C-T. Dated Lahore the 29th March 1915.

Copy forwarded to the Secretary to Government of India Department of Commerce and Industry for information.

C.A. Muspratt-Williams,
Lt. Colonel,
Chief Inspector of Explosives with the Government of India.

True copy
[Sd/-]
Superintendent,
Department of Commerce and Industry.

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Telegram. P.

From — Viceroy. Home Department.
To — Secretary of State for India, London.

No. 478 dated the 3rd May 1915 @ 6.p.m

Secret. Please refer to our telegram dated the 27th March last. After

the capture of Pingley in the sowars' quarters an examination of the bombs was made by an expert and they were found to be highly effective and dangerous, ready for immediate use. **Pingley** had obtained them from **Benares** where they had been procured by **Rash Behari Bose** with whom Pingley had been in close contact both at Benares and Amritsar and Lahore. The bombs may have been manufactured at Benares or more probably brought there from some outside factory under control of Rash Behari's Bengal friends. The investigation into offences committed by Indian soldiers at Meerut was taken over by the Military authorities, and on the 19th April two Sikhs of the 12th Cavalry and two Sikhs of the 128th Pioneers Depot were tried by summary general court-martial at that station for withholding information of conspiracy to mutiny. All four accused were found guilty and the sentence of death was passed upon them. Two other Sikhs of the 12th Cavalry were pardoned and gave King's evidence. A few more Sikhs were slightly implicated but evidence did not warrant their being charged. On the 21st April His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief approved the Court-Martial proceedings, **the sentences were announced to a full parade of the Meerut garrison on the 26th April and carried out privately in the jail with the assistance of the Civil authorities on the same day.** There was no disturbance or excitement. Meanwhile the case against Pingley was dealt with by police. He is now standing his trial in the main conspiracy case at Lahore in which he was an absconding accused before his capture at Meerut. In the course of the police investigation evidence has been obtained that besides crude and unsuccessful attempts to tamper with Indian troops in most cantonments of upper India, Rash Behari Bose, Pingley and some other lesser people from Benares had revived the seditious activities of several petty local people especially in Delhi and Cawnpore and were arranging for houses for storage of explosives and arms. We do not yet know the full extent of these plots, but they were probably not very dangerous except that they might have led to the assassination of officials. A ramification in *Rajputana* has however still to be probed. In all this business it is found that the people concerned are mostly old connections of Ghadrites and the names mentioned in the Delhi-Lahore, Arrah and Kotah cases of last year again recur. The police have been materially assisted by this in tracing guilty persons and in checking developments. In these plots the leaders had exaggerated idea of readiness of Indian Troops to revolt and of willingness of

Mahommedans and Rajputs to join. When cornered by police the petty local seditionists show strong tendency to confess and disclose what they know and have been doing. Attempts were made to induce Mahomed Ali of Delhi to join but he is said to have refused, saying to confidential emissary that he had other plans connected with purely Mohammedan developments. The most serious feature of the above plits nor remaining is the continued elusiveness of Rash Bihari Bose and some of his lieutenants and perhaps of the Rajpputana ramification. There is, however, no certainty as to the latter.

Reference: *Ghadr Movement Original Documents: Judgements*, Vol. III Unistar Books Pvt. Ltd., SCO 26-27, Sector 34-A, Chandigarh 160022. — For Benares Conspiracy Cases, see Chapter Nos. XIII and XIV.

II. RANDOM ATTEMPTS

(A) POLITICAL

1) Hav. Harnam Singh

JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF HARNAM SINGH, AN EX-HAVILDAR OF THE 9TH BHOPAL INFANTRY WHO WAS TRIED AT FYZABAD FOR SEDITION AND SENTENCED TO 10 YEARS' RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENT.

Telegram no. 256, dated the 9th October 1915.

From: The Chief Secretary to the Government
of the United Provinces, Naini Tal.
To: The Secretary to the Government of India,
Home Department,
Simla.

Harnam Singh, charged at Fyzabad for sedition, has been sentenced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment.

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No 445-L., dated the 18th November 1915.

From: The Hon'ble Mr. R.BURN L.C.S.,
Chief Secretary to the Government,
of the **United Provinces**.
To: The Secretary to the **Government of India**,
Home Department.

In reply to your letter no. 4585, dated the 13th instant, I am directed to forward for the information of the Government of India a copy of the judgment in the case of King-Emperor *versus* Harnam Singh of Fyzabad.

Harnam Singh, a *Jat Sikh* who was until some fifteen or sixteen months ago a *havildar* in the 9th (Bhopal) Infantry and was at the time of his arrest, on the 6th April 1915, the *chaudhari* of the regimental bazaar,

stands committed to this Court for trial on charges—

(a) under section 123 of the Indian Penal Code, of illegally omitting to give information of, and thereby concealing, the existence of a design to wage war against the King-Emperor, intending by such concealment to facilitate, or knowing it to be likely that such concealment would facilitate, the waging of such war:

and (b) under section 121 A, of the same Code, of being a member of **a criminal conspiracy the object of which was to wage war against the King-Emperor** and to overawe, by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force, the Government of India.

To both of these charges he has pleaded not guilty.

The existence of a formidable, widespread and carefully organized conspiracy with is headquarter at **Lahore**, the object of which was to wage war against the King-Emperor and thereby to overthrow the Government of India and set up another government in its stead, has been abundantly proved and is, indeed, conceded by the learned pleaders who represent the accused. For the purpose of this case it is unnecessary to enter into great detail. Suffice it is say that the conspirators hoped to attain their object by the indiscriminate murder of Europeans and **by overpowering the few British troops then left in India and such other troops as might remain loyal and true to their salt.** To make this possible arms and money were necessary. Dacoities were therefore planned and committed in order to raise funds, which were to be substantially increased on the actual outbreak by loot from *thanas* and treasuries. Arms, ammunition and instruments for cutting the telegraph wires and railways were collected, bombs manufactured and the material for making others got together. **A tricolour of red, yellow and dark blue was decided** upon as the revolutionary flag, the necessary materials purchased and a number of the flags made up. **This tricolour was to be the emblem of the unity, or common cause, of the Hindu, the Sikh and the Musulman; the red to represent the Hindu, the yellow the Sikh and the dark blue the Muhammadan.** In order to gain the sympathy of the people and to get recruits to the cause, seditious and revolutionary **leaflets and books** were to be widely circulated among the Indian troops and throughout the country, and for this purpose emissaries were sent to the various cantonments and elsewhere. 11 o'clock on the night of the 21st

February 1915 was the date originally fixed for the actual outbreak.

This date was, however, subsequently changed to the 19th February, as suspicion had fallen on **Kirpal Singh** (C.W.No17), who, with the objects of finding out and disclosing to the police all that was possible, got himself introduced into the conspiracy on the 12th of that month. Fortunately for India in general and the English community in India in particular, he was able to obtain information of the most valuable nature. This led to the arrest of a number of the conspirators, the discovery of arms, ammunition, bombs, material for bombs, flags and revolutionary literature, and above all, the frustration (for a time, at any rate) of the conspirators' diabolical plans. To Kirpal Singh's loyalty and utter disregard of danger we owe a deep debt of gratitude.

*Notwithstanding, however, that the conspiracy was scotched in February, **it was by no means crushed out of existence***. For in March 1915 active steps were taken at Meerut to bring about a rising there and the wholesale massacre of Europeans. But once again, on this occasion owing to the loyalty and pluck of Nadir Khan (C.W.No.18), now Jamadar, of the 12th Cavalry the plans of the conspirators were foiled. Thanks to Jamadar Nadir Khan, ten bombs, which had been provided by the notorious Rash Behari Bose for the traitors at Meerut, were secured on the 23rd March and further arrests made. Of subsequent developments and events, however, other than those in which the accused was concerned, there in no evidence before me. I shall, therefore, proceed to the evidence against him.

Among the emissaries sent from Lahore headquarter to the various cantonments with the object of seducing the Indian troops and obtaining recruits was one **Sucha Singh** (C.W.No.1).After visiting Meerut, Agra, Cawnpore, Allahabad and Benares he came, on the 10th February 1915, to Fyzabad. On arrival here he drove straight to the Native Infantry bazaar. **There, near the *Gurdwara,* he met the accused**, with whom he entered into conversation. He expressed a wish to buy some hot milk, whereupon accused took him to a shop in the bazaar. As no hot milk was to be obtained there, accused then took him on to his house, nearby. There accused gave him some tea to drink and asked him what had brought him to Fyzabad. Sucha Singh confided to him that a mutiny was imminent and that he was going about the country to give notice of it. He then produced, and proceeded to read out to the accused highly inflammatory passages from two revolutionary pamphlets, the *Ghadr di gunj* (of which

Exhibit A is a translation) and the *Ghadr Akhbar*. These apparently appealed to the accused, who asked Sucha Singh to give him the pamphlets. Sucha Singh, however, told him that he could not let him have the pamphlets then, but would supply him with copies later. Discussing the mutiny that had been arranged, accused said that he would "cut his name"; in other words, resign his post. Sucha Singh asked him why. Accused replied that on the occasion of the Mutiny of 1857 the Indian troops had been disarmed and killed and that he did not wish to meet with a similar fate. Sucha Singh, however, assured him that he had no occasion to worry, as he (Sucha Singh) would keep him supplied with information, to which accused said "All right; keep me informed". After telling accused that he would pay him another visit or else send someone else to him, Sucha Singh left the house and the same day left Fyzabad for Lahore, where he reported at headquarters that Harnam Singh of Fyzabad was prepared to join them.

A few days later Rash Behari Bose wished Sucha Singh to pay accused a second visit, but Sucha Singh declined, on the ground that he had to go to Umballa. It was then decided to send Sajjan Singh (C.W.No.2), to Fyzabad. Rash Behari Bose made over to Sucha Singh a number of copies of the *Ghadr Sandesa* and the *Aelan-i-Jang* (Exhibit D), as well as two of the revolutionary flags. One of these flags and a number of the copies Sucha Singh passed on to Sajjan Singh, with instructions that he was to take them and hand them over to Harnam Singh, whose house was near the *gurdwara* in the Native Infantry lines at Fyzabad. He at the same time told Sajjan Singh to inform Harnam

Singh that the mutiny would take place in a few days and to give him instructions that the mutiny was for their common good and that they should all join in it.

On this mission Sajjan Singh came to Fyzabad in mid-February. Going straight to the 9th (Bhopal) Infantry lines, he made enquiries for Harnam Singh and was shown where he lived. There is some discrepancy in the evidence as to whether accused was then at home, but one thing is certain, accused and Sajjan Singh had an interview at accused's house. Sajjan Singh started by asking accused whether he knew Sucha Singh, to which accused replied that he did.

Sajjan Singh then informed accused that he had been sent by Sucha Singh and placed upon the charpoy on which they were seated the bundle of leaflets, wrapped up in the flag, which had been given to him by Sucha Singh. One of the two opened the bundle. Sajjan Singh told accused to distribute the leaflets. He also told him that the mutiny was imminent and that, when it did break out here, he was to set up the flag and let people know that the mutiny was for the good of the whole of Hindustan. At this accused appeared to be perturbed and said that, if there was mutiny, he would be in a bad way as the regiment had gone to the war and there were only recruits in Fyzabad, form whom little or no assistance could be expected. He also said that he was a man with a family, who would be left alone, far from him, if he were killed, and that he would go home and see them. In about half an hour he returned, but without the leaflets. In answer to Saajjan Singh's enquiries as to what he had done with them be replied that he had made arrangements. The flag he put in a box. The same afternoon he applied for, and was given, ten days' leave. That night he and Sajjan Singh left Fyzabad and travelled together to Ludhiana. At Ludhiana station they parted, accused saying that he had to go to his home. He did not return to Fyzabad until four days after his leave had expired, but as to how he was occupied during his absence from Fyzabad there is no evidence.

On the 6th April, apparently as the result of disclosures made elsewhere, accused's house was searched in his presence and in the presence of Captain Irvine (C.W.no.6) (Commanding the depot of the 9th Infantry) and other witnesses by Mr. Denham (of the Criminal Investigation Department), Mr.Richardson (Deputy Inspector General, United Provinces) and Mr. Burton (C.W.no.20) Superintendent of Police, Fyzabad). On a shelf was found a copy of the *Aelan-i-Jang*

(Ex.B.) and in a box a strip of red worsted (Ex.B.) or serge. The house was then locked up and sealed by Captain Irvine. Next day, at Mr Burton's house, in the presence of Mr. Burton and the regimental *granthi,* Captain Irvine asked accused for the names and addresses of the two Sikhs who had visited him in February. On one of these slips (the other has not been brought on record) he wrote the name of Sajjan Singh, whose address he then gave verbally to Captain Irvine. On the 11th April, in consequence of information given him by the accused, Mr. Burton went a second time to accused's house, on this occasion expressly to search for what he found, a strip of dark blue material. He was accompanied by Captain Irvine and the search witnesses, but accused himself was not present. The seal placed by Captain Irvine on the house on the former occasion was found intact. In one of the boxes in the house was found a strip of navy blue worsted or serge. (Ex.C.)

The copy of the *Aelan-i-Jang*, (Ex.D) which was found on the shelf, is a copy of the same leaflet as is Exhibit K, one of the many copies found by Inspector Ahmad Khan of the Lahore Police in one of the houses occupied by the conspirators in that city, when searched by him on the 22nd February, and appears to have been made by the same duplicator. The red and blue material (Exs.B.and C.) found in the boxes exactly correspond, both in shade and texture, with the red and blue strips in one of the revolutionary flags (Ex.J.) found by Inspector Ahmad Khan on the same occasion. Exhibit C., moreover, exactly corresponds in length and breadth with the blue stripe in the flag, while Exhibit B. exactly corresponds with the red stripe in the flag, but is slightly narrower, a narrow strip having been torn off along one side.

Better corroboration of the evidence of the approvers and more damnaing evidence against the accused would be difficult to find. What became of the other leaflets made over to him by Sajjan Singh there is, with some solitary exception, no evidence. A leaflet was found on the 12th or 13th March by Hardit Singh, (C.W.no.12), a sepoy of the 9th (Bhopal) Infantry, as he was returning from the regimental latrines. Being unable to read it and thinking that it might have something to do with his company, he took it to his section commander, *Lance-Naik* Sundar Singh. Sundar Singh, on reading a portion and realizing that it was against the Government, made Hardit Singh burn it there and then. On the 6th April he reported the incident to *Subadar* Mange Khan (C.W.no.11) who in turn reported it to Captain Irvine. That none of the other leaflets have

been distributed by the accused, I say *distributed* by him, for, had he destroyed them, one would not have been found nearly a month later lying about near the latrines. If, on the other hand, they were not destroyed, how did he get rid of them if he did not distribute them to others?

Why, too, if he destroyed any, did he not destroy all? The presumption is that the leaflet found on the 12th or 13th March was one of those made over to him by Sajjan Singh; it is a certainty that that which was found in his house was.

The only other evidence against the accused that I need mention is that, on the 25th August, both Sucha Singh and Sajjan Singh successfully identified him in the jail in the presence of Mr. McNair (C.W.no.15), the District Magistrate.

Examined as to the evidence against him, accused had taken up a most foolish attitude. He admits that in February he saw Sucha Singh in the regimental lines near the *gurdwara*, but denies that he had any talk with him and says that he did not even go near him. The explanation that he offers of Sucha Singh's evidence is that he is a tutored witness and that it is possible that the regimental *granthi* may have said something to him. As to Sajjan Singh, he denies having even seen him; much more, that Sajjan Singh had any conversation with him or that Sajjan Singh gave him a flag and a number of revolutionary leaflets, or that he and Sajjan Singh left Fyzabad and travelled together to Ludhiana. His explanation of Sajjan Singh's evidence is that a person who had started such a storm ("typhoon") as had Sajjan Singh, was capable of telling any lie. He admits being present when his house was searched on the 6th April and says that he was told by the Sahibs that the copy of the *Aelan-i-Jang* (Ex.D.) and strip of red material (Ex.E.) had been found in it. How they came to be where they were said to have been found he, of course, professes not to know. What he wishes one to believe is that he left the key of his house with the regimental *granthi* when he went away on leave and asked the *granthi* to look after the things in the house and see that they were not damaged by white ants, his suggestion being that the leaflet and red material were put during his absence from Fyzabad where they were found a month or more later. As to the strip of dark blue material which was found in his house by Mr.Burton on the 11th April he says that he does not know whether it was really found there, as he was not present on that occasion. But he has the impudence to deny

that he gave to Mr.Burton, the information which led to this second search being made and to say, when asked for an explanation of Mr.Burton's evidence, that Mr.Burton would say anything to suit his case, or words to that effect. He has also had the folly to say that he does not remember whether he wrote on one of the slips handed to him by Captain Irvine for the purpose the name of Sajjan Singh, but he has not dared go to the length of saying that Captain Irvine and Mr. Burton have lied on this point.

The explanation he has offered in his attempt to account for the copy of the *Aelan-i-Jang* and red and blue materials found in his house is not only false, but is ridiculous. The *granthi* absolutely denies that accused left the key of his house with him when he went away on leave, and there is not the remotest reason to disbelieve him. Accused's suggestion that the *granthi* bears him a grudge as his (the *granthi's* house has been assessed to tax since he (the accused) became bazaar *chaudhri* is not proved to have any foundation in fact. The very fact that he says he left the key of his house with the *granthi* and asked him to look after his things while he was away on leave is sufficient indication that the *granthi*, so far from being his enemy or having a grudge against him, was his friend. Moreover, it must be remembered, it was not until a month or more after accused's return from leave that the copy of the *Aelan-i-Jang* and the red and blue materials were found in his house. The copy of the *Aelan-i-Jang* was found lying, unhidden, on a shelf. The materials were found among clothes and other things. Had they been put there by anyone else than accused, or without his knowledge, they must been discovered by him on his return from leave, and in that case why did he leave them there?

Note:— The remaining part of this documents was not made available despite of best efforts.

PROCEEPINGS OF THE
HOME DEPARTMENT, DECEMBER 1915.

Judgment in case of Harnam Singh.{Pro No. 463

2) Two Sowars of 8th Cavalry

REPORT REGARDING TWO MUHAMMADANS BROTHERS OF THE 8TH CAVALRY WHO RAN AMOK AT JHANSI AND KILLED THREE OFFICERS, AND ONE BRITISH SOLDIER AND WOUNDED ONE OFFICER AND A BRITISH SOLDIER

As per a report dated 28.6.1915 from Jhansi, some *sowars* of 8th Cavalry stationed there, had, under the influence of *Ghadrite* propaganda assaulted their officers. The army officers are working overnight to investigate the role of the assailants and their mentors. (1916 Home: Pol. Deposit, March: 1/113)

Telegram, dated the 1st July 1915

From: The Commissioner of Jhansi,
To: The Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

Your 1994. At 8 A.M., 28th June. Major Gale, 8th Cavalry, and Lieutenant Courtenay, Indian Army Reserve, when attending stables were attacked by two Muhammadan sowars of their regiment, one armed with a .577 pistol and a sword and the other with a sword. The two sowars were brothers from Moradabad district of whom one was to have gone to France with a draft same afternoon. He had succeeded in evading going earlier in the year by malingering. **Both were fanatically inclined** and had always kept aloof from their comrades, so at present it appears to me that the onslaught was not connived at by others. They came out from their quarters shouting the *Ghazi* cry and shot Gale from behind while he was examining a troop horse. He died very soon after. With him were three Muhammadan officers and Courtenay and latter trying to escape fell over a heel rope when both men attacked him with swords cutting his head open, cutting off both his hands and inflicting several other injuries from which he died same evening. The three Indian officers attended to Gale and called to the Regiment to bring their swords and lances. Five recruits turned up, but were kept off by the murderers threatening them. The two men then went towards officers' mess on the way meeting the

Adjutant, Captain Hudson, who was riding. One of them fired at him wounding him in the side slightly, whereupon Hudson dismounted and escaped by scaling a wall and went to Artillery lines where he gave the alarm. Meantime the two sowars proceeded to the mess where Colonel Chaplin was. He had been informed of occurrence by a Muhammadan officer. Receiving information that the men were approaching the mess he went out and called on them to lay down their arms. While he was talking to them he was pulled behind pillar of porch by a Muhammadan servant or officer in consequence a shot fired at him missed by a few inches. Chaplin had already sent Lieutenant Dacres and a **Jat** sowar for rifles which arrived soon after this, but there was further delay owing to absence of ammunition. The two sowars meantime went towards Artillery lines and seeing a gunner and a sergeant shot at both killing former and slightly wounding latter. They then went, towards Brigade office and meeting the Station Staff Officer, Captain Cooper, West Kents, whom they saluted, they shot him in the back and head after had passed them. He died at once. By this time Colonel Chaplin and Captain Kay, same regiment, arrived armed with rifles and accompanied by some of their own men. Some gunners also arrived. The two sowars were then shot dead. At time of attack on Gale, Kay was in lines of **Jat** troops, the Indian officer of which pushed him into stable for protection saying the Muhammadans are out. As soon as possible Kay fell in the Hindu squadrons, but did not permit Muhammadans to arm. This explains that Muhammadans did not assist in shooting the murderers though a number of them joined in the chase. ***Funeral of murderers was arranged for by police and was attended by some 500 city Muhammadans, but Regimental orders had forbidden presence of soldiers***. We have received information that attempt being made to fabricate evidence that Gale had abused the were sowars. The affair gave rise to intense alarm **in sadar bazaar** and city. Shops were closed and people fled. News of shooting of murderers spread equally quickly and confidence was re-established. All has been quiet since. Court of Enquiry is sitting. The rifle and ammunition used by murderers were purchased from Lyon, Calcutta, in February on pass given by Gale which pass was fraudulently altered so as to cover 125 instead of 25 cartridges. The draft which was to have left for France on 28th left on 29th.

The facts as reported by the Commissioner of Jhansi go to show that this most deplorable incident was confined to a fanatical attack by

two *brothers*.

The Commissioner does not say at what time the murderers were shot dead, but it seems surprising that two men armed respectively with rifle and a sword, and a sword only should have been able to remain at large to do so much damage before they were shot down. It will be seen that even when rifles were forthcoming there was no ammunition.

Disquieting features of the incident seem to be that only five recruits turned up when the Muhammadan officers with Major Gale appealed to the regiment for assistance; that 500 Muhammadans of the city should have attended (or been allowed to attend) the funeral of the murderers; and that attempts have been made to fabricate evidence to throw the blame for the incident on to Major Gale.

The conduct of the officer or servant who saved Colonel Chaplin's life, and even more so that of the Jat officers, and the fact that a number of Muhammadans joined in the chase of the murderers are reassuring features.

S.R. Hignel, — 1.7.15.

The telegram from the Commissioner of Jhansi is for perusal. It gives us the fullest information yet available and certainly looks more as if the outrage was the work of these two men and not of the outcome of a wider conspiracy. Probably the men were worked up to it while on leave. *I certainly do not understand how a public funeral of the murderers seems to have been permitted.*

H. Wheeler, —1.7.15.

The Military Court of Enquiry will no doubt show whether the Regiment as a whole did their duty. The ugly feature is the 500 Muhammadans attending the funeral. The murders must have been worked up while on leave, and this feature of the case requires enquiry. The disposal of the dead bodies of the murderers led to a sort of civil demonstration (P.15)

R.H.C. [Raddock], — 1.7.15

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Confidential. Murder of officers in the 8th Cavalry at Jhansi

Further enquiries made since the submission of my report of the 4th July have brought out the following facts:—

(i) That Ahmad Ali Shah, *alias* Jamal Shah *Kambalposh*, who was the Pir of the murderers, spent 24 hours in the Cavalry lines just before the murders were committed.

(ii) That the two murderers visited Ahmad Ali Shah in the evening of the 27th June, and again early in the morning the following day (the day on which the murders were committed) and took him away with them.

(iii) **That Ahmad Ali Shah has a considerable following in the Cavalry, and that certain of them must have known that Muhammad Saddiq and Muhammad Jan were about to attack their British officers.**

2. The circumstantial evidence collected goes to show that Ahmad Ali Shah not only knew that the murders were contemplated but aided and abetted them by offering the murderers spiritual consolation.

This man is the nephew of Nizam-ud-din Aulia, a well-known saint of Delhi, and he is also cousin of the *notorious* Hasan Nizami of the same place.

3. There is reason to believe that a sowar named Sher Muhammad and Muhammad Sadiq the second maulvi in the regiment, are aware of the Pir having spent twenty-four hours in the Cavalry lines.

4. The fact that the murderers when shot down were found in possession of dried dates with which to break their fast (roza) and a fair amount of cash, makes it look as if they had hopes from the first of escaping uninjured.

5. We know the names of some of the Pir's followers in the regiment and the next step to be taken is to see if any of them can be made to speak out. We can do nothing to this end except through the Colonel of the regiment and I am writing to him today on the subject.

6. I do not think we should ever be able to prove a criminal charge against Ahmad Ali Shah but there should be no difficulty in taking action against him under rule 3 of the rules framed under *the Defence of India Act*.

H.G. Richardson, — 6.7.15.

Dated: Dehra Dun, the 16th July 1915.

Copy forwarded to the Director of Criminal Intelligence, Simla, for information.

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Home 1916 Political: March, 469-491, Part A
(From No. 2/636 to 638)

Orders to put M00aulvi Ahmed Ali Shah of Nizzammudin, Delhi under house arrest were passed on 8.11.1915 under Rule 2 of the rules framed under the Defence of India Act.

Home **1918** Pol. A. Oct, No. 108-118 (1/330)

Ahmed Ali Shah, an associate of the two guilty *sowars* has been under house arrest at Nizzammudin, Delhi; these restrictions can now be removed by revoking the orders in question.

Demi-official letter from Captain C.W.G. Walker, Deputy Adjutnat General (Temporary) to H.G. Richardson, Esq., D.I.G. Police, United Provinces, dated Simla, the 14th August 1915.

General Aylmer, the Adjutant General, has asked me to write to you on the case of the murders of the British officers at Jhansi by the two sowars of the 8th Cavalry.

As a result of the Court of Enquiry, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has decided that:—

Jemadar Wazir Muhammad Khan,
Kot Dafadar Abdul Kayum,
Lance Dafadar Shakur Rahman Khan (Daroga),
Recruit Abdul Majid,
Recruit Israh Hassan,
Recruit Muhammad Shafullah,
Recruit Nur-ud-Din,
Recruit Gulam Mustafa Khan,
Recruit Abdul kayum,

should be dismissed from the service for the cowardice they displayed on that occasion.

Proceeding of the Home Department, July 1915 (Nos. 37-39)
Telegram, dated the 1st July 1915.

3) 7th Rajputs — *Ghadrites* (Benares Conspiracy Case):

(i) Drill Havildar Jaleshwar Singh: hanged

21 March 1916

Jaleshwar Singh, age 29, Height 5'-10" son of Shri Mohan Vir Singh, Rajput, R/o Asfabad Bada Sagwa, Dt. Unnao (U.P.)

While the regiment was stationed at Benaras, *Ghadrite* revolutionaries like Narendra Nath Banerji and Priya Nath Bhattacharya were able to win him over to the cause of revolution. Betrayed by an informer he was arrested. The army authorities **subjected him to *brutal torture* at their special cell in Delhi Red Fort to extract from him the intelligence regarding *Ghadrite* influence in military Cantonements.**

He stole an opportunity to escape from military custody on 2nd Feb. 1916; wearing him armyhalf-pants, and khaki woolen pullover, which was detected soon after. He went to a Mandir-cum-Handicappeds' Home, where a number of homeless destitutes — beggars are crowded and slept there.

The captors were on his heels and after searching for him inside the fort, the main police Kotwali at Chandni Chowk was put on alert, and police was desperately looking for him in every possible hideout. Next morning at 5 A.M., a large number the devout going for a holy dip in Yamuna started moving around the place. Taking advantage of the situation, Jaleshwar Singh too tried to escape by mixing among them, hardly aware of the fact that the police had been looking for him over the night. His military half-pants and the pullover betrayed his identity and he was soon nabbled, and brought back to the Red Fort. Tried in a General Court Martial he was sentenced to death on 28 Feb., 1916. On 20th March, military escort took him to the local Civil Jail, where he bore the identity No. 6285.

Following day, he was martyred in the early hours, dying hero's death.

References:

1) Chief Commissioner, Delhi File No 5.B, 1916, Fortnightly Report.
2) Delhi Jail 1916, Prisoner registration No. 2, 1916.
3) Home 1916, Pol. Deposit Feb. No. 24.
4) Home 1918, Pol. A Sept. 184.
(Source: Manuscript, Compiled and donated by Shri Phul Chand Jain, P.A. Section, National Archives of India, New Delhi.)

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(ii) Rikhraj Singh

Confidential D.O. No. 1048-C
Naini Tal, 27th July 1916.

My dear Hignell,

I am desired to report the following incidents for the information of the Government of India. On the 11th July the Officer Commanding the 7th Rajputs at Benares informed the Superintendent of Police that a sepoy named **Rikhraj Singh** in that regiment had for sometime been suspected of visiting the city without leave, and another sepoy named **Chandra Singh, who had been deputed to shadow him had reported that he saw Rikhraj Singh entering a house in Bengali Tola in Benares.** Chandra Singh pointed out to a sub-inspector of the special branch 4 houses in the city. One of these houses is occupied by a pleader called S.C. Ghosh who uses it for purposes of his practice but actually lives in the house of one **N. Banerji** who is an absconder in the Benares Conspiracy case. Ghosh appeared for one of the accused in the Benares Insurance Fraud case. The second house belongs to a Dr. Ganga Singh who is dead. His son is a student in the Queen's College and the family came from Amritsar. The third house is occupied by one Narayan Das alias Lallu, a sarraf, who has never been suspected. The fourth house is that of Manik Lal Chatarji, a silk merchant, who is also free from suspicion.

2. It was suggested to the Officer Commanding the regiment that Rikhraj Singh should be sent to the Superintendent of Police; but on the night of the 13th July the sepoy absconded. According to his roll he was enlisted by a recruiting officer at Lucknow. At the time of enlisting he gave an address in Fatehgarh where enquiries are being made. Four years

previous service in the Police department was declared. On joining the regiment Rikhraj Singh gave out that he was the son of *taluqdar*. He appeared to have **plenty of money** and he fed a number of recruits at his own expense. He was **enlisted on the 6th June 1916 and is reported to be generally well educated and to have some knowledge of English**.

3. Chandra Singh the sepoy who gave information also said that he had served in the police. He informed the Superintendent of Police that Rikhraj Singh had on at **least one occasion been taken from near the infantry lines in a motor car which Chandra Singh ws able to describe.** This car has been traced at the house of one **Panchanan Banarji,** son of the late Abinash Chandra Banarji in Benares. It appears to have been brought from Calcutta and has not yet been registered in Benares. Panchanan Banarji has a house in Sigra a village in Benares; but is a **zamindar of** Condalara in **Chandernagore**. So far no reply has been received from Bengal regarding Banarji. A C.I.D. sub-inspector has some recollection that in 1912 a suspect from Gondalpara was harboured in Benares by Abinash Chandra Banarji, but no confirmation of this can be traced in our records. The whole affair seems very suspicious, and enquiries are in progress the result of which will be reportted.

Yours sincerely,
Sd/-

The Hon'ble Mr. S.R. Hignell, I.C.S.,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Home Department.

4) Revolt in 113 Infantry: *Ghadrites*

This regiment, while it was stationed at Allahabad during 1916, two persons, namely **Nalini Kanta Ghosh** and **Aushotosh Kohli** were trying to incite revolt in the regiment; both were arrested in July, 1916.

(Home Pol. A, March: 568-572) (4/1611)

5) Burma Military Police – A Havildar found with revolutionary literature and dynamite

FEB. 1916

Ghadrites tried to incite revolt in Burma Military Police:—

As per a February 1916 report six young revolutionaries, having entered Burma, tried to incite revolt in th Burma Military Police Cantonment. Havildar Kirpa Ram has been put under arrest, from whom two pistols have been recovered. A lot of revolutionary literature and 4 lbs of dynamite explosives has too been recovered.

Upto interrogation, Kupa Ram had disclosed the ways in which they were incited for revolt, as a result of which a new kind of awareness got hold of our minds.

Police is actively investigating the entire matter.

(Home Pol. B. January 1916, 541-544, Monthly Report((1/254)

B) MISC.

1) 58th Rifles:
21 soldiers serving in France, deserted

No. H-4153.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
ARMY DEPARTMENT.

Simla, the 10th April 1915.
12th

To

The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and
Agent to the Governor-General,
North West Frontier Province.

Sir,

I am directed to inform you that intimation has recently been received that 27 desertions to the enemy have taken place amongst the *Afridis* of the 58th Rifles serving with the Indian Army Corps in **France**.

2. The cause is unknown but they apparently were on picket duty and all went off the same night.

3. The Officer Commanding the Depot, 58th Rifles, has been informed in accordance with paragraphs 38 and 39, Army Regulations, India, Volume II, but I forward a list of 21 of these men (the names of others not yet being available) with their father's name, clan, village and district for your information.

I am, Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
(sd) A.H.O. Spence
Major,

Depy. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

Copy of the above forwarded to:—
The Foreign and Political Department.
(A.G. Case No. 23968).

Major,
Depy. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

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1. Mir Mast Jamadar s/o Wada Mir, Clan: Kambar Khel, Vill. Bassivaria, Dist. Tirah.
2. Sarwar, *Havildar*, s/o Alwar Shah, Clan: Kambar Khel, Vill. Khahwaja Suk Shilohar, Distt. Maidan.
3. Guli Jan, *Havildar*, s/o Gul Zaman, Clan: Kowhar Khel, Vill. Tirai, Dist. Maidan.
4. Itbar Gul, *Naik*, s/o Shaudi Gul, Clan: Kambar Khel (Nekzam Khel), Vill. Hutav, Dist. Maidan.
5. Azam Khan, *Naik*, s/o Azad Khan, Clan: Kambar Khel (Mukram Khel), Hutav, Butan (?)
6. Bial Nur, *Sepoy*, s/o Nazir, Clan: Kambar Khel, Vill. Dorpur, Shiloher Tirah.
7. Baghi Shah, *Sepoy*, s/o Sher Ali, Clan: Kambar Khel, Vill. Kharzinadaud, Distt. Shiloher Tirah.
8. ….. Anwar, *Sepoy*, s/o Sher Haz, Clan: Kambar Khel (Moti Khel), Vill. Mastik Khel, Darbi Khel, Darwa.
9. Sar Gul, *Sepoy*, s/o Sarfaruz, Clan: Kambar Khel (Zana Khel), Vill. Darpur, Dist. Shiloher Tirah.
10. Mohamad Khan, *Sepoy*, s/o Sher Wali, Clan: Kambar Khel (Zana Khel), Vill. Daud, Dist. Shiloher Tirah.
11. Gul Didar, *Sepoy*, s/o Suleman, Clan: Kambar Khel, Vill. Daud, Dist. Shiloher Tirah.
12. Bedin Shah, *Sepoy*, s/o Gul Mir, Clan: Kambar Khel, Vill. Butan, Dist. Shiloher Tirah.
13. Mir Shah, *Sepoy*, s/o Nur Shah, Clan: Kambar Khel (Khiru Khel), Vill. Narboo, Distt. Maidan.
14. … Gul, *Sepoy*, s/o Nur Shah, Clan: Kambar Khel (Khira Khel), Vill. Narbao, Dist. Maidan.
15. ……, *Sepoy*, s/o Gul Zaman, Clan: Kambar Khel (Mut Khan Khel), Vill. Butan, Dist. Maidan.

16. Mohammad, *Sepoy*, s/o Nur Baz, Clan: Kambar Khel (Mut Khan Khel), Vill. Fachrapura, Dist. Kahu.
17. Zaria, *Sepoy*, s/o Adam Khan, Clan: Kambar Khel (Mota Khel), Vill. Butan, Maidan.
18. Mir Kazim, *Sepoy*, s/o Shah Zava, Clan: Kambar Khel (Mut Khan Khel), Vill. Mirzabi Khel, Dist. Maidan.
19. Madshah, *Sepoy*, s/o Lal Shah, Clan: Kambar Khel (Mut Khan Khel), Vill. Addli Khel, Dist. Narbar.
20. Baz Khan, *Sepoy*, s/o Wali Khan, Clan: Malakdin Khel (Kulla Khel), Vill. Daria, Dist. Maidan.
21. Sepet Shah, *Sepoy*, s/o Amal Din, Clan: Malakdin Khel (Kulla Khel), Vill. Lagga Tiga, Dist. Madan.

2) Revolt in 15th Lancers: 6 Sowars refused to go to war front

As per a report of April 1916, 15 Lancers regiment was ordered to attack Baghdad, Mecca and Medina, which are holy places of Mohammadons. The regiment refused to do so, due to which 6 sowars were punished.

(Home 1916 Pol. Deposit, May 7) (1/457)

3) 59 Rajput Rifles: 6 sepoys found inciting revolt

In this regiment while it was stationed at Jalandhar, six sepoys were arrested in August 1916 who were found to be inciting revolt. Of these two were sentenced to 7½ years of rigorous imprisonment and the rest to 5½ years each of the same kind of jail sentence.

(Home 1916 Oct. Pol. Deposit No. 28 Fortnightly War Report: Sept. 1916) (1/462)

4) 127 Baluchi Light Infantry: A Jemadar refuses to go to war front

Telegram P. (319).

From... The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

To... The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor General, N. W. F. P., Peshawar.

No. D.S.283, Dated the 8th, March 1915,

On the 17th February, at Karachi, trial by Summary General Court Martial was held over **Jemadar Anwar Khan**, belonging to 127 Queen Mary's Own Baluchi Light Infantry; charge against Anwar Khan was that of behaving, in a manner unbecoming to the position and character of an officer, when warned for active service; he was also charged with an omission prejudicial to good order and military discipline. Anwar Khan was found guilty by the Court and sentenced to be dismissed from the service. General Officer Commanding, Karachi Brigade, has confirmed finding and sentence of Court.

Anwar Khan is an Afghan, son of Abdul Ghafur, belonging to the village of Apozai, Post Office Matra, Peshawar District.

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(Copies sent to P.S.V., P.S.V.O., M.S.V., Army Deptt. and Lt-Col. Black, General Staff Branch.)

5) 17th Cavalry: Two sowars desert

No. H-4558,

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
ARMY DEPARTMENT.

SECRET Simla the 30th April 1915.

To

The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and
Agent to the Governor-General,
North-West Frontier Province.

Sir,

I am directed to forward for your information particulars, as in statement attached, of two sowars of the 17th Cavalry who are reported to be absent from their regiment on service with Indian Expeditionary Force "B".

2. The General Officer Commanding Force "B" states that there is cause for thinking they have **deserted to the enemy**.

I am, Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
Sd/- B. Hollway.
Brigadier-General
Secy. to the Govt. of India.

Copy of the above forwarded to:—

The Foreign and Political Department.

Major;
Depy. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

Army 33. (A.G.'s Case No. 23968).

Particulars of two Sowars of 17th Cavalary who are absent from their regiment on service.

Name	Father's Name	Residence	Particular
2093 Said Rasul	Fatteh Mohammad	Village Gadhia Khel (near Safed Thana in Kohat Pass), Transfrontier.	Hassan Khel, sub section of Adam Khel *Afridis*.
No. 175 Lazam	Mirzaman.	Village Ashokhell Transfrontier.	Shinwari

6) 27th Punjabis: 4 soldiers desert

Foreign & Political DEPARTMENT.
Frontier **BRANCH.**

File No.
Serial No.

HEADING Confidential
~~*No.*~~ D.O.
Delhi 11th March 1915

To

The Hon. Lt. Col. Sir George
Roos Keppel, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.
C.C. & A.G.G., N.W.P.

Dear Sir George,

I am desired to let you know that a report has been received from the General Officer Commanding in Egypt to the Effect that, on the night of the 27th/28th December, four *Khattaks* of the 27th Punjabis deserted from Kantara. Their names and numbers were,

4093 S. Masaffar Khan
4554 Ghazan Khan
4690 Awal Khan
126 Sailana Khan

The residence and father's names of the first three have not been communicated. Sailana Khan's father's name is Arsala Khan, Seni Khattak, of Makorah, Police Station Teri, Kohat district. (Arsala Khan is said to gave been a havildar in the South Waziristan.

Instantly they were put under arrest. They were Court Martialled and sentenced to death. But as the first three were executed, the death sentence of the fourth (SAILANA KHAN) was commuted and was sent back to Bombay. His case was reviewed after the end of the war since his father was serving as a Havildar in South Wazirastan Malta.

(Foreign and Political, 1915 Frontier B. October 86-89 (1/478).

III. COUNTER MEASURES

1) Property Confiscation — March 1916

CONFIDENTIAL. D.O.No. 898-Political.
HOME DEPARTMENT.
Delhi, the 7th March, 1916.

Dear Kettlewell,

In connection with proposals at present under consideration for the confiscation of the property of Indian soldiers who have deserted doubts have been expressed whether orders of forfeiture passed against their property are in practice capable of enforcement. I am accordingly to request that with His Honour's permission the Government of India may be informed at an early date, in which of the cases in the *Lahore Conspiracy case*, in which the accused were sentenced to forfeiture of property, the orders were set aside by the local Government and in which they were carried out; also whether any difficulties were experienced in the carrying out of the orders of forfeiture and if so, what were their nature, or how were they overcome. This particular case is taken as the most recent known instance in which orders of forfeiture were passed on a considerable scale, but the question whether practical difficulties arise in enforcing such penalties is really of a general character.

Yours sincerely,
Sd/-H. Wheeler.

A.B. Kettlewell, Esqr.,
Additional Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

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D. O. No. 110 Mily 1.
Punjab Civil Secretariat.
Dated Lahore, the 14th of April 1916.

My dear Wheeler,

Please refer to your demi-official letter No. 898-Political, dated the 7th March 1916, on the subject of the confiscation of the property of persons convicted in the *Lahore conspiracy case*. The sentence of forfeiture of property was passed on *52 accused* in that case by the tribunal, but was remitted by the Local Government in 21 cases.

It will be observed that the special tribunal in passing orders of forfeiture restricted their application to such property as is liable to confiscation, a qualification, which would normally exclude ancestral property for the reasons already set out and discussed in the correspondence ending with Home Department [LA Janigh 120-121] letter No. 60 dated the 9th January 1909 to this Government. In order to test, if possible, the validity of the view taken in this point by the Chief Court, the Lieutenant Governor directed that *test cases* should be selected and the land possessed by the convicts confiscated and sold by auction. In two cases therefore, viz., those of **Bakshish Singh** (No.7) and of **Lal Singh** (No.49) the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar has attached the land owned by these convicts and is *about to sell it by auction*. So far no difficulties have been experienced, and probably none will arise until the reversioners institute suits to set aside the forfeiture as against themselves.

In cases in which ancestral property is not involved no… difficulties have so far come to notice. The order of… forfeiture is carried out by the District Magistrate of the district in which the accused resided and the property is… seized and sold, but no report of any difficulty having arisen in any particular case has so far reached Government. Further enquiry is however being made and the result will be communicated to the Government of India in due course.

Your sincerely,
As Kiwaaae

To,
The Hon'ble Mr. H. Wheeler, C.S.I., C.I.E.,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Home Department.

2) Preserving Troops' Loyalty — January 1920

SECRET

NOTES.
POLITICAL DEPOSIT — JANUARY 1920.
No. 76.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE SUBJECT OF PRESERVING THE TROOPS FROM DISLOYALTY.

Letter from A. C. Blunden, Esq., Chief Intelligence Officer, Headquarters Meerut Division, to Sir William Marris, dated Mussoorie, the 23rd June 1919.

I wonder if you will mind my worrying you in the subject of preserving the troops from disloyalty. It is a most important subject and (so far as I have seen since working here) it has hardly been considered by the Military authorities. The attached letter is very vague and contains nothing but commonplaces I am afraid. I have written lengthy notes, some of which have been circulated in the Division, but I feel that it is a matter which should be and probably has been only the results have not been passed on to local officers) taken up by Government; so I hope you will excuse my writing direct to you.

Letter from A.C. Blunden, Esq. Chief Intelligence Officer, Headquarters 7th (Meerut) division to Sir William Marris, no. nil, dated Mussoorie, the 23rd June 1919.

I hope you will not mind my writhing to you direct—Since I took over as Chief Civil Intelligence Officer here (I am on Military duty) I have been trying to deal with the general question of preserving the troops from **contamination**. Usually it seems to be considered that the *chief thing to do is to prevent outside agitators from getting onto the regimental lines, but I think there are many more insidious means by which unsound ideas can be spread among the troops, whom it is quite impossible to shut off from all outside influences, e.g., they read newspapers, hear rumours*

and discuss things with all kinds of people when out on duty or away on leave. It seems to me that *what we should aim at is the training of the troops to think reasonably (Sic!) on current affairs* we ought to educate them (though their British Officers, who as a class are I think surprisingly ignorant of public questions, and regard all politics as sedition) not to take an active part in political movements, but to know what is going on so that they will not be deceived by every disaffected person they may come across and by every bazaar rumour they may hear. If in the Regiments we could conduct **a quiet propaganda** we should be building up a useful class of men who when they get back to their homes would have a healthy influence and tend to overcome the evil that is caused by public affairs being entirely in the hands of the **lawyers** class.

Here I think we could do a great deal, e.g., by arrangement with the *United Provinces War Journal,* which is now becoming a popular educator, we could have **suitable literature** distributed and discussed among the troops. But what is necessary is a word from Army Head-Quarters recognising the facts of the present situation and showing **the difference between legitimate political activity and seditious movements.**

We have just received from Army Head-Quarters a draft Military Intelligence Scheme, which seems to show that Army Head-Quarters have not yet grasped the problem. This scheme is very rough indeed, and simply aims at creating a system of intelligence working through agents of the untrained *Khufia* constable type. This merely adds to our sources of information a few spies who will probably succeed in causing suspicion and find out nothing that could not be done equally well by Regimental Officers, if the latter were made aware of their responsibilities and given enough information on general affairs to enable them to take *an intelligent interest in the thoughts of their men*.

I am afraid I cannot explain fully without writing many pages probably you have the whole question under consideration. It seems to me essential to take it up? Certainly, for the whole Army (not as is being done here, for one Division?) if real good is to result.

This letter is from a young United Provinces policeman who had some short experience of the Criminal Investigation Department two years ago. I think he is probably right and that the problem needs tackling on systematic lines. I think I might ask him in the first instance to send me his notes. We shall have to go warily with Army Department and I would not approach them on these papers alone.

W.S. Marris,—24-6-19.
W.H.V (INCENT),—24-6-19.

Demi-official letter from Sir William Marris, to A.C. Blunden, Esqr., Chief Intelligence Officer, 7th Meerut Division, Mussoorie, no. 1341, dated Simla, the 26th June 1919.

Many thanks for your letter of June 23rd. the question you raise is of course primarily for the Army Department; but it has considerable interest for the Home Department, too, and is closely connected with a number of other questions with which we are dealing. Personally I think you are on the right lines, and, if you will, I should be glad if you would send me copies of the notes you speak of which you have submitted to the local military authorities.

Letter from A. C. Blunden, Esqr., Chief Intelligence Officer, Head-quarters Meerut Division, Mussoorie, dated the 27th-28th June 1919.

Thank you very much for your letter (no.1341 of yesterday). I am of course very pleased to hear that you consider there may be something in the idea and I hope these "notes" may be useful. I am sorry not to be able to send you typed copies of them all.

The Divisional General, is taking up the *United Provinces War Journal* for the troops and we hope to give the Editor material for special articles for Indian troops.

I should also like to mention the views of Mr. Sands on the whole question of **protecting** Indian troops—he specially emphasizes the importance of **avoiding the least show of distrust**, the necessity for the most extreme caution in enquiries affecting the troops, and the need for educative work (for officers as well as men) which he regards as "the first principle and the last."

I am sending the following papers:—

1. Copy of note circulated to officers with covering memorandum.
2. Manuscript note to General Officer Commanding.
3. Copy of report on an incident of tampering with the troops.
4. Copy of report on Intelligence System in the Meerut Division.

Our weekly intelligence notes are at present giving only very elementary information on current politics, so I am not sending copies.

I hope some of these papers will be useful to you.

Memorandum from Lieutenant-Colonel K.D. Murray, General Staff, Meerut Division, no.0504-1-G., dated Mussoorie, the 9th June 1919.

The attached notes are issued in continuation of no. 47407-17-2-G. of 2nd May 1919, not with the object of laying down hard and fast rules, but to give General Officers Commanding some general idea of the lines on which it is desirable for Officers Commanding units to work, in order to prevent the dissemination of sedition in their units. At the present time many depots are commanded by young officers; often from the British Service, who have not had the experience necessary to enable them to understand the needs of Indian Troops, and the dangers to which they are exposed in the present troubled times. Depots offer more favourable ground to agitators than Regiments, for men are continually coming and going and consequently far more exposed to outside influence. It is desirable that General Officers Commanding should have informal meetings of Officers Commanding in their Brigades and discuss the points dealt with in these notes, supplemented or modified by their own experience. It is hoped that in this way Officers Commanding will be enabled to get into closer touch with their men to find out what they think, and to help them to form sound opinions on current affairs and preserve a healthy tone in the unit.

The Divisional Commander desires the weekly confidential report from all Officers Commanding on matters affecting their units and information which they may obtain, to be as full and interesting as possible.

The reports will be forwarded through Brigade Headquarters.

General Officers Commanding are requested to add a brief note of the general situation in their command, and to forward the Officer Commanding reports in original, to Divisional Headquarters, so as to arrive on Saturday in each week.

Interests of Indian Soldiers.

1. In the Regiment—
   Work, Pay and Promotion.
   Games.
2. Outside—

Family.
Property.
Religion.
Politics.

With Indians, generally, family ties are very strong; Indian soldiers have usually a certain amount of property, which is often heavily encumbered, and the influence of religion is immense among all classes of Indians. An agitator wishing to rouse the common people, invariably appeals to one or more of these interests. It would probably be said that the Indian people generally care nothing for politics; nor do they, for *politics in the abstract*, *but they directly they are persuaded that their own interests are affected any political question, they roused at once, e.g., the possibility of the terms of peace being considered by Muhammadans as injurious to their religious rights, is particularly important at the present time.*

2. Influences to which Indian Soldiers are subject.

1. In the Regiment—
   Discipline.
   Regimental tradition.
   Racial (Sic!) Martial traditions.
   Personal influence of officers who are known and trusted.
   Experiences of men who have been abroad.
2. From Outside—
   Letters from home touching family property and religious interests.
   Men returning from leave, possibly having been approached by disaffected persons while away.
   Bazaar rumours.
   Newspapers.
   Outsiders, coming into lines.

3. All the influences inside a well ordered regiment are for good, and can be strengthened by judicious action by the Officer Commanding, who should make every endeavour to gain the confidence of his men, by intelligent sympathy, impartially, readiness to listen to all views, *and above all not appearing to depend solely on one Indian Officer.* Each Commanding Officer should have as many sources of information as possible. The men should understand that they as well, as their officers and the British Troops are soldiers of His Majesty the King Emperor, *who trusts them implicitly and* has shown his trust by giving them training and equipment, rifles and ammunition. They

should think of the Government, *as their own Government*, of which they are part and which is working for the real good of the whole country.

4. British Officers should make a point of conversing with their men. Men who have been on service overseas are always delighted to talk of their experiences to sympathetic listeners, and it will be found that *a few months army training has a wonderful effect on quickening the intelligence of the dullest rustic recruit*.

5. An *alarmist letter from home* will worry the best soldier. Men on leave are subjected to various influences, many of them *pernicious*. Bazaar rumours are notorious, and many of the *Indian Newspapers* are prone to exaggerate grievances and attribute dishonest motives to the British in India. These disturbing influences can be overcome by British Officers talking freely to their men on all subjects. All Officers should have a thorough knowledge of recent political developments in India to enable them to educate their men on sound lines.

6. The apparent indifference of the average Indian Officer or soldier to matters political is largely due to the fact that he imagines his *Sahib* would not like him to show an interest in such matters, and this is liable to make him think all political activity must be anti-British, and should be kept secret; but if the *Sahib* shows himself prepared to discuss and argue, the men will soon be led into a *healthy frame of mind*.

7. Outsiders can be kept out of the lines by co-operation with the Civil Police. All men must know that it is their duty to report the presence of unauthorized strangers. The conditions of life in an Indian regiment are such, that practically *nothing can be kept a secret*. If an outside visitor comes, many men will know at once, and a man cannot disappear even for a few hours without his absence being known.

8. It is most important that none of the men should harbour a grievance; men who feel that they have been unjustly treated are the most likely to fall a prey to the wiles of agitators. Officers should invariably try to have the matter out with any man who is punished, or passed over for promotion, or who may fancy himself slighted in any way. Men should be led to understand that it is to their British Officers that they should bring their troubles with the certainty of a fair hearing and a straight forward explanation.

9. For all this it is obvious that more than a smattering of the vernacular is essential, and Officers Commanding should insist on all their British Officers being able to express *themselves freely in language* that their men can understand. They should also be acquainted with the most important

religious ceremonies and social customs of their men.

10. In the hot weather when out-door work has to be reduced to a minimum, Commanding Officers should try to prevent their men from being bored with life and attempt might be made to teach every man to read and write; informal talks, in the presence of a British Officer, on current events, and discussions in which Non-Commissioned Officer and men could freely join, might be found useful.

11. The gist of the above hints and suggestions, is that the British Officers, in an Indian unit, must be the trusted adviser and friend of his men, if his influence is to be felt.

He should therefore make himself acquainted with questions of current topics affecting the men's interests, or which they think affect their personal interests, in order that he can explain to them questions on which they are liable to be led astray.

Note.

While in Naini Tal last week I discussed the whole question, of protecting the troops from *seditious influences*, with the Hon'ble Mr. Kaye. Inspector General of Police, and with Mr. Biggane, head of the special Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department.

Mr. Kaye told me of his experiences in 1897, when there was a general feeling that there might be trouble among the troops. It was found that attempts by outside agents or disguised police officers to obtain information of what was going on *inside* regimental lines were quite ineffective. Mr. Kaye said that the civil police would be unable to do anything useful in the matter of ascertaining the feeling in regiments, and he could not undertake to arrange for any secret police officers to work inside the lines. In any case he said it would be worse than useless to send anyone but a man of very special qualifications only an exceptionally clever detective with a very wide knowledge of military affairs could possibly avoid giving himself away, and the result of it becoming known that Government spies were working in Regiments would be most unfortunate. The Criminal Investigation Department are unable to place any officers at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding and they are averse to interfering in any way with the internal arrangements of units for bringing matters of importance inside the lines. Of course the general responsibility for keeping suspicious outsiders out of regiments is fully recognized. The Criminal Investigation Department watch

prominent agitators, and in every cantonment there is a strong force of civil police whose duty is to prevent undesirables from obtaining access to the troops. In this work military police are also engaged.

But a really dangerous agitator would be careful to avoid suspicion by assuming some *innocent guise* such as that of a *religious mendicant or fortune-teller* which would give him access to the lines. He might pose as, and might actually be, the *relation* of some officer or soldier through whom he would become acquainted with men likely to agree with his views. It would be practically impossible to check such people except with the good will of the men in the regiment. It will be remembered that the Meerut case in which bombs were found in the 12th Cavalry lines was discovered by one of the *sowars* in the regiment.

Besides the danger from agitators actually getting inside the lines there is the ever present danger of men being approached outside the lines in the bazaars, at places of amusement, as picture palaces, or even when they are out on duty, at railway stations, etc.

Other influences to which men are exposed were discussed in my first note which has been circulated for general information. There is also the danger from *returned prisoners of war* who may have been seduced while abroad.

Generally it may be said that the outside seditionist is only one of the dangers against which we have a guard—the civil police are fully alive to their responsibility in this matter but there are also the questions of preventing the troops from being affected by any general feeling of unrest and hostility to the British Government. This matter I discussed with the Chief Secretary to Government, United Provinces, who agreed that it is a real danger. He said it is quite impossible for the troops to be kept entirely segregated from and unaffected by, the opinions of the outside world, and he thought something might be done by co-operation with the United Provinces Publicity Department (I am communication with the Editor, *United Provinces War Journal* but I doubt if this question, which affects the whole of India, can be satisfactorily taken up by one Division alone) to spread sound ideas.

The substance of all that I heard from United Provinces officials is that Regimental officers should be able to ascertain what is going on in their units and protect their men from seditious ideas.

3) Tabulated Statement of attempts to tamper with Indian Troops' Loyalty — 1920-21

12. 27.5.20 1) Blunden's Note 2. A.G. 023077 Int: Sit: Rpt: 1349 Part II. (Notes) p. 73 North Cmd: 30.5.20.			Servant of a British Officer *en route* from Bombay mistaken for Sepoy and spoken to by agitators who attempted to induce him to leave the Army. (By Flag 62).
2) 3. 30.5.20 Punjab S.A.		Ferozepore	Speech by Abdul Haq.
3) 24. 1.6.20 A/G 023077 pps. 76/78		Jullundur	Sowars of Cavalary Regiment refused to take their pay. C.C.I.O. reports this was the result of efforts of agitator.
4) 23.a. 17.6.20 A.1135		Kohat	Seditious pamphlets received in lines of 22nd Punjabis.
5) 23. 24.6.20 A. 1135		Jullundur	Seditious pamphlets received in lines of 51st Sikhs.
6) 18 & 74 August '20 'Hijrat' Case 1435 p. 37 p. 43 (Circular let: from 'Chief') p. 39, 48, 93. 14.8.20		The 'Hijrat' Movement	Pensioned officers called *'Kafirs'* for wearing medals (2) *Mullahs* preaching and giving out false statements regarding occupation and desecration of the Holy Places of Islam by British troops. (3) Three Newspapers: the 'Moslem Outlook', the 'Bande Matram'and the 'Siyasat'all published false statements about 59th Rifles, inciting other Sepoys to desert and join *Hijrat*.
7) 41 1468 11.9.20GS		Bighyanand *alias* Sadabhal Singh arrested at Dinapur for attempting to tamper with the troops. (Had pamphlet about lectures to troops). Probably a regular agent.	
8) 55. Case 1318 20.10.20		Asmas	Large number of Urdu notices received in N.W. Punjab calling on Indians to make use of the arms they have to free their country from the British (Notice published by provisional Government of India).
9) 22. 19.11.20 A.1155.		Peshawar	An ex-I.O. visited lines of 1/26th Punjabis and attempted to get the Subedar Major of that regiment to join him in a seditious conversation. This finally becomes case of one man's evidence against another's, although Court of Enquiry have their doubts about the I.O.
10) 57. Decr. '20 Punjab C.I.D. 28.1.21		Nagpur	False and exciting statements concerning ex-sepoys.
11) 7. 5.4.21 W.S. R.O. Benares. 28.11.20		Partabgarh	Reported that an Indian student was trying to obtain help in enlisting in the Indian Army with the intention of seducing the troops.
12) 43. April '21. R.O.		Lucknow	Recruiting officer reports serious effects of non-cooperation on recruiting.
13) 44. April '21. R.O.		Rajputana	Recruiting office reports non-cooperation agitation interfering with recruiting._____ put up.
14) 53. 5(a) 25.4.21. Kohat. Northcom: Int: Sit:Rpt: 312/9		Hoshiarpur	Sepoys on leave find difficulty in purchasing things from the big shopkeepers unless they promise to adopt a rebellious attitude toward their officers, etc.
15) 54. 25.4.21 N.Cmd.Int.Sit.Rpt.		Kohat	There is a clique in the City who incite Sepoys to mutiny.
16) 60. 25.4.21 N.Cmd. 25.4.21 Rpt. by Officer.		Amritsar	False statement by a Sikh saying he had seen a Sikh have both his arms cut off by a British soldier in an aeroplane-shed because he had expressed his dislike of the British.
17) 51. 26.4.21. C.C.I.O. Lahore		Lahore	Secret meeting of Siromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee passed resolution that Sikh should continue to serve Government till their services be required by the Akalis.
18) 24(a) April 1921. A.G. 023077. p.181		Umbala	Two Khilafat volunteers entered the lines of the Cantonment and sold Khilafat notes there. They were allowed to go away owing to the late arrival of the police to whom the affair was reported.
19) 52. 9.5.21. Jullundur Bde.		Jullundur	Men of the 45th Sikhs ridiculed at their homes for serving in the Army.
20) 47. 28.5.21. Peshawar Dist. Regt. 18.6.21		Peshawar	A Subedar reported that a man (possibly a Turk) offered him employment in Gandhi's army and asked him to carry out propaganda among sepoys.
21) 49 b. Kohat Dist. May 1921.		Kohat	**Certain Sikhs of certain regiments owing to injunctions received, refuse to cease to wear the *black pagri*.**
22) 37. Bombay S.A.-461(2) 4.6.21		Karachi	District Magistrate reports an agitator was seen to accost and talk to two sepoys of 9th the Gurkhas to whom he made statements of a seditious character.
23) 30 June 14.		Bombay	Seditious resolutions passed & published by the All Indian Congress Working Committee.
24) 45. R.O. 14.6.21		Dehra Dun	**Letters about non-co-operation & taking possession of Gurdwaras, found in Sikh Gurdwara.**
25) 34. 19.6.21 Bombay S.A. 25.6.21		Belgaum	Conference of Belgaum District, passed resolution forbidding Mahommedans to help British Govt. against Angora Government.
26) 38. 25.6.21 Madras P.A. 25.6.21		Madras	The 'Tamil Nadu'of June 5th applauds two Sepoys punished for working for Rohilkand District Conference and suggests disloyalty as correct attitude of Indian Army.
27) 48. R.O. June 1921.		Lucknow	Recruiting officer reports ex-sepoys being persuaded not to enlist.

4) Tampering with Indian Troops' Loyalty — Dec. 1922

SECRET

File No. 44 of 1923.
Part I.
Serial Nos. 1-4 & K. W.

NOTES.
(Political)

Demi-official letter from Sir GEOFREY DE MONTMORENCY, K.C.V., C.I.E., C.B.E., Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy, to the Hon'ble Mr. J. CRERAR, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S., dated the 25th December 1922 (Confidential).

His Excellency desires me to inform you that he has received a private and personal telegram from the Secretary of State giving his reasons for the issue of his official telegram no. 4943, dated 21st December, and its tenor. In the former communication among other things the Secretary of State mentions that allegations of tampering with the loyalty of troops have been published and excited considerable attention at home; and that *inter alia* a communiqué concerning explusion from cantonments issued by Government of India on August 14th has given rise to the impression that attempts to tamper with the loyalty of soldiers in India can be made with impunity.

For these reasons His Excellency considers that the reply to the official telegram will require to be framed with care and should meet and dispose of the implication that the Government of India have been careless or supine in the matter. He would like to see the draft reply before it issues.

TELEGRAM FROM THE SECRETARY FOR INDIA, DATED THE 21ST DECEMBER 1922.

This Department has since April 1920 impressed upon local Government the desirability of taking vigorous action against persons found tampering with the loyalty of the troops. In this connection please

see —

(i)* [*K.W.] Letter to local Government, no. 983, dated the 23th April 1920.

(ii)** [**K.W.] Letter to local Government, no. 1022, dated the 28th April 1920.

(iii) Letter to local Government, no. 2163, dated the 12th June 1920. [Poll. Dep., June 1920, no. 72]

(iv) Minute of a Departmental Conference held in June 1920 on the subject culminating in the issue of letter no. 2795, dated the 3rd July 1920. [*Poll. A., 1921, nos. 341-354.*]

(a) ……. The papers in the subject were passed to Director Intelligence Bureau, who formed the opinion that there would be no reasonable probability of securing a conviction in any of the cases. As Director, Intelligence, Bureau, is being separately consulted by Secretary, Home Department, General Staff Branch will not go into further details in this regard.

(b) Whether soldiers affected are court-martialled or dismissed? Yes. The following is a list of cases of Indian Non-Commissioned Officers and men dealt with for disaffecting during 1922:—

Month	Station	Unit	Action
February	Jullundur	14th Sikh and 19th Punjabis	12 men court-martialled.
April	Dera Ismail Khan	28th Cabalry	2 court-martialled of whom I dismissed after imprisonment
May	Loralai	20th Punjabis	3 dismissed
May	Idak	36th Sikhs	2 court-martialled and dismissed.
May	Quetta	27th Sikhs	1 dismissed.
June	Piaza Baghza	57th Rifles	15 court-martialaled, all imprisoned and dismissed
August	Bombay	45th Sikhs	1 court-martialaled, all imprisoned and dismissed
August	Mesopotamia	15th Sikhs	1 court-martialaled, all imprisoned and dismissed
September	Quetta	C.I.H.	1 pensioned; 1 dismissed.
November	Deolali	Indian Platoon of K.O. Y.L.I.	1 court--martialled.
		Total	45 cases

3. Paragraph 3 of Mr. Gwynne's note of 3rd January, as regards an appreciation of the extent to which attempts at subversion have been made and of the extent to which they have been successful:—

(a) The total of the attempts as recorded by the General Staff are in —

1920 . . . . . 30 cases
1921 . . . . . 82 cases
1922 . . . . . 59 cases

The general staff have roughly classified the various attempts and a perusal of this classification may be interesting: it stands as follows:—

Year	Seditious pamphlets and notices.	Seditious newspapers.	Seditious letters.	Furtive agitators.	Open agitators	Speeches *fatwas*, etc., by Mullahs, Maulvis, Granthis and Sadhus	Efforts by *Khilafat* Committees.	Publications, etc., by *Parbandhak Committee*.	Recuriting obstruction by non-co-operators and others	Village and Railway boycott and annoyance.	Anonymous and various unclassified attempts	Totals
1920	6	2	1	7	3	3	…	…	1	1	6	30
1921	15	5	2	21	4	…	6	2	8	8	4	82
1922	26	2	4	7	…	5	…	11	…	4	…	59
	47	9	9	35	7	13	6	13	9	13	10	171

A glance at this record indicates the *elusive nature of the majority of the attempts*. That there has been and still is a deliberate campaign directed against the loyalty of the sepoy the figures leave no doubt. But the campaign is waged in a *cunning manner* which affords, but few targets for attack and these mostly elusive. The pamphlets and letters are practically all anonymous, the individuals who personally try and get at the men do so on a furtive manner and with the notable exception of the successful proceedings against the Ali Brothers in 1921 cases which *have been taken up have in practically all cases failed for want of satisfactory evidence*.

The forces directing the campaign are thus obviously well versed as regards avoidance of becoming implicated, a notorious example of which is that afforded by the **Parbandhak Committee**.

On more than one occasion have the General Staff obtained evidence which has raised hopes of getting action taken against this organization, which may be confidently regarded as responsible for no less than 42 out of the 45 Court-Martial cases detailed in paragraph 2 above, but on each occasion the General Staff have been disappointed by being told that the institution of proceedings would be hopeless — usually by reason of the fact that the publication of letter in question was unsigned or could be argued to have a *double meaning* or through some similar method of evasion.

(b) As regards the extent to which attempts at subversion have been successful, it will be convenient in this regard to divide the Indian Army into certain classes against which agitation has been directed on separate lines, viz., *Mohammedan troops*, against whom *Khilafat* agitation has been mainly directed. Sikhs, who have been the target for the activities of the Parbandhak Committee: *Gurkhas*, as regards whom a definite campaign has been carried on; and the remaining classes all of whom have been subject in one way or another to non-co-operation propaganda.

(i) As regards *Mohammedans* the General Staff have no evidence to show that any definite harm has been done. Recruiting continues to be satisfactory. In the event of a very severe strain, such for instance as hostilities against Turkey, sporadic cases (of the nature of which the Mesopotamian Campaign afforded examples) would probably occur, but it is believed that the main bulk of Mohammedan soldiers are not sufficiently interested in Khilafat matters to be adversely affected.

(ii) As regards *Sikhs* the list of Court-Martial cases in paragraph 2 above proves the **Akali agitation to have been and still remain a serious matter**. The General Staff are of opinion that the main bulk of the rank and file take little interest in the matter, but there is no doubt that a certain number of individual soldiers, *notably among the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks*, are affected and are convinced that the Government are in the wrong over the Gurdwara question.

(iii) No effect appears to have been produced in the cases of Gurkhas.

(iv) Little if any effects of any importance are believed to have been produced by the efforts of non co-operators against the remaining classes of the Indian Army.

4. As regards the reference to counter-measures in paragraph 3 of

Mr. Gwynne's note the following are the main lines on which these have been undertaken:—

(a) Tours by selected British Officers.
(b) Constant activities by British recruiting officers both, personally and through the agency of Indian officers and Non-Commissioned officers, specially placed at their disposal.
(c) Distribution of leaflets.
(d) Articles in the Press.
(e) Discussion in the pages of the "Fauji Akhbar" of current political topics and answers by the Editor to all correspondence on political matters.
(f) Lectures sent to Indian Officers Associations.

5. As regards Mr. Crerrar's reference to communication of information by Commanding Officers to local civil authorities:— in case where the source of trouble is in or in the vicinity, of the station of the Commanding Officer concerned, the matter is dealt with direct contact between the Commanding Officer and the local civil authorities. In other cases the mater is reported through the usual channels and actions is taken where feasible, but as a general rule this action does not take place until arrival of the case at Army Headquarter. The question of whether such action can be expedited is now under investigation by the General Staff.

6. In conclusion the General Staff take this opportunity of recording their opinion with regard to what would constitute the most effective action against subverters of the loyalty of the troops. To the General Staff the punishment of the various petty agitators, seditionists, boycotters, etc, who annoy or attempt to seduce the sepoy although desirable does not appear to go to the root of the matter.

The actions against the Ali Brothers and against Gandhi was such as the soldier could understand and appreciate as it was directed against the "big men": it is for this reason that the General Staff feel disappointed that none of the evidence so far forthcoming has been found sufficiently strong to justify action against the Parbandhak Committee, whom they consider directly responsible for the fact that over 30 Indian soldiers are now undergoing sentences of imprisonment or have been expelled from military service.

Seen by Adjutant-General who agrees.

W. H. BEACH,—9-1-23,
Colonel.

Home Department.

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Director Intelligence Bureau's reply is now awaited. He should see the Army Department notes for information and the favour of early return with his remarks on the case.

J. CRERAR,—10-1-23.

Director, Intelligence Bureau.

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Seen with thanks, and returned.

C. KAVE,—11-1-23.

Secretary of State's reply to our enquiry regarding our 'telegram of November 6th has been received. Has the telegram been traced?

J. CRERAR,—12-1-23.

Colonel Kaye, C.S.I., C.I.E.

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The accompanying note* [*below] gives details of the action taken in specific cases of relative importance. The great majority of the cases recently brought to our notice have been instances of the distribution of the propaganda leaflet, of the *Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee* which are, in practically every instance, issued by the 'Secretary'— unsigned by any individual. As stated in paragraph 3 of Mr. Hare Scott's note, the Punjab C.I.D. are collecting evidence, of the nature, with a view to *preparing a case against the Committee as a whole*, as well as against prominent individual members of the Committee is so far as they are parts of that whole — so far as I know, no definite information, at any rate of a nature admitting of legal proof has been obtained against any of the members of the Committee in their individual capacity. I understand that the number of cases included by the General Staff Branch, in their appreciation, makes a formidable total: and the Secretary of State might reasonably ask how it happens that, on so large a number, it has not been found possible to bring even one instigator to justice. The answer is, that the very great majority of cases are those of propaganda

leaflets, for the issue of which no one individual can legally be held responsible: and that it has not been possible to bring home to any individual the part played by him in their distribution— a number of enquiries set on foot to attempt to identify the handwriting of persons addressing covers in which such propaganda was sent out, having proved abortive. The total also, of course, includes all kind of attempts—including many which are, in fact,—though it would be impolitic to say so— trivial: the obvious retort would be that no attempt on the loyalty of the Army can properly be described as 'trivial'.

C.KAYE,—11-1-23.

The General Staff Branch have prepared a note giving their appreciation of the situation and detailing the cases that have come to their notice. We are to supplement this by giving information as to the action taken.

2. The General Staff Branch pass on to us all the reports they receive from Commands and Units, and we in turn address the provincial C.I.D. concerned regarding any case which appears to call for enquiry of action.

3. As the Government of India know the S.G.P.C. have been flooding the country especially the Punjab, with their propaganda and the majority of the papers referred to us by the General Staff Branch consist of communiqués, circulars; notices, etc, etc, issued by the Committee. The cumulative effect of this propaganda is to excite religious feeling and disaffection against Government amongst Sikhs, and the S.G.P.C. have relied on this to influence the serving soldiers rather than to make any direct attempt to tamper with their loyalty. The result is that their individual productions have contained nothing tangible on which legal action could be taken, *and direct reference to the Army has, as a rule, been carefully avoided.* In September last when the propaganda was particularly active, I discussed the situation with Mr. Isemonger, Deputy Inspector General, C.I.D., Punjab, and it was arranged with the consent of the General Staff Branch to pass on to him up a case against the S.G.P.C. and if there was sufficient evidence to put it up to the local Government and press for action. There the matter rests so far as the S.G.P.C. is concerned.

4. As a result of their propaganda, cases have come to notice where individuals and discharged soldiers have addressed letters or sent copies of the S.G.P.C. circulars to their friends and relations in regiment. The letters quoted in the summary referred to by the Secretary

of State are of this nature. These were passed to the Punjab C.I.D. for enquiry. In forwarding the letter addressed to the Subedar- Major of the 93rd Burma Infantry I noted "I doubt if any action is possible on this letter. It purports to be from the Amritsar Khilafat Committee but bears no signature." I have quoted this because the remark applies to several documents that have come to our notice; and in cases that have been taken up failure has been due to the inability to trace the writer or distributor of a leaflet.

5. Apart from the activities of the S.G.P.C. very few attempts to tamper with troops have come to notice.

6. I give below the cases in which action has been taken and an attempt made to trace the offenders —

(1) In 1921 a *fatwa* against enlistment in the Army was distributed in Jhansi. The case was taken up by the United Provinces C.I.D., and a prolonged enquiry was made in co-operation with his Bureau which led to no result as sufficient evidence was not forthcoming regarding the writer and distributor of the *fatwa*.

(2) In November 1921 in Ajmer 7 persons who were signatories to a *fatwa* directed against service in the Army, were prosecuted under section 108, Criminal Procedure Code, and on failing to furnish security were committed to prison for one year.

(3) In July 1922 a *fatwa* addressed to the Subedar-Major of the 83rd Walajabad Light Infantry, and the case was taken up by the Madras C.I.D. Here again the enquiry proved fruitless as the writer of the *fatwa* could not be traced.

(4) In July 1922 the General Staff Branch brought to our notice a circular relating to the **Nankana Tragedy**, which was issued by Uttam Singh, Secretary of the Khalsa Dewan, Burma, to the Rangoon and Maymyo Gurdwaras which are frequented by Sikh soldiers. This was referred to the Burma C.I.D. who were asked to take legal advice and to take action if possible. The Deputy Inspector-General, C.I.D., Burma, replied — "I referred the question as to whether a prosecution of Uttam Singh under section 124-A, Indian Penal Code, would be successful or not. The Legal Remembrancer says — section 124-A is very wide, and the passage referred to by the Central Intelligence Bureau, about the prayer for the

removal of the unjust Government, can perhaps be held to come under it; but looking to the document as whole it does not seem to be its intention to create disaffection, the removal referred to need not necessarily be violent, it was probably the writer's intention to pray that God will by his divine power awaken a sense of justice in the minds of those whom he believes to be unjust, or something of that sort rather clumsily expressed. I should say the chances of a successful prosecution are not assured, and would depend very much on the personal equation."

"I consulted the Chief Secretary about his prosecution, and His Honour to whom the case was referred is also not in favour of a prosecution."

I have quoted this opinion at length as it seems to me to apply to many of the productions of the S.G.P.C. which are largely tinged with religious sentiment.

H.V.B. HARE-SCOIT, —11-1-23,
Deputy Director, Intelligence Bureau.

The telegram has been received. The telegram of the 6th of November referred actually to one dispatched from here on the 5th* [*Poll. File no.914 of 1922 and also K.W.] and relates to the Sikh situation. No wonder we found some difficulty in understanding the reference. The arguments mentioned relate to the reasons for not arresting the members of the Shrimoni Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee.

2. I put up a draft reply to the Secretary of State's telegram.

3. Secretary will no doubt speak about the case when he visits His Excellency, in view of Private Secretary's letter of the 25th December. The Press *Communique*, to which reference is made in that letter, is put up. Secretary will perhaps explain the contents of Mr. Burdon's note to His Excellency. The official telegram does not give any ground for referring of this *Communique* and we do not know the contents of the private and personal telegram.

C.W. GWYNNE, — 13-1-23.

The draft may be approved.

J.CRERAR, — 13-1-23.

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NOTE:—

1935 to 1939

Attempts made by Kirti Party activists to spread revolt in troops posted at Meerut, in Punjab and Delhi. The following army units were affected:—

1. 25 Motor Transport Company, Meerut
2. Central India Horse, Meerut
3. 3rd Division Signals, Meerut.
4. Indian Central Transport Company (I.C.T.C)
5. 49 Motor Transport Company Secundrabad.
6. 10/2 Punjab Regiment Training Centre,
7. Motor Transport Depot, Chaklala (Rawalpindi)
8. Other sympathizers in the Indian Army.

(Home 1940 Pol. 215/40 (8/134)

IV. POSTSCRIPT

An Irish Martyr on Indian Soil: Executed on 2 Nov., 1920

On 28 June 1920, men of the Connaught Rangers stationed at Jullundur in north-west India politely informed their officers that they no longer intended to obey orders. Angered and disturbed by accounts of atrocities committed by the Black and Tans in Ireland, and sensitive to the similarity between their own military role in India and that of the British troops in Ireland, they announced that they would be ready to serve the King only when Ireland had been granted independence.

James Daly

Two days later, 20 miles away in the hills at Solon, another detachment of the Connaughts followed their example. The ringleader there was Private James Joseph Daly, a mild, well-educated 20-year-old with strong Republican sympathies.

Since the regiment was on active service, each of these incidents was tantamount to mutiny. Yet at both barracks the 'mutineers' continued to hold parades and to treat ail the officers and NCOs with courtesy and respect. As a pledge of their intentions not to use violence, both groups agreed to disarm, and to let the officers place a guard over their rifles and ammunition while they waited for the troops who had been summoned to relieve them.

At Jullundur, it was three days before this transfer of power took place. When it did, everyone involved in the mutiny was marched away to a barbed-wire compound hurriedly erected in a field some two miles away. They were told that their protest against the British Government's policies in Ireland would be given due consideration. And even at this late stage, strenuous attempts were made urging them to return to duty.

Some agreed, but 47 refused.

Meanwhile, at Solon, rumours that the other group of mutineers had all been massacred began to spread. Against his better judgment, James Daly was persuaded to try to reclaim the rifles they had handed over. Together with 27 others, he advanced towards the magazine. The guards immediately opened fire, two men were killed. And when the Royal Sussex Regiment marched into the camp, Daly and the others were placed under arrest.

Eighty-eight Connaught Rangers mutineers were finally brought to trial. A few were acquitted. The majority were given prison sentences of up to 15 years. Fourteen were condemned to death, but the sentences were later commuted to life imprisonment – all except Daly's. Singled out because of his leading part in the events at Solon, he was executed and buried in the military cemetery in the Simla hills.

One of the few witnesses to the mutiny still alive today is the widow of Captain Carney, then regimental doctor at Jullundur. 'My first reaction, when I heard what was happening, was t*o take out the trap and drive down to the barracks to look at the green-white-and-gold tricolour they had hoisted.* I wanted to see history being made!'

But her early excitement soon Rave way to dismay. 'Although my husband felt some sympathy for the stand the boys were making, he thought their action was foolish. But there can be no excuse for the way they were treated afterwards. The state of the men imprisoned in the compound was appalling. They were kept there under canvas, in the burning heat, with no latrines and very little water. My husband, as medical officer, sent in three reports to headquarters protesting that the conditions were inhuman. He told me that he wouldn't even treat rats like that.' Mrs Teresa Maher, one of James Daly's sisters and the only surviving member of the family, has equally bitter memories of that time. She was 18 when her brother died, and she remembers how her parents first heard the news. 'He wrote a last letter to my mother from prison. Up to that, we only knew that there had been some trouble, but we had no idea he was going to be executed. The first we heard of it was when his letter came. The English Government hid it all. By the time the letter arrived, he was already dead.'

She still lives in Tyrrellspass, the small village in County Westmeath where the family was brought up. In the living-room of her bungalow, the walls are studded with photographs of James. The most striking one among them was taken shortly before the execution; he looks straight

out at the camera, and one glimpses something of his determination – he refused from the start to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court which tried him.

From an old shoebox containing other memorabilia. Mrs Maher produced her brother's last letter home and then his prayer book, opening it at the 'Prayer before the High Altar' (a prayer before death), and pointing to the dark bloodstain on the pages. Daly, a devout and practising Catholic, *was reading from this prayer as he faced the firing squad.*

'He was never a violent man,' she said. 'His three brothers were all serving in the British Army, and it was reading the letters they sent us that made Jim want to go as well. When he first joined up, he was under age. Mother had to go and get him out of it. But he only went and joined up again a year later.'

Two of the brothers were killed in the First World War. The third – William – was also a Connaught Ranger, and he was one of the band of five men who first hatched the plans for passive disobedience at Jullundur. But he withdrew early on, convinced that the course of action they proposed would be useless. 'My own brother', commented Mrs Maher, 'he backed out of it. Not that I want to blame him. But he would never talk about it afterwards.'

Judged strictly in historical terms, William Daly was probably right: the mutiny was no more than a futile gesture, motivated by strong emotion but never likely to further the cause of Irish independence. Almost 60 years on, however, it is Jim Daly who is remembered. In Tyrrellspass, where a memorial now stands in honour of all those who died 'that future generations of Irishmen might be free', he has taken on the status of a martyr.

In 1970 his remains were brought back from India and buried in the local cemetery. The money was raised through a private subscription scheme to which most of the village contributed. Phil Fagan, who owns the general store, makes no bones about the depth of feeling that Daly's name can still evoke. 'My God, there was such a crowd of people! Daly dominates everything round here. We're very proud of him. It doesn't end in 1920, you see. Men from the Connaught Rangers called here when they came back from India: his grave was tended. But in the end we managed to bring him back.'

The recent death at an advanced age of Mrs. Teresa Maher of Tyrrellpass, Co. Westmeant, was an event which probably did not cause much talk in influential Irish political circles, and even less perhaps in British corridors of power then working itself up about the issue of capital punishment. Yet when this kind-hearted widow was laid to rest in the same graveyard as her brother, Jim Daly, in the small Westmeant village, it marked the end of another living link between the historic sacrifice of one man, the freedom of Ireland and the downfall of the British Empire.

Jim Daly, a native of Co. Galway, was a soldier in the British Army. A private in the Connaught Rangers, one of the "Irish" regiments in the service of the Crown who had distinguished themselves throughout most of the Colonial wars of conquest in the 19th and right into the 20th century with such a reputation for courage of the cold unthinking type that the British always like to see others who fight on their behalf, that they had earned the reputation of being "The Devil's Own". Recruits to the "Connaughts" were not drawn exclusively from the deprived province, but the vast majority of the regiment was always drawn from the West, and midlands generally, and usually from the sons of poor, mainly Catholic and frequently Irish-speaking peasantry or small towns people whose prospect of employment were bleak at home and for whom the Queen's Shilling and the Connaught Rangers was just about the only readily available avenue up and away from their surroundings if they wished to see the world.

The Connaughts served in various wars and in all corners of the Empire, including India, then still the big jewel in the crown of British colonial conquest, that by 1914, covered one fifth of the land-mass of the globe.

And it was in India, as the Irish War of Independence began to hot up, in the Summer of 1920, that Private Daly and some other members of the Connaught Rangers took part in what was to become one of the few mutiny efforts in the British Army in modern times and an incident then already being seriously contested back home.

Men of the First Battalion of the Connaught Rangers, stationed at Jullundur in the Punjab had by the end of June 1920, began to get stories from home about the way the Black and Tans were dealing with the Irish people whose claim to nationhood as declared by the First Dail in 1919 was being ignored by the British Government. Instead of taking note of the 1918 General Election result, which Sinn Fein had won hands down, before proceeding to establish an independent Irish Dail, repressive elements like the Black and Tans and the "Auxies" were brought into the

country as the long-established Royal Irish Constabulary lost grip of the situation through resignations or being shot, by the I.R.A.

IN THE NAME OF THE KING

But the professional soldiers of the Connaught Rangers could no longer tolerate what was being done by other British troops to their own people at home, while they themselves were being paid to keep the Indian natives in check. Thus on 28 June, 1920, they marched into their guardroom and announced: "In protest against British atrocities in Ireland, we refuse to soldier any longer in the name of the King."

The mutiny spread to a second pocket of resentment originally, but did not last long and was soon suppressed. *Its real significance was to highlight internationally once again the growing chorus of opposition to British Government involvement in Irish affairs.* And that at a time before other big international stories of the time before other big international stories of the time like the death on hunger-strike of Cork T.D., Lord Mayor and I.R.A. leader, **Terence MacSwiney**, or the hanging of Kevin Barry, the U.C.D. Medical student, who went to his death on 1st November, 1920, because he would not reveal the identity or inform on the comrades in return for a pardon from his torturing interrogators. This was some three weeks before Dublin's Bloody Sunday when Michael Collins' 'hit squad' effectively eliminated the major part of the British counter-intelligence system in the city. A week or so later, on the 28th November, 1920, Tom Barry and the Third West Cork Brigade won a significant victory, not over the Black and Tans but over the widely-feared crack-force, The Auxiliaries, at Kilmichael, Cop. Cork, and the course of the Anglo-Irish War looked likely to turn against the British.

It was in the context that the execution of Private Jim Daly in far-away India on **2nd November, 1920,** is to be judged. Some 350 members of the Connaught Rangers had joined the original protest in June. Later they laid down their arms saying they were willing to accept arrest. In the months that followed some 62 were court-martialled and given various sentences from two to twenty years in prison. About half a dozen of the *leaders were sentenced to death but in the end, the only person actually executed was Jim Daly, the man from Tyrellspass, who, ironically enough, had done more than most to keep bloodshed to a minimum during the mutiny itself.* But such an effort involved a leadership role and so Daly was singled out for execution in the end.

The British, at that time, had learned the lessons of 1916 and large numbers of executions were ruled out. However, mutiny within the British Army was something which the authorities particularly feared, especially in far flung and always restless corners of the Empire, like India. And so at the beginning of 1920, as Kevin Barry was hanged in Dublin, Private Jim Daly was executed in far-off India for the same basic cause.

Before his execution on 2 November, 1920, Private Daly wrote as follows:

"My dearest Mother, I take this opportunity to let you know the dreadful news that I am to be shot on Tuesday morning, the 2nd of November. What harm, it is all for Ireland. I am not afraid to die, but it is thinking of you I am. That is all: if you will be happy on earth I will be happy to Heaven. I am ready to meet my doom. The priest is with me when needed so you need not worry over me.

I am the only one of 62of us to be put out of this world, but I am ready to die."

Needless to say, communications in those times were not what they are today and Jim Daly had gone to his reward a long time before his family back in Ireland got a letter from British Army H.Q. confirming that their son had been shot for mutiny. The letter was only one of a series of items which Jim's sister, Teresa, cherished all her life. The sad, almost apologetic, tone of the officer's note with the bad news was impressive as was the decision of the officer who supervised the execution to enclose the butt of the last cigarette Private Daly smoked on this earth with the communication. It was something which Mrs. Maher kept in a glass on the dresser of her kitchen for years and years until it finally disintegrated into dust.

The British authorities at the time made it quite clear that there would be no question of bringing back Jim Daly's remains to Ireland, even if voluntary subscriptions were made towards the cost. And so the body of Jim Daly lay buried in the Simla Hills in Dagshai military cemetery in India — grave murder 340 — for all of 50 years. Then, in 1970, on the 50th anniversary of his death, the Irish Government, through the good offices of the Indian Ambassador in Dublin, co-operated in the life-long efforts of Mrs. Teresa Maher and other members of the Daly family to get the remains home. They were buried in Tyrellspass, on 2 November 1970, just 50 years after the event.

END OF THE RANGERS

The fact that India had since become independent, no doubt, had been a help in getting the release of the remains, and the Irish Minister for Finance at the time of the negotiations, early in 1970, Mr. Charles Haughey, was particularly helpful. By the time the remains actually arrived back in Ireland in November 1970, however things had taken a somewhat dramatic course here in Ireland as well. Mr. Haughey had been sacked from office by the then Taolseach Mr. Lynch and had to stand a court trial in connection with alleged Arms importation efforts, charges on which he was, of course, found not guilty.

The mutiny in India in 1920 marked not only an important event in the mounting international pressure on Britain to negotiate with Sinn Fein about Ireland. It also probably contributed to the decision to wind up the Connaught Rangers as a fighting unit of the British Army two years later. Those who had been sentenced to jail terms for their part in the mutiny received very harsh treatment at the outset, but in 1922 an agitation for their release organised by Colonel Maurice Moore, Captain Stephen Gwynn, General Sir Bryan Mahon and other Irish officers and ex-officers of the British Army, was successful. Many of the Connaught Rangers themselves felt bitter because while they had lost all career benefits from the British Army, their contribution to the Irish struggle for freedom by revolting against the Crown way out in India in the crucial summer of 1920, got little recognition from the Irish Free State that came about as a result of that struggle. Eventually, the Irish Government did grant the mutineers an Army pension like other I.R.A. Veterans of the Black and Tan period. But the sum paid in each case was calculated on the number of years they had spent in the service of the British Army before revolting! Yet another example of an Irish solution to an Irish problem, no doubt!

80 YEARS AFTER HE WAS EXECUTED, IRISH SOLDIER'S MEDAL BACK IN COUNTRY

THE CONNAUGHT Rangers medal, the cross and the frayed prayer book, are back in India nearly 80 years after a young Irish soldier James Daly was executed by the British Indian Army for mutiny against the Empire.

The memorabilia (the prayer-book contains pages with Daly's fingerprints smeared in blood) have been brought back by Irish journalist and biographer Nollaig O'Gadhra, who is now on a visit to India. "It was on Nov. 2, 1920 that Daly was executed in India, a day after 18-year-old Kevin Barry, a student of the Dublin University, was hanged under the new emergency regulation for his role in the Irish uprising against the British." said Mr O'Gadhra.

A week earlier, on Oct 25, 1920 Terence MacSwienuy, the Lord Mayor of Cork, died after a 73-day hunger strike, an event which had a profound impact on India.

"Ireland was the first British colony", said Mr O'Gandra. "Anything the British did in India was first done in Ireland. Four hundred years ago, they cut down trees in Ireland so that ships for the British Navy could be built."

Even the deployment of the Connaught Rangers, manned entirely by Irishmen, illustrated the British policy of downright exploitation of a helpless people. The regiment was first brought to India to fight the 1857 sepoy uprising, which came to be regarded as the country's first War of Independence. Typical of the British, the Irish Rangers were sent to the most inhospitable areas of the hot northern plains where English officers and men did not want to be deployed.

The Rangers mutinied in June 1920 and when the revolt was finally quelled, 100 of them were court martialed. Twenty of them were sentenced to death, but the sentences were commuted for all except the young James Daly.

Fifty years after his execution, the Indian Government sent home Daly's body, the result of a sustained campaign by then member of Irish Parliament David Andrews. Bodies of three other Irishmen were also sent home at the time.

Daly's body was buried in Tyrrells, County Westmeth, and therein lies the story of how Mr O'Gadhra came to possess the memorabilia. He did a radio documentary on the young soldier who paid the supreme price for his defiance of the British and Daly's sister presented the Connaught Rangers medal, the cross and the prayer-book to Mr O'Gadhra in appreciation.

There was a fourth item of the memorabilia, part of a cigarette that Daly had smoked just before his execution. For 50 years, the cigarette butt had been kept in a glass case. When Daly's sister took it out to present to Mr O'Gadhra, it just disintegrated.

(*Indian Express,* 14 Sept. 2003, Dharminder Kumar)

SINN FEIN AND *SWARAJ*

Between history and amnesia, searching through the rubble of events which are neither metaphors nor memories is tough. In the sleepy hills of Solan and sweltering plains of Jalandhar the spectre of Easter Rebellion stalked frightened British minds in 1920.

The keen eyes of Barkat Masih — the fifty-something caretaker of Dagshai graveyard — are reassuring. Definite, resolute lines of his face waver and settle into a stirred expression, as he hears names of Daly, Miranda, Sears and Smyth: "*Woh fauji jinhon ne baghawat ki thi* (you want to know about the soldiers who rebelled)?"

Now imagine Jalandhar cantonment in June 1920. There was ferment in the barracks as news of atrocities by British forces 'Black and Tan' back home filtered through soft Irish brogues. Soldiers of Ist Battalion of Connaught Rangers, also called The Devil's Own, known for their bravery as well as obduracy, gathered in groups and mulled over the news of torture and hangings at home.

Soon, steeped in the *Sinn Fein* spirit, the soldiers bought lengths of cloth from the local market and got down to stitching the Irish tricolour. On June 28, 1920, five men refused to take orders from the British officers and served notice saying they won't serve the King until the British forces left Ireland. About two hundred soldiers joined them later. It did not take more than three days for the British forces left Ireland. About two hundred soldiers joined them later. It did not take more than three days for the British to stamp out the rebellion. The mutineers were taken prisoners in inhuman conditions before they were shifted to Dagshai.

Solan smouldered as the news of mutiny soon reached another detachment of Connaught Rngers stationed there. Rumours were afoot that the British had massacred all Irish soldiers in Jalandhar. Under the command of Private James Daly about 70 Rangers refused to parade and wore *Sinn Fein* colours in rosettes. Private Daly, 21, of Tyrrelspass. County Westmeath, acted as their spokesman. Though they gave up arms, later one night Daly reconsidered their decision and with his companions attacked a magazine. The British retaliated. Sears and Smyth were killed in firing while others were taken prisoners. Now Royal Sussex Regiment had taken command.

Daly and his companions were arrested. Finally 88 were brought to trial. Some were acquitted, most were giving prison sentences up to 15 years and 14 were condemned to death. Except Daly, sentences of others were commuted to life imprisonments. Daly faced the firing squad in Dashai prison on November 2, 1920.

Privates Sears and Smyth were buried at Solan while John Miranda, who had died in prison, and James Daly were buried in Dagshai graveyard. Remains of Sears, Smyth and Daly were taken back to Ireland in 1970.

You wade through the waist-high grass, reading every epitaph that has survived, pull out grass to peek at the stones; there is no Daly no Miranda, only fear of snakes slithering in the grass. The Irish saga turns out to be not only a victim of history, but also of nature.